THE ACCOUNTABILITY DEFICIT: WHEN IMMIGRATION DETENTION OBSTRUCTS ONE’S DAY IN CRIMINAL COURT

THE ACCOUNTABILITY DEFICIT: WHEN IMMIGRATION DETENTION OBSTRUCTS ONE’S DAY IN CRIMINAL COURT

The right to have your day in court is foundational to the U.S. criminal legal system. Yet, many noncitizens in immigration detention facing criminal charges are denied this right when ICE routinely fails to produce immigration detainees to criminal court to resolve charges. In immigration proceedings, immigration judges regularly use those unresolved charges to detain and deport. This Article is the first to examine this obstruction of court access and its implications—a particularly imperative study as recent executive and congressional proclamations foretell a gross expansion of the number of individuals in immigration detention with pending criminal charges.

Immigration obstruction of court access occurs because of an accountability deficit: Neither the immigration jailor nor criminal prosecutor suffers consequences for obstructing court access, and thus the accountability deficit falls on the noncitizen defendant. This Article posits the following three implications. First, noncitizen defendants suffer constitutional criminal procedure violations when obstructed from accessing criminal proceedings. Second, noncitizen defendants are harmed in immigration proceedings because the unresolved criminal charge is used to detain and deport them, perpetuating a cycle of obstruction. Finally, noncitizen defendants’ rights are in even greater jeopardy because the jailor and prosecutor are the same entity in the immigration apparatus and are further commingled with the judge. This Article proposes to close the deficit by assigning accountability to criminal and immigration enforcement actors through a two-pronged remedy: dismissal of charges on the criminal side and prohibiting use of the pending charge to detain or deport on the immigration side.

The full text of this Article can be found by clicking the PDF link to the left.

Introduction

Recent executive and legislative proclamations foretell the gross expansion of the U.S. immigration detention system, particularly for individuals with pending criminal proceedings. Days after being sworn into office, President Donald Trump issued quotas to U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to increase immigration arrests from a few hundred per day to at least 1,200 to 1,500 per day. 1 Nick Miroff & Maria Sacchetti, Trump Officials Issue Quotas to ICE Officers to Ramp Up Arrests, Wash. Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/immigration/2025/01/26/ice-arrests-raids-trump-quota/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last updated Jan. 26, 2025).  Just a few months later, the Trump Administration increased the quota to 3,000 arrests per day. 2 Julia Ainsley, Ryan J. Reilly, Allan Smith, Ken Dilanian & Sarah Fitzpatrick, A Sweeping New ICE Operation Shows How Trump’s Focus on Immigration Is Reshaping Federal Law Enforcement, NBC News (June 4, 2025), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/justice-department/ice-operation-trump-focus-immigration-reshape-federal-law-enforcement-rcna193494 (on file with the Columbia Law Review).  As a result, ICE detention facilities are over capacity. Detention centers were reportedly already at 109% capacity within the first few weeks of the Administration, 3 Camilo Montoya-Galvez, ICE Releases Some Migrant Detainees as Its Detention Facilities Reach 109% Capacity, CBS News, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/ice-releases-some-migrant-detainees-detention-facilities-reach-109-percent-capacity/ [https://perma.cc/5PHB-QNTS] (last updated Feb. 5, 2025).  and the number of immigrants in detention had increased by 20% six months later. 4 Meg Anderson, Private Prisons and Local Jails Are Ramping Up as ICE Detention Exceeds Capacity, NPR (June 4, 2025), https://www.npr.org/2025/06/04/nx-s1-5417980/private-prisons-and-local-jails-are-ramping-up-as-ice-detention-exceeds-capacity [https://perma.cc/4L9N-HGYL].  The Trump Administration has long said that its top priority for such detention and deportation is noncitizens with criminal convictions or pending charges. 5 Allison McCann, Albert Sun & Eileen Sullivan, Who Are the Millions of Immigrants Trump Wants to Deport?, N.Y. Times, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2025/01/17/us/immigrants-trump-deportations.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last updated Jan. 24, 2025); Miroff & Sacchetti, supra note 1 (“Tom Homan has said for weeks that ICE . . . would prioritize immigrants with criminal records and who are gang members.”).  Moreover, in January 2025 Congress enacted the Laken Riley Act, which requires that certain individuals be detained by ICE with no opportunity for a bond hearing, even if they have only been arrested or charged—and not yet convicted—for a host of crimes, including minor crimes like shoplifting. 6 Laken Riley Act, Pub. L. No. 119-1, 139 Stat. 3 (2025) (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).  A few months later in July 2025, Congress passed the so-called One Big Beautiful Bill Act 7 One Big Beautiful Bill Act, Pub. L. No. 119-21, 139 Stat. 72 (2025) (codified in scattered titles of U.S.C.). —a massive budget reconciliation bill that will “supercharge” the Administration’s anti-immigration agenda, allocating approximately $170 billion to immigration detention and enforcement. 8 Juliana Kim, How Trump’s Tax Cut and Policy Bill Aims to ‘Supercharge’ Immigration Enforcement, NPR (July 3, 2025), https://www.npr.org/2025/07/03/g-s1-75609/big-beautiful-bill-ice-funding-immigration [https://perma.cc/LV7S-6T5E].  The immigration detention dragnet, then, is set to sweep in many individuals who face pending criminal charges and thus need to have their day in criminal court.

That ICE detains individuals with pending criminal proceedings is not surprising. But what many may be shocked to learn is that, once noncitizen defendants are detained, many are barred from accessing criminal court proceedings. 9 See infra Part I.  Indeed, ICE routinely refuses to permit individuals in its custody to attend criminal court hearings, in person or virtually, even when ordered to do so by a state criminal court. 10 See infra section I.B.  As a result, individuals are obstructed from having their day in criminal court to resolve those charges. Meanwhile, unresolved charges are used against noncitizen defendants in their immigration proceedings to deny release from immigration detention—therefore prolonging detention—or to deny immigration relief, thereby leading to deportation. 11 See infra Part III.

This Article is the first to shed light on this little-known and constitutionally problematic immigration detention practice—which this Article calls “obstruction of court access”—and the ways it shapes the crimmigration 12 See generally Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, 56 Am. U. L. Rev. 367 (2006) (coining the term “crimmigration” to describe the growing criminalization of immigration law).  paradigm. Consider the case of Ramirez, who arrived in the United States at age fourteen and worked throughout high school to support his family. 13 Rosa v. Garland, 114 F.4th 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2024). This author was counsel in this petition for review before the First Circuit. A pseudonym is used for purposes of this Article.  Ramirez’s immigration troubles began when, in high school, he was charged with an offense against a minor for sexual involvement with a schoolmate. 14 Id.  Based on this pending charge, ICE detained him and placed him in immigration removal proceedings. 15 Id.  In immigration court, Ramirez sought relief from removal by applying for adjustment of status to become a legal permanent resident, which he became eligible for after his mother became a naturalized U.S. citizen. 16 Id. at 5–6.  Although the immigration judge concluded that Ramirez was statutorily eligible for adjustment of status, the judge denied him relief and ordered him deported based solely on the pending criminal charge. 17 Id. at 7.  He was ultimately deported to a country where he feared persecution. 18 Attestation of Tiffany J. Lieu (Aug. 26, 2025) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Lieu, Attestation].

Ramirez’s deportation, based solely on the pending criminal proceedings, is all the more troubling in light of what did—or rather, did not—occur in those criminal proceedings. For nearly four years, Ramirez never had his day in criminal court to refute the allegations levied against him because he was stuck in immigration detention. 19 Rosa, 114 F.4th at 22 n.9.  ICE failed to produce him despite numerous state court writs of habeas corpus ordering that he be produced to court. 20 Lieu, Attestation, supra note 18.  In the end, immigration authorities deported him based solely on a charge that immigration authorities obstructed him from resolving. 21 Rosa, 114 F.4th at 7.  More than a year after he was deported, the First Circuit remanded his case to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)—the administrative appellate body that reviews immigration judges’ decisions and the highest administrative body for interpreting and applying immigration laws—to properly analyze the impact of the pending charge on his application for relief. 22 Id. at 25.  But still, he remains deported, as ICE has refused to permit his return to the United States.

Ramirez’s story is just one of many. Yet, thus far, immigration obstruction of court access has occurred in the shadows of public 23 Although press sources have reported on the obstruction-of-court-access problem, there has thus far been no systematic description or examination of the practice or its implications. See, e.g., Barbara Howard, ICE Detainees Can Now Answer State Charges, GBH (Jan. 30, 2019), https://www.wgbh.org/news/local/2019-01-30/ice-detainees-can-now-answer-state-charges [https://perma.cc/MVV7-HLLU] (last updated Aug. 1, 2023) (“It has been a problem for a while now: immigrants failing to show up to their state court hearings because they’re not being transported from federal [ICE] detention.”); Adrian Walker, Criminal Defendants in ICE Custody Haven’t Always Been Able to Have Their Day in Court. That’s About to Change, Bos. Globe (Jan. 29, 2019), https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2019/01/29/criminal-defendants-ice-custody-haven-always-been-able-have-their-day-court-that-about-change/L7xrSntmEyAh1InLXScZ7L/story.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (“You can’t clear your name if you can’t go to court, and many of those held—no one knows how many—weren’t being allowed to go to court.”).  and scholarly attention. Criminal law scholars have examined defendants’ failure to appear in criminal court after being released on bail, 24 See, e.g., Lauryn P. Gouldin, Keeping Up Appearances, 58 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1019, 1021–29, 1068–89 (2024) (examining pretrial appearances and critiquing the consequences for nonappearance).  but, as Lindsay Graef and others recently noted, failure to appear because a jailor failed to bring the defendant from jail to court is a type of failure to appear that “has been largely unrecognized in [criminal law] scholarship and policy conversations.” 25 Lindsay Graef, Sandra G. Mayson, Aurélie Ouss & Megan T. Stevenson, Systemic Failure to Appear in Court, 172 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 22 (2023).  Moreover, this body of criminal law scholarship does not consider the interaction between the criminal and immigration legal systems when the individual impacted is a noncitizen defendant stuck in immigration detention. Nor has there been much litigation challenging immigration failure to produce. 26 This author is co-counsel on a first-of-its-kind putative class action lawsuit challenging ICE’s policy of denying individuals in its custody at the Moshannon Valley Processing Center remote attendance to state criminal court proceedings in violation of their constitutional right to court access. See Doe v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 3:24-cv-00259-SLH-PLD (W.D. Pa. docketed Sep. 11, 2024). That litigation is ongoing.  Indeed, it bears noting that, while anecdotes like Ramirez’s abound, it is difficult to ascertain the precise scope of the problem empirically due to a lack of systematic recordkeeping by state or federal entities. 27 It is difficult to ascertain the precise scope of the problem because detention facilities do not keep close track of or report who in detention has pending criminal court proceedings, whether the facility received a state court writ for production of the individual, or whether the individual was ultimately produced to court. Similarly, criminal courts do not track in any systematic way, if at all, which defendants are detained in ICE custody and whether their failure to appear was due to immigration detention. Some advocates have sought this information on a local level in New Jersey through federal Freedom of Information Act requests and state public access records requests to ascertain the scope of ICE’s practice of failing to produce. These requests are pending. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 1–3, Legal Servs. of N.J. v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, No. 2:23-cv-22222 (D.N.J. filed Nov. 9, 2023) [hereinafter LSNJ FOIA Complaint]. Seeking empirical information through records requests on the state and federal levels is an area for further research.

Yet immigration obstruction of court access is an important subject of study not only because of the unique jeopardy noncitizen defendants face but also because it sheds new light on the interaction between the criminal and immigration legal systems when a noncitizen defendant faces active proceedings in both. This new understanding of crimmigration is all the more imperative as executive and congressional priorities and mandates increasingly bring active criminal and immigration proceedings into conflict.

This Article fills the scholastic and information gap. It examines the systems that permit obstruction of court access in immigration detention and the harms it imposes on noncitizen defendants as a matter of criminal law rights and immigration law rights, and it proposes a two-pronged solution to remedy the harms as an adjudicatory matter. In so doing, this Article contributes to existing criminal law and immigration law scholarship.

Drawing on court rulings, government documents, and client experience, Part I describes immigration obstruction of court access. It examines the immigration priorities and enforcement practices that result in a detention system that detains many noncitizens who have pending criminal proceedings. It then examines the ways ICE affirmatively and effectively obstructs those individuals from having their day in criminal court to answer those charges.

Part II turns to the question of how immigration detention could possibly be permitted to obstruct a noncitizen defendant’s constitutional rights to court access in this way. This Article argues that the answer lays in what Professor David Sklansky has called in other contexts an “accountability deficit.” 28 See David Alan Sklansky, Crime, Immigration, and Ad Hoc Instrumentalism, 15 New Crim. L. Rev. 157, 217–19 (2012).  When neither the immigration jailor nor the criminal prosecutor face consequences for refusing to produce a noncitizen defendant to criminal court proceedings, obstruction of court access is permitted to occur with effective impunity. The accountability deficit, then, is paid by the noncitizen defendant stuck in immigration detention who suffers harms under both the criminal and immigration legal systems.

The existence of the accountability deficit in immigration obstruction of court access is glaring when compared with the accountability mechanisms that lawmakers have legislated in the criminal custody context. 29 See infra section II.A.  Indeed, the problem of obstruction of court access is not unique to immigration detention. For much of U.S. history, defendants serving carceral sentences in one jurisdiction while facing prosecution in another jurisdiction have similarly struggled to exercise their rights to face charges against them. 30 See infra section II.A.  Recognizing this problem, the states and federal government enacted the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, 31 See 18 U.S.C. app. § 2 (2018).  which requires that charges be dismissed if incarcerated individuals are not brought to court and timely tried. 32 See infra section II.A.2.  Lawmakers, in effect, legislated accountability to protect defendants’ rights in criminal custody. Such legislated accountability, however, does not apply when a noncitizen defendant is subject to civil immigration detention. 33 See infra section II.B.

Having identified the accountability deficit, Part III examines the consequences of that dearth. It posits three interrelated implications that are underexplored in criminal law scholarship and immigration law scholarship and give rise to an accountability imperative.

First, noncitizen defendants stuck in immigration detention suffer criminal law harms of constitutional proportion when they are obstructed from participating in criminal proceedings. 34 See infra section III.A.  The right to have one’s day in court is a foundational precept of the U.S. criminal justice system, safeguarded by a constellation of rights under the First, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments. 35 See generally Wayne R. LaFave, Jerold H. Isarael, Nancy J. King & Orin S. Kerr, Modern Criminal Procedure: Cases, Comments, and Questions (16th ed. 2023) (examining a defendant’s constitutional rights to counsel, speedy trial, confrontation, and compulsory process in criminal proceedings).  The Supreme Court has long made explicit that these criminal procedure rights apply to anyone in criminal proceedings, regardless of whether they are a citizen or are detained. 36 See, e.g., Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 237–38 (1896) (explaining that noncitizens in criminal proceedings are entitled to full constitutional criminal procedural protections).  Thus, through a criminal rights lens, the constitutional dilemma that occurs when ICE obstructs a noncitizen defendant from appearing in court is, perhaps, intuitive. In Doe v. Department of Homeland Security, a putative class action on which this author is co-counsel, the district court concluded that ICE’s obstruction of court access policy at the Moshannon Valley Processing Center was likely unconstitutional, emphasizing that even defendants agreed “that a deprivation of access to criminal court proceedings causes a waterfall of further . . . deprivations [that] are illegal under the United States Constitution.” 37 Doe v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 3:24-cv-00259-SLH-PLD, 2025 WL 360534, at *5 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 31, 2025).  The court issued a preliminary injunction ordering defendants to “immediately function in compliance with the tenants of the United States Constitution” by granting individuals access to criminal court proceedings virtually. 38 Order Granting Preliminary Injunction at 1, Doe, 2025 WL 360534.  But outside the context of this one case, which remains ongoing, individuals who are in ICE custody are continually obstructed from attending criminal proceedings in violation of their constitutional rights.

Second, this criminal law obstruction, in turn, harms noncitizen defendants in immigration proceedings in what this Article calls “cyclical obstruction.” Immigration judges, as an evidentiary and adjudicatory matter, are permitted to and do often consider unresolved criminal proceedings against an individual to deny release from detention or deny immigration relief, leading to deportation. 39 See infra section III.B.  These dual immigration consequences are harms in and of themselves and, moreover, interact with the criminal legal system to fuel cyclical obstruction. That is, the very detention that obstructs the criminal process perpetuates that detention, which in turn perpetuates the obstruction of criminal process, and so on. Deportation fuels the same cycle of obstruction. Obstruction of court access and the accountability deficit, then, shed light on the interaction between the criminal and immigration legal systems that occurs because immigration judges can consider the resulting unresolved charges.

This cyclical obstruction, and its evidentiary/adjudicatory origins, compels a new understanding of the criminal–immigration interaction. Much of the crimmigration scholarship has focused on the impact of one system on the other. Professor Stephen Legomsky, for example, has theorized that elements of the criminal legal system have been asymmetrically incorporated into immigration proceedings and adjudication—that is, criminal law enforcement methodologies but not criminal procedural protections have been incorporated. 40 See Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law: Asymmetric Incorporation of Criminal Justice Norms, 64 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 469, 474–75 (2007).  Flowing in the opposite direction, scholars like Jennifer Chacόn, 41 See Jennifer M. Chacόn, Managing Migration Through Crime, 109 Colum. L. Rev. Sidebar 135, 136–37 (2009), https://columbialawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/
08/Chacon1.pdf [https://perma.cc/9GNZ-M6PR] (arguing that the relaxed procedural norms of civil immigration proceedings are being imported into the criminal realm).
 Ingrid Eagly, 42 See Ingrid V. Eagly, Prosecuting Immigration, 104 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1281, 1288 (2010) (arguing that the immigration agency interacts with criminal process to erode procedural protections afforded to criminal defendants).  and Amy Kimpel 43 See Amy F. Kimpel, Alienating Criminal Procedure, 37 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 237, 241 (2023) (arguing that the increased prosecution of immigration crime is changing criminal procedure in the federal courts, including through mass hearings and eroding Fourth Amendment rights).  have theorized the ways immigration law and adjudication have begun to erode criminal procedural norms. This Article’s study of the obstruction of court access builds on this scholarship by articulating the bidirectional impact of the criminal and immigration legal systems and the ways in which the immigration system, quite literally, obstructs criminal process. This cyclical obstruction is significant: The noncitizen defendant stuck in immigration detention faces a double and cyclical jeopardy.

The third and final implication of obstruction of court access and the accountability deficit must be understood through the institutional design of the immigration apparatus. That design is one in which the jailor and prosecutor are the same entity and are commingled with the judge. Drawing on the growing body of scholarship that has examined the administration of immigration law through the lens of institutional design, 44 See, e.g., Adam B. Cox & Eric A. Posner, The Second-Order Structure of Immigration Law, 59 Stan. L. Rev. 809, 814 (2007) (examining the design choices governing how immigrants are screened and selected and conflicting incentives within the immigration system); Alina Das, Immigration Detention: Information Gaps and Institutional Barriers to Reform, 80 U. Chi. L. Rev. 137, 139 (2013) (examining the institutional design choices governing the use of information in immigration detention); Eagly, supra note 42, at 1290–91 (examining the institutional design of criminal immigration prosecutions).  this Article posits that the roles of jailor, prosecutor, and judge lack sufficient internal checks and balances. Indeed, the same entity, ICE, is both the jailor who prevents noncitizen defendants from resolving criminal charges and the prosecutor who uses those pending charges against them to detain and seek to deport. In other words, ICE as the jailor and prosecutor is capable of effectively manufacturing evidence against a noncitizen defendant in immigration proceedings in the form of unresolved criminal charges or, at the very least, preventing noncitizen defendants from presenting exculpatory evidence. That evidence, or lack thereof, in turn, is then considered by immigration judges—whom scholars have critiqued as lacking independence because they are also governed by an executive department with the same immigration policy agenda 45 Mary Holper, The Fourth Amendment Implications of “U.S. Imitation Judges”, 104 Minn. L. Rev. 1275, 1306–13 (2020) [hereinafter Holper, Imitation Judges] (arguing that immigration judges are not neutral arbiters in bond hearings in violation of the Fourth Amendment); Stephen H. Legomsky, Deportation and the War on Independence, 91 Corn. L. Rev. 369, 372–75 (2006) [hereinafter Legomsky, War on Independence] (describing immigration judges’ concerns with Justice Department involvement in their adjudication of immigration cases); Stephen H. Legomsky, Restructuring Immigration Adjudication, 59 Duke L.J. 1635, 1644–76, 1685–720 (2010) (calling for a new immigration system with immigration judges independent from the Justice Department); Tara Magner, Immigration Judges Seek Independence From Department of Justice, 16 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 733, 733 (2002) (referencing the National Association of Immigration Judges’ petition for immigration courts to be placed under an independent agency). —to detain and deport noncitizen defendants, which further drives the cyclical obstruction of criminal court access. The implications of this institutional design in the context of obstruction of court access make the need for accountability all the more imperative.

Part III, in sum, tells the story of the implications of the accountability deficit in obstruction of court access. It demonstrates that immigration obstruction of court access quite literally obstructs criminal process in violation of individual constitutional criminal law rights, and it identifies two facets of the immigration system—one adjudicatory and one institutional design—that interact with the criminal system to create a cycle of harm in both criminal and immigration proceedings.

Part IV then turns to closing the accountability deficit. The focal point of the proposed solution is not about how to directly force ICE to produce a noncitizen defendant in criminal court, but rather to assign accountability to criminal prosecutors and ICE as the jailor and immigration prosecutor when obstruction of court access occurs. To do so, Part IV proposes a two-pronged remedy that draws upon the implications previously identified. The remedy is two-pronged because the consequences of the accountability gap are cyclical and flow to both the criminal and immigration systems. Accountability mechanisms, therefore, must attach in both. On the criminal side of the ledger, this Part proposes that if an individual is not able to appear in criminal court, the charges against them must be dismissed. As to immigration proceedings, this Part proposes that the BIA restrict immigration judges from considering pending or dismissed criminal proceedings against an individual if ICE has obstructed their ability to resolve those proceedings. Omitting such evidence mitigates the adjudicatory and institutional design concerns. While these remedies may seem improbable in the current political environment, they are what strict adherence to constitutional principles demands.