AGENCIES AND ARBITRATION

Daniel T. Deacon*

This Essay examines the roles that federal administrative agencies have begun to play in response to the rise of private arbitration, particularly in the consumer and employment contexts. Such agency actions have included enforcement strategies designed to mimic the effects of private litigation when such litigation may not be possible due to the presence of arbitration agreements. And, in some cases, they have involved regulatory responses, including...

ABDICATION AND FEDERALISM

Justin Weinstein-Tull*

States abdicate many of their federal responsibilities to local governments. They do not monitor local compliance with those laws, they disclaim responsibility for the actions of their local governments, and they deny state officials the legal capacity to bring local governments into compliance. When sued for noncompliance with these federal laws, states attempt to evade responsibility by arguing that local governments—and not the state—are...

The traditional portrait of the administrative state often features the politically-appointed agency head at its center: the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, for instance, or the Secretary of the Department of Labor. This picture of bureaucratic power, however, is incomplete. For much of that power is, in fact, subdelegated within the agency. The implication is that decision rights are often exercised not by statutory delegates,...

PHANTOM RULES

Catherine T. Struve*

Introduction The Judicial Conference of the United States is charged with “carry[ing] on a continuous study of the operation and effect” of the national rules of court procedure promulgated under the Rules Enabling Act. The cycle of rulemaking regularly produces amendments that super­sede or abrogate rules. Do the now-dead versions of a rule have any […]

Introduction Pressure is building again for Congress to reform patent law. Various proposals would reduce patent-litigation costs through fee shift­ing, delaying discovery, or allowing manufacturers to defend suits on behalf of their customers. Eluding consideration, however, is one simple change that might eliminate millions or even billions of dollars worth of waste across the entire […]

This Essay challenges a central narrative in the history of Anglo-American business by questioning the importance of the corporate form. The Essay shows that the corporate form was not, as we have long believed, the exclusive historical source of powers such as limited liability, entity shielding, tradable shares, and legal personhood in litigation. These powers were also available throughout modern history through a little-studied, but enormously...

The United States taxes both corporations and shareholders on corporate profits. In principle, the United States could rely on only one of these taxes, as many commentators have suggested. Although choosing to tax the corporation or its owners may seem like taking money from one pocket or the other, this Essay emphasizes a key dif­ference: These taxes prompt different planning. Relying on one or the other mitigates some distortions and leaks,...

Administrative law presumes a neat system of agency rulemaking and adjudication followed by judicial review. But the reality of the administrative state departs starkly from this model. One such departure is the use of audited self-regulatory organizations (SROs)—private organizations comprised of specific industries that formulate binding law to regulate themselves. Although SROs operate subject to the oversight of federal agencies, their power...

Bankruptcy judges consider both value to creditors and harm to employees in deciding whether to liquidate or reorganize firms. This Article proposes to systematize what is currently an ad hoc trade-off by making bankruptcy law explicitly counter-cyclical—that is, placing more weight on preserving employment during times of high unemploy­ment. Although the suggestion that bankruptcy law should consider em­ployment effects runs counter to decades...

THE EQUIPOISE EFFECT

Bert I. Huang*

This Essay explores an overlooked way to use the remedy of dis­gorgement in torts, contracts, and regulation. It begins with a reminder that disgorging net gains does not force the liable actor to take a loss; by definition, it allows him to break even. As a matter of incentives, it places him in a sort of equipoise. This equipoise effect has a logical up­shot that might seem counterintuitive: Substituting disgorgement for any other remedy, part...