THE FOURTH AMENDMENT IN TECHNICOLOR

THE FOURTH AMENDMENT IN TECHNICOLOR

The Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment doctrine largely ignores how race shapes police encounters. Yet over the past few decades, several state courts have rejected this approach when expounding their own constitutions, adopting more protective standards that better account for how policing actually operates.

Working backward from these departures, the Article examines the logics that persuaded state courts to diverge from federal law. It shows that unique constitutional text mattered less than institutional self-conception, local policing conditions, and advocates’ framing. In some cases, state courts engaged race directly. In others, they constrained police practices that disproportionately burden people of color through race-neutral rulings.

These state-level innovations show how state courts engage in constitutional construction. In a period when the Supreme Court has shown little appetite for confronting the racial harms produced by its criminal procedure jurisprudence, some state courts have taken the pen themselves, reshaping search-and-seizure doctrine to better reflect the realities of policing. By clarifying when and how those state courts have done so, the Article offers guidance for advocates, judges, and scholars working to advance racial justice and vindicate civil rights through state constitutional law.

The full text of this Article can be found by clicking the PDF link to the left.

Introduction

For decades, critical race and criminal procedure scholars have critiqued the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence on racial justice grounds. 1 See, e.g., Paul Butler, The White Fourth Amendment, 43 Tex. Tech L. Rev. 245, 246–47 (2010) [hereinafter Butler, The White Fourth Amendment] (calling attention to decades of scholarship examining race-based policing and racial profiling emerging from racialized Fourth Amendment doctrine); I. Bennett Capers, Criminal Procedure and the Good Citizen, 118 Colum. L. Rev. 653, 654–55 (2018) [hereinafter Capers, The Good Citizen] (highlighting how Supreme Court criminal procedure jurisprudence perpetuates racialized distinctions between “good” and “second-class” citizens (internal quotation marks omitted)); Devon W. Carbado, (E)racing the Fourth Amendment, 100 Mich. L. Rev. 946, 969 (2002) [hereinafter Carbado, (E)racing the Fourth Amendment] (examining how the Fourth Amendment racially allocates burdens and benefits); Frank Rudy Cooper, Post-Racialism and Searches Incident to Arrest, 44 Ariz. St. L.J. 113, 149 (2012) (arguing that Fourth Amendment doctrine leaves room for ambiguity that implicit racial bias often fills); Angela J. Davis, Prosecution and Race: The Power and Privilege of Discretion, 67 Fordham L. Rev. 13, 27, 33 (1998) (highlighting the dangers of judicially sanctioned police discretion incorporating subjective bias into legal standards governing stops and arrests); Tracey Maclin, “Black and Blue Encounters”—Some Preliminary Thoughts About Fourth Amendment Seizures: Should Race Matter?, 26 Valparaiso U. L. Rev. 243, 248 (1991) (arguing that the Court’s reliance on a “reasonable person” standard ignores realities of encounters between Black men and police officers); Tracey Maclin, Race and the Fourth Amendment, 51 Vand. L. Rev. 333, 340 (1998) (critiquing Fourth Amendment decisions for failing to acknowledge race as a factor in police discretion); L. Song Richardson, Police Efficiency and the Fourth Amendment, 87 Ind. L.J. 1143, 1145 (2012) (arguing that the reasonable suspicion standard fails to account for implicit biases that lead officers to view ambiguous behavior by people of color as suspicious); Ekow N. Yankah, Pretext and Justification: Republicanism, Policing, and Race, 40 Cardozo L. Rev. 1543, 1551 (2019) (challenging the rights-based assumptions that hide patterns of racial domination in policing on which the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence relies). I am grateful that these scholars have blazed a path for me to follow. As many have explained, modern Fourth Amendment doctrine has ignored the lived experiences of Black people and other communities of color who are policed most aggressively in the United States. 2 See Daniel S. Harawa, Whitewashing the Fourth Amendment, 111 Geo. L.J. 923, 926 (2023) [hereinafter Harawa, Whitewashing the Fourth Amendment] (summarizing the racial critiques of the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence). But also, by not grappling with race, Fourth Amendment case law has helped produce the racialized policing practices that have fueled the country’s current mass incarceration crisis. 3 Rachel Elise Barkow, Justice Abandoned: How the Supreme Court Ignored the Constitution and Enabled Mass Incarceration 169 (2025) (explaining how the Court had ample information to be “fully aware of the racial consequences of authorizing stop-and-frisk practices”). These scholars have shown how the Court’s doctrinal choices have not merely tolerated racialized policing but also built the legal architecture that sustains it. 4 See, e.g., Butler, The White Fourth Amendment, supra note 1, at 246–47 (contending that the Court, by “rarely mention[ing] race,” is invested in “a project . . . to expand the power of the police against people of color, especially blacks and Latinos”); Brandon Hasbrouck, The Unconstitutional Police, 56 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 239, 251 (2021) (arguing that the Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence “excuses” police racism and then “enshrines it within the limits of constitutional protections”).

Yet while the Supreme Court has essentially treated race as irrelevant to Fourth Amendment search-and-seizure analysis—except when endorsing racially targeted systems of policing 5 See, e.g., Noem v. Vasquez Perdomo, 146 S. Ct. 1, 3 (2025) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (“To be clear, apparent ethnicity alone cannot furnish reasonable suspicion; under this Court’s case law regarding immigration stops, however, it can be a ‘relevant factor’ when considered along with other salient factors.” (quoting United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 887 (1975))); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 563 (1976) (“Thus, even if it be assumed that such [inspection] referrals are made largely on the basis of apparent Mexican ancestry, we perceive no constitutional violation.” (footnote omitted)); Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 886–87 (“The likelihood that any given person of Mexican ancestry is an alien is high enough to make Mexican appearance a relevant factor, but standing alone it does not justify stopping all Mexican-Americans to ask if they are aliens.”). For discussions of how these cases condoned racialized policing, see Daniel Harawa & Kate Weisburd, Opinion, The 4th Amendment Will No Longer Protect You, L.A. Times (Sep. 29, 2025), https://www.latimes.com/opinion/story/2025-09-29/fourth-amendment-racial-profiling-noem-vasquez-perdomo [https://perma.cc/Z4G6-5DA8] (describing that, after Vasquez Perdomo, police “no longer need race-neutral person-specific suspicion” to seize someone); Jennifer Chacón, Whose Common Sense? Some Reflections on Noem v. Vasquez Perdomo, SLS Blogs (Sep. 24, 2025), https://law.stanford.edu/2025/09/24/whose-common-sense-some-reflections-on-noem-v-vazquez-perdomo/ [https://perma.cc/4UZ9-2TLD] (“By staying a lower court’s restraining order, the Court allowed agents once again to stop and arrest people based on how they look, the language they speak, where they live, and the kind of work they do.”); Sherrilyn Ifill, SCOTUS, ICE Raids & the Matter of Facts, Sherrilyn’s Newsletter (Sep. 8, 2025), https://sherrilyn.substack.com/p/scotus-ice-raids-and-the-matter-of [https://perma.cc/CT45-K36A] (scrutinizing Justice Kavanaugh’s concurrence in Vasquez Perdomo as ignoring the reality of abusive profiling practices). —some state courts have taken a different approach. Across the country, state courts have rejected the Supreme Court’s cramped vision of the Fourth Amendment, formulating doctrines that impose greater restrictions on searches and seizures. These states are expounding their constitutions in ways that both implicitly and explicitly acknowledge the role that race plays in policing. In so doing, these states are working to “color in” the Fourth Amendment. 6 Daniel S. Harawa, Coloring in the Fourth Amendment, 137 Harv. L. Rev. 1533, 1575–76 (2024) [hereinafter Harawa, Coloring in the Fourth Amendment].

The traditional account of federalism’s effect on civil rights reform emphasizes that the United States’ diffuse constitutional structure once made it difficult, if not impossible, to secure equal rights nationwide. 7 See Heather K. Gerken, Foreword: Federalism All the Way Down, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 48 (2010) (arguing that “[f]ederalism has often been a code-word for letting racists be racists” and that federalism “has played a tragic role in shielding a powerful regional dissenter—Southern racists—in its efforts to oppress blacks”). Federalism frustrated the pursuit of racial justice. 8 See Lindsay F. Wiley, Elizabeth Y. McCuskey, Matthew B. Lawrence & Erin C. Fuse Brown, Health Reform Reconstruction, 55 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 657, 719 (2021) (“‘People of color have long been disproportionately disadvantaged by federalism,’ and the ‘core problems of racial inequality’ still find their ‘core . . . in questions of federalism.’” (alteration in original) (footnote omitted) (first quoting Jamila Michener, Race, Politics, and the Affordable Care Act, 45 J. Health Pol. Pol’y & L. 547, 550 (2020); then quoting Robert C. Lieberman & John S. Lapinski, American Federalism, Race, and the Administration of Welfare, 31 Brit. J. Pol. Sci. 303, 303–04 (2001))). And constitutional criminal procedure was one of the clearest examples of this: The Warren Court’s criminal procedure revolution was an explicit response to Southern states’ refusal to afford Black people basic constitutional protections throughout the criminal process. 9 See Pamela S. Karlan, Race, Rights, and Remedies in Criminal Adjudication, 96 Mich. L. Rev. 2001, 2002 (1998) (“Although the Supreme Court’s initial forays into criminal procedure surely had been motivated in large part by concern with the racial unfairness of southern criminal justice, the Court developed a series of formally race-neutral rules for constraining police, prosecutors, and the courts.”); Burt Neuborne, The Gravitational Pull of Race on the Warren Court, 2010 Sup. Ct. Rev. 59, 60, 85–86 (“Perhaps the clearest evidence of the gravitational pull of race on Warren Court constitutional doctrine was in the areas of criminal law and procedure.”); David A. Sklansky, Traffic Stops, Minority Motorists, and the Future of the Fourth Amendment, 1997 Sup. Ct. Rev. 271, 316 (“[M]uch of the Court’s criminal procedure jurisprudence . . . was a form of race jurisprudence, prompted largely by the treatment of black suspects and black defendants in the South. The Court’s concern with race relations served as the unspoken subtext of many of its significant criminal procedure decisions . . . .” (footnote omitted)).

But for the last half a century or so, as the Supreme Court has become less protective of procedural rights, 10 See Thomas Y. Davies, The Supreme Court Giveth and the Supreme Court Taketh Away: The Century of Fourth Amendment “Search and Seizure” Doctrine, 100 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 933, 994 (2010) (explaining that the Burger Court represented a “plunge to the right in criminal procedure” and that this iteration of the Supreme Court “produce[d] a dependable pro-government majority”); Carol S. Steiker, Counter-Revolution in Constitutional Criminal Procedure? Two Audiences, Two Answers, 94 Mich. L. Rev. 2466, 2468 (1996) (“[T]he Supreme Court has profoundly changed its approach to constitutional criminal procedure since the 1960s at least in the following fairly limited (but obviously important) sense: the Court has clearly become less sympathetic to claims of individual rights and more accommodating to assertions of the need for public order.” (emphasis omitted)). federalism has been functioning differently, especially when it comes to criminal procedure and the Fourth Amendment. 11 See Donald E. Wilkes, Jr., The New Federalism in Criminal Procedure: State Court Evasion of the Burger Court, 62 Ky. L.J. 421, 425 (1974) (describing how state courts have evaded the Burger Court’s criminal procedure retrenchment). An important counterpoint to this thesis is how the Roberts Court has interpreted the Fourth Amendment in the digital space. See, e.g., Matthew Tokson, The Carpenter Test as a Transformation of Fourth Amendment Law, 2023 U. Ill. L. Rev. 507, 509–10 (describing scholarly reaction to the Court’s decision in Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. 296 (2018)). For instance, Professor Orin Kerr called the Supreme Court’s recent decision Chatrie v. United States, 146 S. Ct. 2193 (2026), a case about location history records, “an expansive pro-privacy opinion” that “reads more like a decision from the Warren Court heyday of 1966 than the Roberts Court of 2026.” Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment After Chatrie, 102 Notre Dame L. Rev. (forthcoming 2027) (manuscript at 3), https://ssrn.com/abstract_id=7238178 [https://perma.cc/K65L-V6N2]. Rather than simply following federal law, state courts have crafted more protective standards. 12 See Wilkes, supra note 11, at 425 (“The Court’s shift in attitude has made conditions ripe for an astonishing development in criminal procedure—evasion of the Supreme Court by state courts willing to protect rights of criminal defendants that are no longer guaranteed under the Federal Constitution as interpreted by the Burger Court.”). And more recently, this innovation has taken the form of state courts interpreting their Fourth Amendment analogs to better account for how communities of color experience policing—the Fourth Amendment in technicolor. 13 See infra Part III. With different states taking different paths to bolstering search and seizure rights, it conjures up a “coat of many colours.” See Andrew Lloyd Webber & Tim Rice, Joseph’s Coat, on Joseph and the Amazing Technicolor Dreamcoat (Vinyl Record, Decca Recs. Jan. 1969).

Of course, turning to the states for a more capacious vision of rights is not new, and this is not to say that state constitutionalism is necessarily reactionary, with states only moving in a dialogic response to the Supreme Court. 14 See Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Miriam Seifter, State Constitutional Rights and Democratic Proportionality, 123 Colum. L. Rev. 1855, 1857 (2023) [hereinafter Bulman-Pozen & Seifter, State Constitutional Rights] (“All eyes are on the states. As the U.S. Supreme Court retrenches, state courts are taking up many issues that matter most to Americans. From abortion to voting, state constitutions are defining the content and scope of rights across the nation.” (footnote omitted)); Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Miriam Seifter, The Democracy Principle in State Constitutions, 119 Mich. L. Rev. 859, 861 (2021) [hereinafter Bulman-Pozen & Seifter, Democracy Principle] (“In one sense, a call to consider state constitutions is nothing new. For decades, prominent jurists and scholars have advocated turning to state constitutions to protect individual rights.”). But as the Burger Court reached its zenith, Justice William Brennan called on advocates and state courts to look to state constitutions as independent sources of rights, given the Supreme Court’s conservative shift. 15 See William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 489, 491 (1977) [hereinafter Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights]; William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 535, 548 (1986). Brennan’s call for state courts to interpret their state constitutions to be more rights-enhancing is still commonly referred to as “new judicial federalism” or “new federalism” (despite no longer being new). See Ronald K.L. Collins, Foreword: The Once “New Judicial Federalism” & Its Critics, 64 Wash. L. Rev. 5, 5 (1989); Lawrence Friedman, The Constitutional Value of Dialogue and the New Judicial Federalism, 28 Hastings Const. L.Q. 93, 94 n.5 (2000) (collecting sources); John Kincaid, Foreword: The New Federalism Context of the New Judicial Federalism, 26 Rutgers L.J. 913, 913 n.1 (1995) (defining “the new judicial federalism” as state high court decisionmaking based on state constitutional provisions serving as independent bases for rulings on individual rights and liberties (internal quotation marks omitted)); G. Alan Tarr, The New Judicial Federalism in Perspective, 72 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1097, 1097 (1997) (defining “new judicial federalism” as “the increased reliance by state judges on state declarations of rights to secure rights unavailable under the United States Constitution” and noting that the phenomenon emerged in the early 1970s). This Article uses “new federalism” and “new judicial federalism” interchangeably. And today, the Supreme Court is far more conservative than the Court on which Brennan sat, making his call even more urgent. 16 See Richard M. Re, The Supreme Court, 2024 Term—Foreword: To a Conservative Warren Court, 139 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 3–4 (2025) (“The present Court . . . possesses the defining traits that the Warren Court did, but in political opposite. . . . [I]t wields its power in pursuit of its ideological goals. Instead of being the most liberal Court in living memory, however, it is the most conservative.”). The call is also timely given that “[l]ockstepping’s critics have increasingly found their voice in the [state] courts.” Developments in the Law, Introduction, 139 Harv. L. Rev. 1371, 1371 (2026). Of late, state courts have been more willing to forcefully criticize the Supreme Court’s decisionmaking. See Mark Joseph Stern, One Judge Has the Guts to Put the Horror of This Supreme Court Term in Context, Slate (July 17, 2026), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2026/07/one-judge-supreme-court-horror-show.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (discussing Granillo v. State, 593 P.3d 1 (Haw. 2026)).

But Brennan’s concerns, rooted mainly in a broad rights-and-liberty frame, now take on a distinctly racial dimension. In one breath, the current Court has announced a full-throated embrace of constitutional colorblindness, 17 See Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll., 143 S. Ct. 2141, 2161 (2023) (“Eliminating racial discrimination means eliminating all of it.”); Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 748 (2007) (“The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.”). going so far as to call the charter document “our colorblind Constitution,” 18 Allen v. Milligan, 146 S. Ct. 1377, 1380 (2026). while in the next it has endorsed a system of racialized policing. 19 See Noem v. Vasquez Perdomo, 146 S. Ct. 1, 3 (2025) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (explaining, in the context of immigration raids, that “[u]nder this Court’s precedents, not to mention common sense,” race or ethnicity can be taken into account when determining whether there is reasonable suspicion for a seizure). In this climate, state innovation has become increasingly critical for acknowledging, confronting, and remedying the racial injustices that the Supreme Court refuses to see, or sees but refuses to correct. 20 See Erwin Chemerinsky, Presumed Guilty: How the Supreme Court Empowered the Police and Subverted Civil Rights 288–95 (2021) (arguing that “[s]tate constitutions . . . provide a way for our society to limit police conduct in instances where the Supreme Court has failed to do so through the Constitution”).

While many today recognize that state courts are key battlegrounds for civil rights, the literature often operates at a higher level of generality, 21 See Bulman-Pozen & Seifter, State Constitutional Rights, supra note 14, at 1857–58 (“For all that rides on state constitutional law, there has been little attention to some of its most basic questions. . . . There is limited discussion of other state constitutional clauses, the distinctiveness of state constitutions collectively, or what those differences might mean for adjudication.”). focusing on interpretive method, 22 See id. at 1857 n.5 (collecting sources engaged in the debate). the scope of state constitutional rights, 23 See, e.g., Helen Hershkoff, “Just Words”: Common Law and the Enforcement of State Constitutional Social and Economic Rights, 62 Stan. L. Rev. 1521, 1523–24 (2010) (“[E]very state constitution in the United States—like many constitutions abroad—contains some explicit commitment to positive rights.” (footnote omitted)); Helen Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The Limits of Federal Rationality Review, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 1131, 1135 (1999) (“Unlike the Federal Constitution, every state constitution in the United States addresses social and economic concerns, and provides the basis for a variety of positive claims against the government.”). For a comprehensive account of rights protected by state constitutional law, see generally Jennifer Friesen, State Constitutional Law: Litigating Individual Rights, Claims, and Defenses (4th ed. 2006). or the uniqueness of state constitutional structure. 24 See, e.g., Jeffrey S. Sutton, 51 Imperfect Solutions: States and the Making of American Constitutional Law 2–3 (2018) (pointing to the dynamic relationship between state courts and state constitutional law, and their federal counterparts, as critical in articulating new legal norms that advance individual liberties); Goodwin Liu, State Courts and Constitutional Structure, 128 Yale L.J. 1304, 1310–12 (2019) (reviewing Sutton, supra).

Rather than theorizing in the abstract, this Article works backward from state-court decisions that have departed from federal search-and-seizure standards to identify the arguments, institutional considerations, and doctrinal moves that have proven effective in persuading state courts to rise above the federal floor. It pays special attention to when state courts have been willing to recognize the racial dynamics of police–citizen encounters in their search-and-seizure doctrine. By providing these examples of success, this Article illustrates how other jurisdictions can “color in” their Fourth Amendment equivalents. At the same time, this Article looks beyond the arguments made in these cases to identify additional considerations that may resonate with state courts exercising their state constitutional authority today. In this way, this Article offers a bottom-up account of how state constitutional law can serve as a vehicle for advancing racial justice in policing, even as federal Fourth Amendment doctrine remains resistant to such concerns.

The Fourth Amendment provides an especially fertile case study for this inquiry. 25 See Robert F. Williams & Lawrence Friedman, The Law of American State Constitutions 151 (2d ed. 2023) (explaining that “criminal procedure generally has, in many ways, provided the driving force behind [new judicial federalism]. It is in this area that state courts first realized they could reach results different from those reached by the U.S. Supreme Court, or at least consider doing so”). State courts started developing the practice of departing from federal search-and-seizure doctrine long before the Roberts Court’s ascension, producing a mature body of state constitutional law from which to learn. 26 See infra section I.C. The Fourth Amendment’s centrality to everyday criminal law enforcement also means that constitutional questions arise—and are litigated—far more often in state courts than in their federal counterparts. 27 Williams & Friedman, supra note 25, at 152 (explaining that “[l]awyers are already in court defending criminal charges, so state constitutional criminal procedure arguments are easier to make” and “criminal law is of special state concern” (emphasis added)); see also Shirley S. Abrahamson, Criminal Law and State Constitutions: The Emergence of State Constitutional Law, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 1141, 1148–49 (1985) (“The sheer number of state criminal cases and the relation between the protection offered by state and federal constitutions means that the state courts have many opportunities to rule on both federal and state constitutional issues.” (footnote omitted)). Today, Fourth Amendment–specific doctrinal roadblocks such as the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule and the Supreme Court’s own ambivalence about whether to retain the exclusionary rule have drastically reduced the number of Fourth Amendment cases the Court agrees to review. 28 See Jack Goldsmith, Orin Kerr & Jen Patja, Lawfare Daily: Orin Kerr on the Digital Fourth Amendment, Lawfare (Jan. 9, 2025), https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/lawfare-daily-orin-kerr-on-the-digital-fourth-amendment [https://perma.cc/Q6AT-JFNZ] (explaining why there hasn’t been a recent rush of Fourth Amendment cases). As a result, state courts have had even more opportunity to engage their constitutions vis-à-vis the federal Constitution in the criminal prosecution context. 29 This is also not to say that states have not departed in other areas of criminal procedure. For example, states have rejected the daunting ineffective assistance of counsel standard imposed by Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–88 (1984). See Alexis Hoag-Fordjour, Back to the Future: (Re)Constructing Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 58 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 111, 175–76 (2024) [hereinafter Hoag-Fordjour, Back to the Future] (noting how several states, including Hawai‘i, New York, Alaska, and Oregon, have dispensed with Strickland’s prohibitive prejudice requirement). This is not to say that state courts always depart from federal Fourth Amendment doctrine or even usually depart from federal doctrine. 30 See 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Jerold H. Israel, Nancy J. King, Orin S. Kerr & Andrew D. Leipold, Criminal Procedure § 2.12(a) (4th ed.), Westlaw (database updated Nov. 2025) (noting that many states have interpreted their Fourth Amendment equivalents in lockstep with Supreme Court Fourth Amendment doctrine); LaKeith Faulkner & Christopher R. Green, State-Constitutional Departures From the Supreme Court: The Fourth Amendment, 89 Miss. L.J. 197, 198 (2020) (considering a database of 342 Fourth Amendment cases and finding that “[o]f [those] cases, 125 cases have triggered a total of 306 such state-level departures, from thirty-seven states”); James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 90 Mich. L. Rev. 761, 781 (1992) [hereinafter Gardner, Failed Discourse] (noting a “general unwillingness among state supreme courts to engage in any kind of analysis of the state constitution at all”). But still, there has been enough departure from states across the country such that the Fourth Amendment provides a useful example of state constitutional innovation. And while scholars have discussed how states have departed from the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence more generally, 31 See, e.g., Sutton, supra note 24, at 42–83 (including a chapter on how state courts have followed or departed from Supreme Court Fourth Amendment doctrine); Bulman-Pozen & Seifter, State Constitutional Rights, supra note 14, at 1864 (noting that much of the commentary on state constitutionalism has focused on rights recognized by the U.S. Constitution, including “freedom from unreasonable search and seizure”). the literature has not adequately focused on when and why state courts depart specially to consider issues of race. This Article brings a racial justice lens to the conversation.

Here’s a preview of what’s to come. The Article details in-depth departures in ten cases from state courts across the country that have charted a different course. Exploring what prompted these state-court departures in the Fourth Amendment context confirms some intuitions about new federalism. 32 See infra section IV.A. State courts exercised their authority to depart from the Supreme Court by focusing on the textual differences between their state search-and-seizure provisions and the Fourth Amendment, as some state constitutions contain broader language. 33 See infra section IV.A.1. Relatedly, state courts felt freer to depart when prior state-court precedents had enshrined broad search-and-seizure protections, allowing those courts to invoke stare decisis. 34 See infra section IV.A.2. Also helpful was if other states had moved beyond the Supreme Court, as a state court could cite those decisions and follow their lead. 35 See infra section IV.A.2. And when departing, state courts were often attentive to the lived realities within their state’s bounds, adopting arguments that emphasized how the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment doctrine inadequately protected their state’s residents. 36 See infra section IV.A.3.

The exploration of state courts interpreting their state constitutional search-and-seizure provisions independent of the Fourth Amendment also reveals new insights. 37 See infra section IV.B. First, a more recent trend is for state courts to explain that issues of race require different search-and-seizure standards. 38 See infra section IV.B. But importantly, state courts are more likely to focus on race when the parties foreground it. 39 See infra section IV.B.2. In other words, when the parties invite the courts to think of search-and-seizure issues in racialized terms, some state courts have accepted the invitation. Of course, whether and how to focus on race remains contingent on the institutional posture of the particular court and the political realities on the ground. Second, and of self-interest to scholars, state courts often discussed whether Supreme Court rulings had been the subject of sustained scholarly criticism when deciding whether to follow them. 40 See infra section IV.B.3. Thus, a robust body of scholarship explaining why a particular Supreme Court decision is wrong or wrongheaded can help legitimate a state court’s decision to chart its own course.

Finally, there are two lines of argument that do not feature prominently in the decisions or the briefing that may be ripe for this constitutional moment. 41 See infra section IV.C. The first is highlighting the different democratic relationships state courts have with their citizens as compared to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court is antimajoritarian by design, while many state courts are democratically accountable. 42 Bulman-Pozen & Seifter, State Constitutional Rights, supra note 14, at 1882 (noting that, as opposed to federal courts, “[s]tate courts are generally majoritarian, elected institutions, and their decisions are readily countermanded” and that their decisions “are entries in an ongoing popular conversation, not the final word on constitutional questions”). Therefore, to the extent the Supreme Court’s sentiments are out of step with what a majority of the state’s citizens regard as just, then that can support state constitutional rulings that provide greater protections. The second is greater emphasis on how the Supreme Court’s precedents harm people of color. For all the talk of colorblindness, most Americans understand that race plays a role in policing and the criminal legal process more broadly. 43 Drew DeSilver, Michael Lipka & Dalia Fahmy, 10 Things We Know About Race and Policing in the U.S., Pew Rsch. Ctr. (June 3, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2020/06/03/10-things-we-know-about-race-and-policing-in-the-u-s/ [https://perma.cc/D5KG-R6JR] (finding that “[m]ajorities of both black and white Americans say black people are treated less fairly than whites in dealing with the police and by the criminal justice system as a whole”). That shared understanding can and should be leveraged in state court constitutional adjudication to reinforce the legitimacy of departures that acknowledge racialized policing. 44 For an in-depth discussion explaining why it is important to recognize race, see Harawa, Whitewashing the Fourth Amendment, supra note 2, at 971–81.

Before proceeding, a couple of caveats. Although not the focus of this Article, legislation is also a means by which some states have addressed the racial injustices rife within police investigative practices. 45 See, e.g., California Racial Justice Act, Cal. Penal Code § 745 (West 2026) (allowing criminal defendants to challenge convictions and sentences based on race and ethnicity); Kentucky Racial Justice Act, Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 532.300 (West 2026) (allowing capital defendants to present evidence about how race influenced their case); North Carolina Racial Justice Act, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-2010 (2009) (repealed 2013) (allowing death-sentenced defendants to challenge sentences based on racial bias). State ballot initiatives are also a source of criminal justice reform. See, e.g., Meg Anderson, Three Takeaways From Crime Ballot Measures Around the Country, NPR (Oct. 31, 2024), https://www.npr.org/2024/10/30/nx-s1-5155201/criminal-justice-ballot-measures [https://perma.cc/5VPG-E4VW]; Marshall Project Staff, We’re Tracking 7 Ballot Measures that Could Change Criminal Justice, Marshall Project (Oct. 28, 2020), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2020/10/28/7-states-where-voters-could-change-the-future-of-criminal-justice [https://perma.cc/X8AT-TZXM] (last updated Nov. 5, 2020). To be sure, this form of state innovation is worthy of examination. This Article nevertheless focuses on courts and state constitutionalism for several reasons. First, unlike affirmative civil rights litigation or episodic legislative reform, criminal cases arise continuously, ensuring that constitutional questions—particularly those involving search and seizure—are litigated with regularity in state courts. 46 See Jennifer Friesen, Recovering Damages for State Bills of Rights Claims, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 1269, 1270 (1985) (explaining that there are a large number of criminal procedure cases applying new judicial federalism “in large part because attorneys are paid to file and brief them”). Second, legislative reforms remain subject to judicial interpretation and enforcement, and courts retain significant power to narrow their reach or blunt their remedial force. 47 For example, the New York Court of Appeals recently made the felony of making terroristic threats bail-eligible despite it not being specifically included in the Bail Reform Act as one of the few offenses for which cash bail can be imposed. See People ex rel. Ellis v. Imperati, 277 N.E.3d 213, 214 (N.Y. 2025) (“We therefore hold that making a terroristic threat is a bail-eligible offense.”). In other words, even a focus on legislative action requires paying attention to the courts. Third, statutory reforms are contingent: They may be amended, repealed, or underenforced as political winds shift. 48 For example, the North Carolina legislature repealed the state’s Racial Justice Act just four years after it was passed and attempted to make the repeal retroactive. See State v. Robinson, 846 S.E.2d 711, 715–18 (N.C. 2020) (holding that this repeal was not constitutional). State constitutional rulings, by contrast, tend to be more durable and harder to unwind. For these reasons, state constitutional adjudication offers a relatively stable 49 There is no fifty-state survey of how often state supreme courts overrule prior decisions, and it seems that the pace of overruling may vary widely by state. Tyler J. Buller & Kelli A. Huser, Stare Decisis in Iowa, 67 Drake L. Rev. 317, 327–30 (2019) (collecting studies of various state supreme courts). It’s worth noting, however, that “state constitutional decisions are generally easier to override by constitutional amendment than federal constitutional rulings.” Liu, supra note 24, at 1339 (citing Sutton, supra note 24, at 18, 213). Or, as Professor Helen Hershkoff colorfully put it, as compared to the federal Constitution, state constitutions are “said to draw more from Mary Poppins than from James Madison: pie crust promises, more fragile even than parchment promises—easily made, easily broken, hardly the stuff of immutable constitutional principle.” Helen Hershkoff, Introductory Remarks: The Promise and Limits of State Constitutions, 99 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1895, 1902 (2024) [hereinafter Hershkoff, Introductory Remarks] (footnote omitted). and recurring vehicle for confronting racial injustice in criminal law’s enforcement, and hopefully, legislative efforts continue alongside it. Finally, a focus on the courts, and particularly on state constitutional interpretation, allows for closer attention to the meaning of the Fourth Amendment itself, especially the disconnect between everyday policing practices and the constitutional protections that govern them.

To be clear, this Article does not seek to romanticize state constitutionalism or federalism more broadly. 50 See, e.g., Elizabeth Bentley, State Court Adherence to Decisions Incorporating Federal Constitutional Law, 110 Iowa L. Rev. 1013, 1019 (2025) (explaining that state courts “did not always wield their interpretive power equitably”); Erwin Chemerinsky, Two Cheers for State Constitutional Law, 62 Stan. L. Rev. 1695, 1702 (2010) (“State constitutions are generally more majoritarian than the United States Constitution because they are easier for the majority to change . . . . Advancing individual liberties and furthering equality is thus inherently more problematic under state constitutions because it puts the rights of the minority more in the hands of the majority.”). State criminal legal systems subjugate Black and Brown people in myriad ways, and this Article does not minimize those harms. 51 See Aaron Gottlieb, Making Gideon Count? Public Defender Resources and Felony Case Outcomes for Black, White, and Latinx Individuals, 13 Race & Just. 506, 507 (2023) (documenting the effects of the underfunding of public defense on case outcomes for minorities); Hershkoff, Introductory Remarks, supra note 49, at 1904 (“[W]e should not ignore or erase the role of state constitutions and state courts in entrenching racial subordination and the Supreme Court’s acquiescence—even partnership—in that enterprise.”). Today, for example, misdemeanor courts are a site of racial injustice. See Alexandra Natapoff, Punishment Without Crime: How Our Massive Misdemeanor System Traps the Innocent and Makes America More Unequal 9 (2018) (“Misdemeanors [] fuel some of America’s most infamous inequalities, especially the gap between the rich and the poor and the disparate treatment of people of color.”). So too are grossly underfunded public defense systems. See Eve Brensike Primus, The Problematic Structure of Indigent Defense Delivery, 122 Mich. L. Rev. 207, 209 (2023) (noting that the criminal justice system “target[s] racial minorities for differential treatment”). But in this constitutional moment—one defined by backlash, retrenchment, and revisionism—state autonomy can be leveraged to advance racial justice. 52 See Gerken, supra note 7, at 46–47 (“[W]e should be open to the possibility that at this stage in our history, minority rule—and not just minority rights—represents a tool for combating discrimination and promoting democracy.”). How states have innovated in the Fourth Amendment space provides proof of concept for how other states can engage and deploy their constitutions to do meaningful racial justice work when the Supreme Court will not.

With those caveats cleared away, this Article makes its case over the course of four parts. Part I explains the traditional account that “those interested in racial justice have long been skeptical of federalism,” 53 Id. at 49. as diffuse authority and the “preservation of states’ rights” often interfered with “the federal government’s [historical] goal of promoting racial equality.” 54 Medha D. Makhlouf, Laboratories of Exclusion: Medicaid, Federalism & Immigrants, 95 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1680, 1752 (2020). As this Part explains, it was federalism concerns that fueled the Warren Court’s criminal procedure revolution, as the Court attempted to constitutionalize foundational criminal procedure rights in the face of Southern states routinely denying those rights to Black people accused of crime. But the new federalism movement has flipped the traditional account of federalism on its head—hence the label “new.” Now, with the Supreme Court adhering to the position that the Constitution must be colorblind while also claiming that the Constitution allows for racially targeted policing, states have taken on renewed importance in the struggle for racial justice. 55 See John Ettorre, Civil Rights Cases Are Part of MLK’s Legacy, but Many Are Moving to State Courts, Best Laws. (Jan. 20, 2022), https://www.bestlawyers.com/article/civil-rights-cases-are-moving-to-state-courts/4347 [https://perma.cc/F43R-GH4X] (“[M]ore and more of these [civil rights] cases are being brought in state courts . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Sanford Rosen, civil rights attorney, Rosen Bien Galvan & Grunfeld LLP)); Matthew R. Segal, Civil Rights and State Courts in the Trump Era, 12 Harv. L. & Pol’y Rev. 49, 50 (2018) (“[S]trategic state litigation can also substantially advance the individual rights placed at risk by the Trump administration . . . .” (emphasis omitted)). In a leading example of this, the ACLU recently launched a “State Supreme Court Initiative,” explaining:The U.S. Supreme Court is increasingly unlikely to protect, let alone expand, individual rights. Empowered by President Trump’s three nominees, the Court’s conservative supermajority has moved radically against liberty and equal justice in numerous recent cases. State supreme courts, however, offer promise for civil liberties and civil rights. That’s why we are making new investments to support litigation in state courts.State Supreme Court Initiative, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/campaigns-initiatives/state-supreme-court-initiative [https://perma.cc/75ST-UMK4] (last updated Oct. 9, 2026). And while this is true beyond policing, it is especially true in constitutional criminal procedure, where states have taken meaningful steps to better protect their residents—especially those of color—against unreasonable searches and seizures.

Part II explores the federal doctrine from which states have departed, focusing on three Fourth Amendment cases involving defendants of color that have drawn the harshest criticism for their racial obliviousness. It focuses on this cluster of cases because, as a corpus, they have given law enforcement sweeping power to aggressively police communities of color, while at the same time minimizing the experiences of those same people most aggressively policed. 56 To be clear, this Article does not catalog every Supreme Court case that has erased race. Rather, it focuses on some of the most prominent cases that have received sustained critique. It therefore does not discuss state court departures from cases not discussed. See, e.g., State v. Ingram, 914 N.W.2d 794, 797–98 (Iowa 2018) (adopting tighter legal standards than the U.S. Supreme Court when it comes to warrantless inventory searches and seizures of automobiles). It examines Whren v. United States, where the Court greenlit racial profiling by holding that an officer’s subjective motives are irrelevant under the Fourth Amendment; 57 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996). Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, where the Court held that the government does not have to prove consent was made with knowledge of the right to refuse, ignoring the precarity and coercion that people of color experience in police encounters; 58 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973). and Illinois v. Wardlow—a case in which the Court held that “unprovoked flight” from police in a “high crime area” gives rise to reasonable suspicion, ignoring the innocent reasons people of color may wish to avoid police contact. 59 528 U.S. 119, 124–25 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 144, 147 (1972)). Together, these decisions constitutionalize a vision of policing that grants wide latitude to officers while failing to conduct any meaningful inquiry into how race shapes police–citizen encounters.

Part III describes state courts’ resistance to federal doctrine. It identifies how state courts have pushed back against the Supreme Court’s refusal to recognize race in its Fourth Amendment case law. For example, Washington has prohibited pretextual seizures—rejecting Whren. 60 See State v. Ladson, 979 P.2d 833, 842 (Wash. 1999) (forbidding pretextual stops). New Jersey requires consent to be informed—bucking Bustamonte. 61 See State v. Johnson, 346 A.2d 66, 67–68 (N.J. 1975) (holding consent must be informed). And Massachusetts has refuted the suspiciousness of a Black person’s flight from police—contra Wardlow. 62 See Commonwealth v. Warren, 58 N.E.3d 333, 341 (Mass. 2016) (citing Commonwealth v. Mercado, 663 N.E.2d 243, 246 (Mass. 1996); Commonwealth v. Thibeau, 429 N.E.2d 1009, 1010 (Mass. 1981)) (refusing to give much weight to flight where suspect is a Black male). To better understand what prompted these departures, this Part examines not only the decisions themselves, but, when available, the briefing and oral arguments underlying them. 63 See generally Harawa, Whitewashing the Fourth Amendment, supra note 2, at 927 (examining how Fourth Amendment cases were litigated to better understand what conclusions can be drawn from them). Doing so illuminates how litigants framed race, policing realities, state constitutional text, and institutional competence—and how those arguments resonated with state courts deciding whether to chart an independent constitutional course.

Finally, Part IV distills lessons from the state Fourth Amendment departures. This Part identifies recurring patterns in how state courts have been persuaded to deviate from federal search-and-seizure doctrine, which essentially erases race, to more fully embrace a vision of the law attuned to a racialized reality. It synthesizes the doctrinal moves, institutional justifications, and framing strategies that have accompanied these departures, shedding light on how state courts have exercised their authority to move beyond the federal floor in concrete cases. Although this Article focuses on searches and seizures, the identified patterns provide insights that extend beyond the Fourth Amendment context, illuminating how state constitutional law can operate as a distinct site of racial justice across doctrinal domains.