Introduction
More than a decade ago, a beer commercial featured a group of people playing wheelchair basketball.
In the ad, the game is raucous. The players shout, push, collide, and fall out of their chairs. Their shirts are soaked in sweat. When the game ends, however, all but one of the players stand up out of their chairs and walk off the court. It turns out that only one participant actually needs a wheelchair. This image, together with a voice-over about “loyalty” and “commitment,” suggests that this is a story about companionship. If one of the friends cannot run, the rest will play in wheelchairs.
While the commercial’s portrayal of disability drew both criticism and praise,
one marketing aspect does not seem to be in dispute: the use of surprise. After all, most viewers probably did not expect to see individuals using wheelchairs for reasons unrelated to physical impairment. Indeed, in the popular imagination, disability integration generally goes in only one direction: integrating disabled
people into mainstream society. People
rarely think about what this paper calls inverse integration,
a term that refers to nondisabled persons participating in disability-focused settings, frameworks, or activities.
Inverse integration may be surprising, but it is neither rare nor entirely new. In the past three decades, for example, an increasing number of high schools and colleges have started offering American Sign Language (ASL) courses to hearing students.
As a result, ASL is currently the third most studied “foreign language”
in higher education.
Other examples abound: Nondisabled persons reside in housing projects for disabled individuals,
nondisabled students participate in “special education” programs,
hearing actors perform in Deaf theaters,
and, as the beer commercial illustrates, nondisabled athletes engage in wheelchair sports.
The seeming popularity of inverse-integration practices is a puzzle, however, since both legal and social norms seem to push in the opposite direction. On the legal side, disability rights law advances a “mainstreaming” model of integration,
which focuses on allowing disabled persons to enter predominantly nondisabled spaces. On the social side, disability rights advocates are often suspicious of initiatives in which the presence of nondisabled persons has the potential to disrupt the dynamics of disability-focused spaces or siphon opportunities and resources away from disabled persons.
And then, of course, there is the fact that mainstream society still stigmatizes disability, which means that nondisabled persons are often reluctant to engage with disability culture in the first place.
Thus, if legal and social norms are not driving inverse integration, then what is? This Article argues that what may motivate some disabled persons to invite nondisabled persons into disabled spaces, and what propels some nondisabled persons to enter those spaces, is the need to establish close interpersonal relationships.
For example, inverse integration allows disabled and nondisabled persons to share experiences, interests, and common language with family members, friends, and intimate partners.
This understanding, in turn, sheds new light on the problems with the existing disability rights framework. Specifically, this Article reveals the relational deficit of traditional integration. While some scholars have noted that disability rights statutes are focused on commercial transactions rather than “humane relationships,”
this Article conceptualizes this issue as a systemic feature of disability rights law. By juxtaposing inverse integration against the existing framework, this Article opens the door to an examination of how the law can better promote and cultivate interpersonal relationships.
This is not to suggest, however, that we should give up on traditional integration or that inverse integration itself can end disability discrimination. In fact, even though some disabled persons find inverse integration desirable,
it may, in some cases, be detrimental to the disability community. Inverse integration can, for example, potentially involve tokenism, co-optation, or cultural appropriation.
Thus, rather than promoting inverse integration, this Article has the following three goals: (1) to identify interpersonal relationships as the underlying principle that likely drives inverse integration, (2) to use this relationality principle to test the normative underpinnings of conventional integration, and (3) to show how current disability law could benefit from the incorporation of this principle.
Studying a relationship-based model of integration is particularly exigent given that in-person interactions are becoming less frequent.
Indeed, despite research establishing the significance of relationships for individual well-being
and workforce participation,
people in the United States today experience high rates of loneliness and social isolation.
And this burden falls disproportionally on disabled persons,
who may be the only people in their families or communities with the specific type of impairment in question.
Drawing upon instances of inverse integration, this Article imagines what a more relational disability rights regime would look like and proposes specific legal and policy interventions.
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part I defines and elucidates the concept of inverse integration. It explains that the definition of inverse integration relies on three elements, each construed broadly: disability, focus, and integration. Part II explores the interaction between inverse integration and legal and social norms. It shows that social norms and the law are not the primary drivers of inverse integration. In fact, they often hinder the involvement of nondisabled persons in disabled spaces or activities. On the basis of this observation, Part II concludes that there must be another principle that facilitates inverse-integration practices. In Part III, this Article suggests a possible driver: the need to foster interpersonal relationships. Specifically, this Article posits that inverse integration offers unique relational opportunities by promoting three primary elements of interpersonal relationships: communication, shared experiences, and reciprocity.
Recognizing the relational advantages of inverse integration, Part IV uses it as a lens through which to evaluate traditional integration. This analysis shows that the mainstreaming model of integration suffers from a relational deficit in that it generally fails to protect, facilitate, and reinforce interpersonal relationships between disabled and nondisabled persons. Thus, the analysis of inverse integration serves as a vehicle to identify the flaws in disability rights law and shows the importance of incorporating relationality into the disability integration regime at the structural level. Last, Part V proposes legal and policy interventions aimed at strengthening the relational potential of disability rights laws in the United States.