THE JURISDICTIONAL LIMITS OF § 1782

THE JURISDICTIONAL LIMITS OF § 1782

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1782, U.S. district courts have jurisdiction to provide discovery assistance for foreign proceedings. That jurisdiction is based, in part, on whether the discovery target “resides or is found” in the relevant district. Recently, federal courts have disagreed on the standard for meeting that requirement. This Note argues that a faithful construction based on the statute’s text, Congress’s intent, and the broader system of transnational litigation warrants reading the requirement as extending to the limits of personal jurisdiction consistent with due process. This Note also examines the history and current practice of discovery assistance and reviews the lessons that they offer for § 1782 litigation today.

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Introduction

Commentary on § 1782 nowadays mostly hovers around two schools of thought. Traditionally, the statute’s 1 28 U.S.C. § 1782. hallmark has been that it gives federal courts broad discretion to assist with the gathering of evidence for use in proceedings abroad. 2 See Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 260, 264 (2004) (Ginsburg, J.) (observing that § 1782 “leaves the issuance of an appropriate order to the discretion of the court” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting S. Rep. No. 88-1580, at 7 (1964))). This traditionalist, liberal approach to § 1782 furthers Congress’s twin aims of providing efficient assistance to litigants in foreign proceedings and encouraging reciprocal assistance. 3 See In re Banco Mercantil del Norte, S.A., 126 F.4th 926, 930 (4th Cir. 2025) (citing Intel, 542 U.S. at 252) (identifying the statute’s twin aims); In re Letter of Request From the Crown Prosecution Serv. of the U.K., 870 F.2d 686, 690 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (Ginsburg, J.) (“The congressional purpose to ‘liberalize[] existing U.S. procedures’ is not in doubt . . . .” (quoting S. Rep. No. 88-1580, at 7)); Hans Smit, American Assistance to Litigation in Foreign and International Tribunals: Section 1782 of Title 28 of the U.S.C. Revisited, 25 Syracuse J. Int’l L. & Com. 1, 9 (1998) [hereinafter Smit, American Assistance] (“The purpose of Section 1782 is to liberalize the assistance given to foreign and international tribunals.”). More recently, however, commentators have lamented the rise of excessive uses of § 1782 that, in their view, unduly burden stakeholders. 4 See Yanbai Andrea Wang, Exporting American Discovery, 87 U. Chi. L. Rev. 2089, 2098 (2020) (“[Section 1782’s] most pressing shortcoming is its failure to include and to provide due process to the appropriate actors.”); Shay M. Collins, Note, The Death Knell and the Wild West: Two Dangers of Domestic Discovery in Foreign Adjudications, 122 Mich. L. Rev. 127, 133 (2023) [hereinafter Collins, The Death Knell] (“In practice, . . . district courts grant wide-ranging and exorbitant § 1782(a) orders and do so with almost unbounded regularity.”); David Rubinstein, Note, Judicial Assistance as Intended: Reconciling § 1782’s Present Practice With Its Past, 123 Colum. L. Rev. 513, 515 (2023) (describing multinational corporations’ use of the statute for nonlitigation purposes as “an abuse of the judicial power vested in the federal judiciary and a departure from Congress’s intent behind § 1782”). This line of commentary reflects practical concerns that certain actors may be abusing American discovery and that federal courts risk becoming complicit in that perversion. 5 See Euromepa S.A. v. R. Esmerian, Inc., 51 F.3d 1095, 1105 (2d Cir. 1995) (Jacobs, J., dissenting) (explaining that an expansive approach risks “interfer[ing] with [foreign] discovery practice and clog[ging] the [foreign] court with the random harvest of the American discovery”); see also Heraeus Kulzer, GmbH v. Biomet, Inc., 633 F.3d 591, 594–95 (7th Cir. 2011) (Posner, J.) (outlining that potential abuses include harassing defendants, swamping foreign courts with evidence, and racking up litigation costs); Wang, supra note 4, at 2137–46 (identifying more systemic risks like undermining foreign tribunals and eroding shared litigation values).

The conflict between these two schools of thought—traditionalists and pragmatists—borders on the existential, and those who value the statute’s role in the American legal system would be wise to view it as a pressing matter. 6 For more on this debate, see Gabriela Barriuso Clark, Note, Interpretive Challenges of 28 U.S.C. § 1782 in the Aftermath of Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 53 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 1377, 1381 (2020). Resolving the tension requires balancing the statute’s flexible design 7 See Hans Smit, International Litigation Under the United States Code, 65 Colum. L. Rev. 1015, 1026 (1965) (“The only limitation on the nature of the evidence is that it must be sought for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal.”). against the risk of overreach on the part of litigants. 8 See, e.g., Collins, The Death Knell, supra note 4, at 129 n.5 (“[O]ne [§ 1782] applicant demanded all documents ever created relating to the billion-dollar acquisition of another bank, including documents about bank operations predating the purchase.” (quoting Brief of Inst. of Int’l Bankers as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 4, ZF Auto. US, Inc. v. Luxshare, Ltd., 142 S. Ct. 2078 (2022) (Nos. 21-401 & 21-518), 2022 WL 333350, at *4)). It requires attention both to Congress’s broad purpose and to the practical effects of unbridled United States–style discovery on nonparties, foreign tribunals, and the federal courts. Recently, the Supreme Court relied largely on textualism to draw the line under one misuse: discovery for private arbitral proceedings. 9 ZF Auto., 142 S. Ct. at 2083, 2086–87 (relying largely on text and context to determine that a tribunal must be “imbued with governmental authority” to qualify as a “foreign or international tribunal”). Yet, § 1782’s text and purpose—along with the practicalities of civil discovery—can leave room for innovation as procedure evolves. 10 See Maryum Jordan, Utilizing Foreign Legal Assistance Actions to Promote Corporate Accountability for Human-Rights Abuses, 132 Yale L.J. Forum 844, 856–61 (2022), https://yalelawjournal.org/essay/utilizing-foreign-legal-assistance-actions-to-promote-corporate-accountability-for-human-rights-abuses [https://perma.cc/EY27-Q67V] (describing her organization’s use of § 1782 for human rights and environmental litigation in Mexico, the Netherlands, Nigeria, Peru, and Tanzania); see also Order Granting 28 U.S.C. § 1782 Request at 1, ACL Netherlands B.V., No. 3:19-mc-80023-CRB (N.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 2019) (using § 1782 to provide testimony via video link for a trial in England).

This Note assesses these considerations in the context of one growing disagreement among the federal circuit and district courts regarding § 1782: the standard for whether a person “resides or is found” in a district. 11 See 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (“The district court of the district in which a person resides or is found may order him to give his testimony or statement or to produce a document or other thing for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal, including criminal investigations conducted before formal accusation.” (emphasis added)). A faithful construction based on the statute’s text, Congress’s intent, and the broader system of transnational litigation warrants reading the requirement as extending to the limits of personal jurisdiction consistent with due process. 12 See infra Parts II, III. Embracing this reading hews closely to the meaning of the term “resides or is found” at the time of the statute’s enactment and furthers courts’ duty to help collect evidence for proceedings elsewhere. 13 See infra sections I.B, II.B.2.

This Note makes its argument in three parts. Part I traces the history of discovery assistance at chancery and common law and reviews the modern statutory scheme. Part II examines the conflicting approaches to federal courts’ jurisdiction under § 1782. And Part III proposes a resolution to the conflict among lower courts that blends the current personal jurisdiction doctrine with the requirements of discovery assistance for courts past and present.