FISCAL CITIZENSHIP AND TAXPAYER PRIVACY

FISCAL CITIZENSHIP AND TAXPAYER PRIVACY

Should individual tax data be public or confidential? Within the United States, secrecy has been the rule since the Tax Reform Act of 1976. But at three critical junctures—the Civil War, the 1920s, and the 1930s—Congress made individual tax records open for public inspection, and newspapers published the incomes of the billionaires of the time. Today, Finland, Norway, and Sweden all mandate significant transparency for individual tax information.

This Essay intervenes in the tax-confidentiality debate by building a new analytical framework of fiscal citizenship. Until now, scholars have focused on compliance—whether disclosure incentivizes honest reporting of income, and if it does, whether compliance gains outweigh the intrusion into a generalized notion of taxpayer privacy. But the choice between confidentiality and transparency implicates more than compliance. It rests on the taxpayers’ dynamic interactions with the fiscal apparatus of a state that aspires to democracy and egalitarianism. This Essay posits that fiscal citizens play the roles of reporters, funders, stakeholders, and policymakers in the tax system. Within these roles, transparency and privacy have distinct valences. Further, the degree to which any taxpayer partakes in each role depends on both their own income and the income inequality within the community structured by federal taxation. Under this taxonomy, the propriety of disclosure falls onto a spectrum, and transparency is more appropriate for ultrawealthy taxpayers in times of high economic inequality. The Essay thus provides insights to help policymakers design public-disclosure regimes that cohere with the norms implicit in our fiscal social contract with the state.

The full text of this Essay can be found by clicking the PDF link to the left.

Introduction

Economic inequality in the United States has reached record levels and poses serious threats to the egalitarianism that forms the foundation of our democracy. 1 See Joseph Fishkin & William E. Forbath, The Anti-Oligarchy Constitution: Reconstructing the Economic Foundations of American Democracy 32 (2022) [hereinafter Fishkin & Forbath, Anti-Oligarchy] (“For the revolutionary generation, political liberty—the very heart of the [American] Revolution—depended on economic equality.”); Rosalind Dixon & Julie Suk, Liberal Constitutionalism and Economic Inequality, 85 U. Chi. L. Rev. 369, 371–74 (2018) (noting rising income inequality around the world); Joseph Fishkin & William Forbath, Reclaiming Constitutional Political Economy: An Introduction to the Symposium on the Constitution and Economic Inequality, 94 Tex. L. Rev. 1287, 1292–93 (2016) (“The American Constitution . . . is threatened in a fundamental way by gross inequalities of wealth.”); Ari Glogower, Taxing Inequality, 93 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1421, 1423–24 (2018) (noting that income inequality has reached levels not seen since the Great Depression); Ajay K. Mehrotra, The Missing U.S. VAT: Economic Inequality, American Fiscal Exceptionalism, and the Historical U.S. Resistance to National Consumption Taxes, 117 Nw. U. L. Rev. 151, 159–63 (2022) (“[I]ncome inequality within countries has increased dramatically, with the concentration of wealth at the top end of the spectrum skyrocketing, especially in the United States.” (emphasis omitted)); Thomas Piketty, Emmanuel Saez & Gabriel Zucman, Distributional National Accounts: Methods and Estimates for the United States, 133 Q.J. Econ. 553, 557 (2018) (showing significant increases in the income share of the top 1% of American earners); Emmanuel Saez & Gabriel Zucman, Wealth Inequality in the United States Since 1913: Evidence from Capitalized Income Tax Data, 131 Q.J. Econ. 519, 523 (2016) [hereinafter Saez & Zucman, Wealth Inequality] (“In 2012, the wealth share of the top 0.1% was three times higher than in 1978, and almost as high as in the 1916 and 1929 historical peaks.”); Frederick Solt, Economic Inequality and Democratic Political Engagement, 52 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 48, 57–58 (2008) (finding that economic inequality adversely affects transitions to stable democratic regimes). Exacerbating this inequality is a perception that the ultrawealthy have not borne their fair share of the costs of governance. 2 See, e.g., Alex Raskolnikov, Taxing the Ten Percent, 62 Hous. L. Rev. 57, 63 (2024) (“A common justification for taxing the rich is that their staggering economic success is destroying the American Dream.”). In response, policymakers and advocates have renewed calls for not only substantive tax and welfare reforms but also transparency in the tax records of the wealthy and the powerful. 3 See, e.g., Joshua D. Blank, Presidential Tax Transparency, 40 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 1, 7 (2021) [hereinafter Blank, Tax Transparency] (arguing for the mandatory disclosure of elected officials’ tax records, if done properly); Daniel J. Hemel, Can New York Publish President Trump’s State Tax Returns?, 127 Yale L.J. Forum 62, 66–70 (2017), https://www.yalelawjournal.org/pdf/Hemel_hcpha29m.pdf [https://perma.cc/5G9B-5D4L] (discussing the potential benefits of presidential tax transparency); Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Doing the Full Monty: Will Publicizing Tax Information Increase Compliance?, 18 Can. J.L. & Juris. 95, 98–103 (2005) [hereinafter Kornhauser, Full Monty] (emphasizing how public visibility of tax records could increase accountability and improve revenues); Joseph J. Thorndike, Presidential Tax Disclosure Is Important—and Not Because of Trump, 165 Tax Notes 1722 (2019) [hereinafter Thorndike, Presidential Disclosure] (“America needs a law mandating presidential tax disclosure—even if it means giving Trump a pass and imposing it only on future chief executives.”); Joseph J. Thorndike, The Thorndike Challenge, 123 Tax Notes 691, 691 (2019) [hereinafter Thorndike, Challenge] (articulating the benefits of requiring elected officials to release their tax returns); Binyamin Appelbaum, Opinion, Everyone’s Income Taxes Should Be Public, N.Y. Times (Apr. 13, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/13/opinion/sunday/taxes-public.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (“Disclosure also could help to reduce disparities in income, as well as disparities in tax payments.”); Lily Batchelder & David Kamin, Taxing the Rich: Issues and Options 3 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (discussing the policy options for systemic tax redistribution in the United States). President Donald Trump’s tax returns provided the most dramatic illustration. During his first presidential campaign and tenure, Trump refused to release his tax returns, breaking from the longstanding practice—since 1973—of voluntary disclosure. 4 Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Trump Won’t Release His Tax Returns, N.Y. Times (Jan. 22, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/22/us/politics/donald-trump-tax-returns.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review); see also Blank, Tax Transparency, supra note 3, at 11–14. The fight for Trump’s tax returns prompted the House Ways and Means Committee to request his tax records from the Treasury Department. 5 Letter from Richard E. Neal, Chairman, H. Comm. on Ways and Means, to Charles P. Rettig, Comm’r, IRS (Apr. 3, 2019), https://cdn.cnn.com/cnn/2019/images/04/03/neal.letter.to.rettig.signed.2019.04.03.pdf [https://perma.cc/PGU2-5CBL]; see also Ways and Means Comm.’s Request for the Former President’s Tax Returns Pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 6103(f)(1), 45 Op. O.L.C., slip op. at 1–2 (2021). The New York District Attorney and the House Financial Services Committee likewise subpoenaed them from Mazars, LLP, and Deutsche Bank. 6 Trump v. Vance, 140 S. Ct. 2412, 2420 n.2 (2020); Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP, 140 S. Ct. 2019, 2027 (2020). This struggle culminated in two Supreme Court rulings on separation of powers and the criminal investigation authority of state grand juries, 7 Vance, 140 S. Ct. at 2429; Mazars, 140 S. Ct. at 2035–36. as well as an order quietly acquiescing to the disclosure of Trump’s tax returns to the House Ways and Means Committee under the Internal Revenue Code (Code). 8 See Trump v. Comm. on Ways & Means, 143 S. Ct. 476 (2022) (mem.) (denying Trump’s application for stay); see also 26 U.S.C. § 6103(f)(1) (2018) (“Upon written request from the chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives . . . the Secretary shall furnish such committee with any return or return information specified in such request.”). After the House released those tax returns to the public, it became clear that Trump had engaged in years of tax avoidance, often reported no income tax liability due to business losses, and broken his campaign promise to donate his salary. 9 Russ Buettner, Susanne Craig & Mike McIntire, Long-Concealed Records Show Trump’s Chronic Losses and Years of Tax Avoidance, N.Y. Times (Sept. 27, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/09/27/us/donald-trump-taxes.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review); Jim Tankersley, Susanne Craig & Russ Buettner, Trump Tax Returns Undermine His Image as a Successful Entrepreneur, N.Y. Times (Dec. 30, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/2022/12/30/us/politics/trump-tax-returns.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review).

Even more consequential is the leak of thousands of ultrawealthy Americans’ tax records to ProPublica in 2021. 10 Jesse Eisinger, Jeff Ernsthausen & Paul Kiel, The Secret IRS Files: Trove of Never-Before-Seen Records Reveal How the Wealthiest Avoid Income Tax, ProPublica (June 8, 2021), https://www.propublica.org/article/the-secret-irs-files-trove-of-never-before-seen-records-reveal-how-the-wealthiest-avoid-income-tax [https://perma.cc/6L36-3VC6]; see also David Gamage & John R. Brooks, Tax Now or Tax Never: Political Optionality and the Case for Current-Assessment Tax Reform, 100 N.C. L. Rev. 487, 512 n.123 (2022) (discussing the reports released by ProPublica). These records, including the tax information of Jeff Bezos, Elon Musk, and Warren Buffett, reveal how the wealthy use legal doctrine and loopholes to achieve substantial tax avoidance. For example, the ProPublica report revealed that Musk used the realization doctrine and the nontaxation of borrowed funds 11 In general, the realization doctrine requires disposition of property before taxing appreciation so that, for example, appreciated stocks are not taxed until sold, if ever. See Cottage Sav. Ass’n v. Comm’r, 499 U.S. 554, 559 (1991) (holding that an exchange of legally distinct entitlements is sufficient for realization); Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955) (“Here we have instances of undeniable accessions to wealth, clearly realized, and over which the taxpayers have complete dominion.”); Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 212 (1920) (holding that pro rata stock dividends are not taxable). to pay no federal income tax in 2018. 12 Eisinger et al., supra note 10; see also Edward J. McCaffery, The Death of the Income Tax (or, The Rise of America’s Universal Wage Tax), 95 Ind. L.J. 1233, 1263–64 (2020) (describing the use of the realization doctrine by the wealthy to avoid income taxes).

The ProPublica leak triggered investigations by the Department of Justice and the Inspector General for Tax Administration after some lawmakers decried the “egregious and unprecedented leak of confidential taxpayer information.” 13 Letter from Jason Smith, Chairman, H. Comm. on Ways & Means, to J. Russell George, Treasury Inspector Gen., Tax Admin. (Feb. 16, 2023), https://waysandmeans.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/2.16.23-Ltr-to-TIGTA-on-ProPublica.pdf [https://perma.cc/L44S-TA4F]. Ken Griffin, the billionaire founder of a major hedge fund, sued the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) in federal court for willful and grossly negligent disclosure of his tax return, citing provisions of the Code that—according to his complaint—show “Congress’s promise” to safeguard taxpayer privacy. 14 Complaint at 8, Griffin v. Internal Revenue Serv., No. 1:22-cv-24023-KMW (S.D. Fla. filed Dec. 13, 2022). In January 2024, a federal district court sentenced the leaker—a former IRS contractor—to five years of imprisonment for his “egregious” crime of “attack[ing] . . . our constitutional democracy.” 15 See Brian Faler, Trump Tax Return Leaker Sentenced to 5 Years in Prison, Politico (Jan. 29, 2024), https://www.politico.com/news/2024/01/29/irs-charles-littlejohn-tax-prison-trump-00138367 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Judge Ana Reyes); see also Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Littlejohn’s Unjust Tax Sentence, 183 Tax Notes 1441 (2024) (discussing the “five-year prison sentence” imposed on the contractor); Press Release, DOJ, Former IRS Contractor Sentenced for Disclosing Tax Return Information to News Organizations (Jan. 29, 2024), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/former-irs-contractor-sentenced-disclosing-tax-return-information-news-organizations [https://perma.cc/3XRF-ZU5H]. In June, the IRS settled Griffin’s lawsuit, “sincerely apologize[d]” for the leak, and promised “to strengthen its safeguarding of taxpayer information” by investing in data security. 16 Press Release, IRS, IRS Statement as Part of the Resolution of Kenneth C. Griffin v. IRS, Case No. 22-cv-24023 (S.D. Fla.), IR-2024-172 (June 25, 2024), https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/irs-statement-as-part-of-the-resolution-of-kenneth-c-griffin-v-irs-case-no-22-cv-24023-sd-fla [https://perma.cc/64X6-MU6F].

Recent events thus foreground the enduring debate whether individuals’ tax information should be public records or kept confidential. 17 Within the United States, the debate on tax confidentiality is as old as the income tax itself. See infra section I.A (describing tax-disclosure provisions associated with the first federal income tax during the Civil War). In the United States, the Tax Reform Act of 1976 enacted the statutory scheme that governs taxpayer privacy today. 18 Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1202, 90 Stat. 1520, 1667–85 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 6103 (2018)). I.R.C. § 6103 prohibits employees and officers of the United States from disclosing to the public any tax information or returns, broadly defined to include the taxpayer’s identity, income, deductions, exemptions, liability, and net worth. 19 26 U.S.C. § 6103(a), (b)(1)–(2). Exceptions authorize disclosure only to congressional committees in charge of tax legislation (e.g., the House Ways and Means Committee, which obtained Trump’s tax returns), state and federal law enforcement, and the taxpayer’s designees. 20 Id. § 6103(d)–(i).

But confidentiality has not always been the rule. The nation’s first income tax, enacted to fund the Civil War, authorized public inspection of tax records. 21 Revenue Act of 1864, ch. 173, § 19, 13 Stat. 223, 228; Revenue Act of 1862, ch. 119, §§ 15, 19, 12 Stat. 432, 437, 439. By 1865, the New York Times regularly printed the incomes and the tax liabilities of the richest Americans, like the Vanderbilts. 22 Our Internal Revenue; The Sixth Collection District in Full. Official Lists of Assessments and Collections. Interesting Data Statistical and Personal Peculiarities of the District. Tremendous Income List. William B. Astor’s Income One Million. Three Hundred Thousand Dollars. The Sixth Collection District, the Collector’s Office the Last Six Months, the Total Annuals Manufacturers’ Returns the Special War Tax the Assessor’s Office Assistant Assessors, Assistant Assessors, N.Y. Times (July 8, 1865), https://www.nytimes.com/1865/07/08/archives/our-internal-revenue-the-sixth-collection-district-in-full-official.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter N.Y. Times, Our Internal Revenue]. Transparency again prevailed in the mid-1920s, after progressive lawmakers pushed for public scrutiny of tax evasion, 23 Mark Leff, The Limits of Symbolic Reform: The New Deal and Taxation, 1933–1939, at 67 (1984) (describing tax transparency as a “prototypical progressive reform”); see also Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 257(b), 43 Stat. 253, 293 (mandating public inspection of income tax liabilities). and for a moment in 1934, at a time of heightened economic inequality during the Great Depression. 24 Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, § 55(b), 48 Stat. 680, 698; Saez & Zucman, Wealth Inequality, supra note 1, at app. fig.B2 (showing that the top 10%’s share of wealth reached a height of above 80% from the mid-1920s to the mid-1930s); see also Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Shaping Public Opinion and the Law: How a “Common Man” Campaign Ended a Rich Man’s Law, 73 Law & Contemp. Probs. 123, 129–30 (2010) [hereinafter Kornhauser, Shaping Public Opinion] (discussing the Congressional push for tax publicity to prevent abuse). Today, Finland, 25 1346/1999 Laki verotustietojen julkisuudesta ja salassapidosta [Act on the Public Disclosure and Confidentiality of Tax Information], ch. 2, § 5 (Fin.) (defining as public information a taxpayer’s annual income, as well as income tax and wealth tax liabilities); Kristiina Äimä, Finland, in Tax Transparency: EATLP Annual Congress Zürich 491, 491–92 (Funda Başaran Yavaşlar & Johanna Hey, eds., 2019). Norway, 26 See Ricardo Perez-Truglia, The Effects of Income Transparency on Well-Being: Evidence from a Natural Experiment, 110 Am. Econ. Rev. 1019, 1019–20 (2020) (“In the fall of 2001, the Norwegian media digitized tax records and created websites that allowed any individual with internet access to search anyone’s tax records.”). and Sweden, 27 Tryckfrihetsförordningen [TF] [Constitution] 2:1 (Swed.) (Freedom of the Press Act of 1766) (providing public access to all official documents); 27 ch. 6 § Offentlighets- och sekretesslag (Svensk författningssamling [SFS] 2009:400) (Swed.) (authorizing public disclosure of tax decisions, which include the taxpayer’s earned income and capital gains); see also Anna-Maria Hambre, Tax Confidentiality in Sweden and the United States—A Comparative Study, 43 Int’l J. Legal Info. 165, 171–198 (2015). among others, allow a significant degree of disclosure of individual income and wealth tax information to the public. Importantly, both historical legislative debate and contemporary disclosure regimes ground tax transparency in egalitarian terms. That is, disclosure of tax information instantiates a foundational, democratic commitment to open fiscal governance.

In this lasting contest between taxpayer privacy and disclosure, scholarship has had a clear focus: compliance. It has questioned whether publicity aids compliance with tax laws, and if it does, whether the compliance gains outweigh the intrusion into a generalized notion of the taxpayer’s right to privacy. 28 See Boris I. Bittker, Federal Income Tax Returns—Confidentiality vs. Public Disclosure, 20 Washburn L.J. 479, 479 (1981) (arguing that “privacy and disclosure can come into conflict—a possibility that has been insufficiently recognized by the courts and the commentators.”); Joseph J. Darby, Confidentiality and the Law of Taxation, 46 Am. J. Compar. L. 577, 587 (Supp. 1998) (arguing that confidentiality “provides an important incentive” to ensure compliance); Michael Hatfield, Privacy in Taxation, 44 Fla. State U. L. Rev. 579, 606 (2017) (describing how tax scholarship portrays taxpayer compliance as a “tradeoff”). Proponents of disclosure stress its potential as an automatic enforcement tool. 29 See infra notes 290–297 and accompanying text. They argue that public access to tax information could deter tax evasion by increasing the perceived risk of detection and lower revenue-collection costs by fostering social norms of voluntary compliance. 30 See, e.g., Erlend E. Bø, Joel Slemrod & Thor O. Thoresen, Taxes on the Internet: Deterrence Effects of Public Disclosure, 7 Am. Econ. J.: Econ. Pol’y 36, 37 (2015) (arguing that public disclosure of tax information presents an opportunity for an individual to demonstrate financial success, incentivizing compliance); Kornhauser, Full Monty, supra note 3, at 96–97 (discussing the social and moral factors that may incentivize compliance); Susan Laury & Sally Wallace, Confidentiality and Taxpayer Compliance, 58 Nat’l Tax J. 427, 428–29 (2005) (arguing that individuals would be more likely comply to avoid public embarrassment if noncompliance were publicly disclosed); Leandra Lederman, The Interplay Between Norms and Enforcement in Tax Compliance, 64 Ohio St. L.J. 1453, 1457–62 (2003) [hereinafter Lederman, Norms and Enforcement] (“[D]eterrence does not seem to explain all tax compliance and there is empirical evidence that compliance norms play a role.” (footnote omitted)); David Lenter, Joel Slemrod & Douglas Shackelford, Public Disclosure of Corporate Tax Return Information: Accounting, Economics, and Legal Perspectives, 56 Nat’l Tax J. 803, 823–27 (2003) (“Undoubtedly full disclosure of corporate tax returns would substantially change what is revealed in the document, but how much this disclosure would compromise IRS enforcement efforts is unknown . . . .”); Marc Linder, Tax Glasnost’ for Millionaires: Peeking Behind the Veil of Ignorance Along the Publicity-Privacy Continuum, 18 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 951, 977 (1991) (outlining how twentieth-century Progressives favored publicity as a means of forcing the rich to comply with tax law); Stephen W. Mazza, Taxpayer Privacy and Tax Compliance, 51 U. Kan. L. Rev. 1065, 1076–78 (2003) (discussing how public messaging can encourage tax compliance); Eric A. Posner, Law and Social Norms: The Case of Tax Compliance, 86 Va. L. Rev. 1781, 1791, 1796 (2000) [hereinafter Posner, Law and Social Norms] (arguing that fear of social retribution may incentivize people to comply). By contrast, defenders of privacy dispute the enforcement potential of publicity. 31 See infra notes 298–304 and accompanying text. They contend that taxpayers entrust the state with private information on the expectation that it will keep such information confidential. 32 See Off. of Tax Pol’y, Treasury Dep’t, Report to Congress on Scope and Use of Taxpayer Confidentiality and Disclosure Provisions 18–19 (2000) (explaining the Department of the Treasury’s long-standing position that reliance on self-reporting is justified “principally because” taxpayers know that their information will remain private); Joshua D. Blank, In Defense of Individual Tax Privacy, 61 Emory L.J. 265, 280–82 (2011) [hereinafter Blank, In Defense of Individual Tax Privacy] (describing the taxpayer-trust theory); Hatfield, supra note 28, at 606 (same). More recently, scholars have argued that privacy enables the federal government to exploit taxpayers’ cognitive biases to influence their perception of its tax-enforcement capacity, thus aiding compliance goals. 33 Blank, In Defense of Individual Tax Privacy, supra note 32, at 269–70; see also Joshua D. Blank, Reconsidering Corporate Tax Privacy, 11 N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. 31, 77–79 (2014) (explaining that tax publicity in the corporate context may lead to decreased compliance due to the perception that competitors could benefit from information in the disclosure); Joshua D. Blank & Daniel Z. Levin, When Is Tax Enforcement Publicized?, 30 Va. Tax Rev. 1, 5–8 (2010) (explaining the belief that publicity of tax abuses may weaken tax morale and compliance by causing individuals to believe that other taxpayers are engaged in similar tax abuse without detection). For a broader discussion on the influence of tax transparency on economic behavior, see generally Deborah H. Schenk, Exploiting the Salience Bias in Designing Taxes, 28 Yale J. on Regul. 253, 264–70 (2011) (“If [a] tax is not very salient, there will be no change in response or less change in response than there would have been had the tax been more visible.”).

But the choice between privacy and transparency implicates more than just tax compliance. 34 For historical and comparative arguments that ground the demand for public disclosure in values beyond tax enforcement, see infra sections I.A–II.A. Federal taxation not only aims to maximize the revenues collected within the bounds of rules that determine taxpayers’ liability, it also structures our fiscal relationship with a state that aspires to democracy and egalitarianism. 35 Conversely—and much more discussed in scholarship—democratic institutions and the design of their bureaucracies influence tax policymaking. See, e.g., Sven Steinmo, Taxation and Democracy: Swedish, British and American Approaches to Financing the Modern State 7–13 (1993) (explaining that the different democratic systems in Britain, Sweden, and the United States “have profoundly shaped the formulation of tax policy in each of these three countries”). Whether the government should disclose any individual citizen’s tax records to the public therefore depends on the nature of this dynamic relationship between the taxpayer and the state. This Essay constructs such a framework, positing that taxpayers play four main roles as they interact with the fiscal apparatus of a democratic regime: (1) as reporters of nonpublic information; (2) as funders of the state; (3) as stakeholders entitled to what they deserve as a matter of law and dignity; and (4) as policymaking partners with the government in shaping federal tax law. 36 See infra section III.A. Within these roles, transparency and privacy have distinct valences. Further, the degree to which any taxpayer partakes in each role depends on two factors: (a) the taxpayer’s own income and wealth; and (b) the extent of inequality in the distribution of income and wealth within the community structured by federal taxation. 37 See infra sections III.B–.C. This Essay refers to the “community structured by federal taxation” because noncitizens, including unregistered immigrants and foreign workers, also contribute to and occasionally derive benefits from the federal fiscal machinery. 38 See Vanessa S. Williamson, Read My Lips: Why Americans Are Proud to Pay Taxes 41–44 (2017) (citing national survey data showing that, even though unregistered immigrants pay considerable amounts in taxes, there is a widely held misconception to the contrary). This Essay’s taxonomy suggests that the propriety of disclosure falls onto a spectrum. Rises in economic inequality and in taxpayers’ own income or wealth accentuate the need for transparency. Given this normative conclusion, lawmakers can limit disclosure regimes to segments of the population who exercise significant fiscal power. They can choose from individualized, anonymized, or statistical disclosure. They can even leave the choice between transparency and privacy to taxpayers themselves. 39 See infra notes 499–500 and accompanying text.

This Essay thus makes three contributions. First, it uncovers historical arguments that ground demands for tax transparency in egalitarianism in addition to compliance. Second, it intervenes in the taxpayer-privacy debate by developing a conceptual framework to analyze when, and for which taxpayers, privacy values should prevail. In the process, it propels the scholarly discourse beyond tax enforcement and compliance and yields insights to help policymakers design public-disclosure regimes that cohere with the norms implicit in our fiscal social contract with the state. 40 As section II.B shows, the existing literature focuses on issues of tax enforcement and compliance. To be sure, this focus is not exclusive: Some scholars have looked to past egalitarian justifications to frame their own views on tax publicity. See, e.g., Kornhauser, Full Monty, supra note 3, at 99–100 (quoting 79 Cong. Rec. 3403 (1935) (statement of Rep. Sauthoff)) (describing President Benjamin Harrison’s egalitarian arguments for tax transparency). But none has developed, as this Essay does, a substantive framework and taxonomy of fiscal citizenship applicable to the privacy debate. Third, this Essay contributes to the burgeoning literature on fiscal citizenship. Drawing on federal income taxation’s use of voluntary compliance, scholars have conceptualized taxpayers’ political and civic engagement with the state as they self-assess their tax liabilities. 41 See, e.g., Ajay K. Mehrotra, Making the Modern American Fiscal State: Law, Politics, and the Rise of Progressive Taxation, 1877–1929, at 143–46 (2013) [hereinafter Mehrotra, American Fiscal State] (arguing that the shift to a direct and graduated tax regime at the turn of the twentieth century marked the emergence of a new fiscal polity animated by both functional needs and broad social concerns); James T. Sparrow, Warfare State: World War II Americans and the Age of Big Government 3–10 (2011) [hereinafter Sparrow, Warfare State] (studying the expansion of the federal government during World War II and how Americans adapted to its increased authority); Lawrence Zelenak, Learning to Love Form 1040: Two Cheers for the Return-Based Mass Income Tax 3–5 (2013) [hereinafter Zelenak, Form 1040] (defending the civic effects of return-based taxation); Assaf Likhovski, “Training in Citizenship”: Tax Compliance and Modernity, 32 Law & Soc. Inquiry 665, 669–81 (2007) (analyzing the creation of a tax-compliant culture in Israel); Ajay K. Mehrotra, The Price of Conflict: War, Taxes, and the Politics of Fiscal Citizenship, 108 Mich. L. Rev. 1053, 1055–58 (2010) [hereinafter Mehrotra, Price of Conflict] (assessing fiscal citizenship during wartime, from the Civil War through the war on terror); James T. Sparrow, “Buying Our Boys Back”: The Mass Foundations of Fiscal Citizenship in World War II, 20 J. Pol’y Hist. 263, 266–70 (2008) [hereinafter Sparrow, Buying Our Boys Back] (examining the durability of the fiscal regime developed during World War II and its contribution to notions of national citizenship); Ajay K. Mehrotra, Reviving Fiscal Citizenship, 113 Mich. L. Rev. 943, 957, 962–64 (2015) [hereinafter Mehrotra, Reviving Fiscal Citizenship] (book review) (chronicling popular attitudes towards taxation since World War II). Of course, the payment of federal taxes is not voluntary. By “voluntary,” scholars refer to the fact that taxpayers self-assess their income tax liability, instead of paying the state up front. See, e.g., infra notes 308–310, 318–320, 421–423 and accompanying text. This Essay adds to this scholarly dialogue a positive, analytical framework of precisely what roles taxpayers occupy as they shape, and are shaped by, the fiscal state. 42 This Essay therefore focuses on federal taxation of individuals. Whether the state should permit public access to corporate tax returns raises distinct questions, including the nature of corporations’ interactions with the fiscal state. See Blank, In Defense of Individual Tax Privacy, supra note 32, at 274 (noting “significant differences between corporations and individuals” which impact tax privacy). For analyses of fiscal citizenship, public tax disclosures, and corporations, see generally Lenter et al., supra note 30, at 814–23 (discussing the justifications for and against public corporate tax disclosure); Alex Freund, Note, Western Corporate Fiscal Citizenship in the 21st Century, 40 Nw. J. Int’l L. & Bus. 123, 144–50 (2019) (noting that corporations are less affected by poor fiscal citizenship than individuals who rely on regulatory and welfare regimes). Two factors in particular counsel the inclusion of corporate tax records into a transparency regime. First, if individuals set up corporate structures to evade taxes or hide their fiscal contributions to the state, then the responsibilities of their individual fiscal citizenship might flow to those corporate structures. See infra section III.A (providing a taxonomy of individual fiscal citizenship). Second, extending corporations’ societal roles to include, for example, furtherance of public norms like transparency could also make corporate tax disclosure appropriate independent of individual fiscal citizenship. See Max M. Schanzenbach & Robert H. Sitkoff, Reconciling Fiduciary Duty and Social Conscience: The Law and Economics of ESG Investing by a Trustee, 72 Stan. L. Rev. 381, 384–85 (2020) (“[A] growing and influential group of scholars and practitioners[] ha[ve] even taken the position that fiduciary principles require a trustee to use ESG factors.”).

This Essay proceeds in three Parts. Part I examines past disclosure regimes of the federal income tax. It shows that tax confidentiality has always been contested in the United States. It also uncovers historical arguments in favor of disclosure not (only) to increase revenue collection but also to advance egalitarian goals. Part II discusses contemporary treatment of tax transparency. It provides a comparative analysis of the disclosure regimes in Nordic countries, as well as an overview of the scholarly literature. Part III builds a taxonomy of fiscal citizenship. It articulates the four roles of taxpayers as they interact with the fiscal state and explains the distinct valences of privacy and transparency within each role. It examines how each component of our fiscal citizenship—as reporters, funders, stakeholders, and policymakers—varies based on our income levels and the degree of equality in the distribution of income within the community structured by federal taxation. Finally, it discusses scholarly and policy implications. It contends that transparency values, instead of privacy demands, prevail as to the tax records of the ultrawealthy, especially in times of high economic inequality.

One final note: By “democracy” and “egalitarianism,” this Essay refers broadly to a notion of democratic equality. 43 This notion of democratic equality traces its origins to Classical Athenian law and Aristotle and is the subject of continued discussion in contemporary political theory. See, e.g., T.M. Scanlon, Why Does Inequality Matter? 75–76 (2018) (describing John Rawls’ view that “the fair value of political liberties is achieved when ‘citizens similarly gifted . . . have roughly an equal chance of influencing the government’s policy’” (quoting John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 46 (2001))); James Lindley Wilson, Democratic Equality 5 (2019) (discussing the distinction between “inequalities that are in fact objectionable from those that are consistent with equal citizen status”); Alex Zhang, Separation of Structures, 110 Va. L. Rev. 599, 618–20 (2024) (describing Aristotle’s typology of constitutional structures, with democracy dependent on the public’s consent). Citizens in democratic regimes should have, all else equal, an equal share in ruling, instantiated in equal opportunity to ventilate their views in public debate and, absent justification, roughly equal influence in policy outcomes. 44 This is not to say that democracy and privacy are transhistorical Platonic forms. Instead, their content has been contested. See generally Sarah E. Igo, The Known Citizen: A History of Privacy in Modern America 3–4 (2018) (“Arguments about privacy were really arguments over what it meant to be a modern citizen. To invoke its shelter was to make a claim about the latitude for action and anonymity a decent, democratic society ought to afford its members.”); James T. Kloppenberg, Toward Democracy: The Struggle for Self-Rule in European and American Thought 1–18 (2016) (discussing the “rival understandings of what democracy means” throughout the United States and Europe). But a baseline of some type of equality in the exercise of political power is common to most democracies. It is inherent in the world’s first radical democracy, which allowed all citizens to participate in lawmaking, selected executive offices by lottery or sortition, and enabled ordinary people to serve the dual role of jury and the judge in the courtroom. See Paul Cartledge, Democracy: A Life 108, 170, 310 (2016) (describing Athenian democratic decisionmaking process and culture); Michael Gagarin, Democratic Law in Classical Athens 17–18 (2020) (noting that “[t]he poorest citizens paid nothing in direct taxes . . . and received . . . pay for attending the Assembly, serving on a jury, or serving as an official”); Douglas M. MacDowell, The Law in Classical Athens 25 (1986) (discussing the appointment of executive officials in classical Athens by lottery); Adriaan Lanni, “Verdict Most Just”: The Modes of Classical Athenian Justice, 16 Yale. J.L. & Humans. 277, 284–86 (2004) (“Classical Athens was a participatory democracy run primarily by amateurs . . . . [with] juries chosen by lot . . . .” (footnote omitted)). It is embodied, perhaps most directly, in the one-person-one-vote principle of our representative democracy. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 560–62 (1964) (holding that “one person’s vote must be counted equally with those of all other voters” because “the right of suffrage is a fundamental matter in a free and democratic society”); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964) (discussing the importance of voting equality to the principles of a democracy); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 379–80 (1963) (discussing the importance of one person one vote to the American conceptualization of political equality and democracy). Importantly, this is not to require that political power be, in substance, equally shared. Deviations from the baseline of equality are common and not necessarily illegitimate. It only shifts the burden to demand reasons for any inequality in governance. Expertise, for example, grounds certain forms of inequality in a democracy. Transparency may do the same. Importantly, transparency serves a higher-order and trans-substantive value: It allows the public to see whether any inequality—deviations from the principle of equal share in ruling—is in fact grounded in a legitimate value. It enables the state to write policy on an informed basis, thus fulfilling its reciprocal duty to ensure a fair and effective tax system. 45 This duty flows from fiscal citizenship. See infra notes 307–310 and accompanying text. It also flows from the state’s need to foster quasi-voluntary tax compliance and create confidence among the citizenry that fiscal rulers will keep their part of the bargain by (1) enforcing existing tax law and (2) maintaining relative fairness in tax policy (e.g., declining favoritism of special interest groups). See Margaret Levi, Of Rule and Revenue 54 (1989) (describing the concept of quasi-voluntary compliance as an aspect of “legitimacy” and as a species of tax compliance that is neither based solely on state coercion nor purely voluntary, because taxpayers will comply only if others do too); infra notes 363, 426 and accompanying text. Both are key to democratic fiscal governance.