CONSULAR NONREVIEWABILITY AFTER DEPARTMENT OF STATE V. MUÑOZ: REQUIRING FACTUAL AND TIMELY EXPLANATIONS FOR VISA DENIALS

CONSULAR NONREVIEWABILITY AFTER DEPARTMENT OF STATE V. MUÑOZ: REQUIRING FACTUAL AND TIMELY EXPLANATIONS FOR VISA DENIALS

The visa application process is laden with discretion and reinforced by consular nonreviewability—an extensive form of judicial deference. Until recently, courts recognized a small exception to consular nonreviewability. Under this exception, courts engaged in limited review of a consular officer’s decision when visa denials implicated the fundamental rights of U.S. citizens.

The Court curtailed this exception in United States Department of State v. Muñoz, anointing consular officers with nearly complete power over visa decisions. This deference jeopardizes the integrity and fairness of the immigration system, leaving visa applicants and their U.S. citizen sponsors at the mercy of consular officers. This not only fosters an arbitrary visa system but also conflicts with broader immigration system and administrative law trends.

This Note traces the accidental history of consular nonreviewability—from its racially motivated origins to its full-fledged indoctrination in Muñoz. This Note proposes an amendment to the Immigration and Nationality Act: Consular officers should be required to provide factual and timely explanations for visa denials. Such a requirement would inject greater fairness into the visa application process and better align it with broader immigration law—without sacrificing the values underpinning consular nonreviewability.

The full text of this Note can be found by clicking the PDF link to the left.

Introduction

In 1995, fourteen-year-old Edvin Colindres Juarez, a Guatemalan citizen, crossed the United States border without inspection. 1 See Final Opening Brief of Appellants at 1, Colindres v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 71 F.4th 1018 (D.C. Cir. 2023) (No. 22-5009), 2023 WL 1816861 [hereinafter Colindres, Brief of Appellants]. He lived in New York with his family for a few years before moving to Florida, where he worked for a pool-finishing company. 2 Id. at 4. In 2006, he married Kristen, a U.S. citizen; two years later, the couple welcomed a daughter. 3 Colindres v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 575 F. Supp. 3d 121, 127 (D.D.C. 2021). Mr. Colindres built a life in the United States, all the while lacking documentation to be legally in the country. 4 See Colindres, 71 F.4th at 1020 (noting that Mr. Colindres “did not have permission to live or work in the United States”). To stabilize his precarious foundation, he hoped to secure a visa and fix his immigration status. 5 Id. People “unlawfully present” are ordinarily not issued visas, 6 See Unlawful Presence and Inadmissibility, USCIS, https://www.uscis.gov/laws-and-policy/other-resources/unlawful-presence-and-inadmissibility [https://perma.cc/97C3-MG6P] (last updated June 24, 2022) (summarizing standards for the admissibility of noncitizens who have accrued unlawful presence). This policy is currently in flux: On June 18, 2024, President Joe Biden announced a new policy permitting undocumented spouses of U.S. citizens who have been living in the United States for more than ten years to apply for lawful permanent residence status without leaving the country. See Press Release, White House, Fact Sheet: President Biden Announces New Actions to Keep Families Together (June 18, 2024), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/06/18/fact-sheet-president-biden-announces-new-actions-to-keep-families-together/ [https://perma.cc/4GQ4-SVQ4]. It seems likely that this policy will be reversed in the upcoming Trump Administration. See Camilo Montoya-Galvez, Judge Declares Biden Immigration Program for Spouses of U.S. Citizens Illegal, CBS News (Nov. 8, 2024), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/judge-declares-biden-immigration-program-for-spouses-of-u-s-citizens-illegal/ [https://perma.cc/9ZRC-SRAR] (predicting that “the Keeping Families Together program is likely to be in the crosshairs of the incoming administration of Trump”). but the Attorney General waived this prohibition as applied to Mr. Colindres in 2015, finding that the Colindres family would face extreme hardship without Mr. Colindres in the United States. 7 Colindres, 71 F.4th at 1020 (noting that the Attorney General has this authority under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v) (2018)). In June 2019, Mr. Colindres traveled to Guatemala to complete the final step of the visa process: an interview with a consular officer. 8 Id. He packed lightly, expecting a quick trip. 9 Colindres, Brief of Appellants, supra note 1, at 1.

He was wrong. After multiple interviews, a clean criminal record check, and almost a year’s delay, a consular officer denied Mr. Colindres’s application. 10 Colindres, 71 F.4th at 1020. The officer claimed that “‘there [was] reason to believe’ that he was ‘a member of a known criminal organization.’” 11 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Joint Appendix at 242–43, Colindres, 71 F.4th 1018 (No. 22-5009)). The embassy provided no evidence to support this assertion, 12 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 6, Colindres v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 144 S. Ct. 2716 (No. 23-348), 2023 WL 6517286 [hereinafter Colindres Petition]. leaving Mr. Colindres to speculate how the officer could believe he was “seek[ing] to enter the United States to engage . . . in . . . unlawful activity” 13 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(A)(ii). when he had a clean criminal record and had been peacefully living in the United States for twenty-four years. 14 Colindres Petition, supra note 12; see also Gabriela Baca, Comment, Visa Denied: Why Courts Should Review a Consular Officer’s Denial of a U.S.-Citizen Family Member’s Visa, 64 Am. U. L. Rev. 591, 596 (2015) (“Without any formal recourse, the [parties] are left wondering why the consular officer denied the application despite USCIS’s approval . . . .”). The officer’s reasoning did not matter: When Mr. and Mrs. Colindres appealed the visa denial, the court dismissed the case for failure to state a claim, holding that the consular nonreviewability doctrine barred review of the officer’s decision. 15 Colindres v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 575 F. Supp. 3d 121, 126 (D.D.C. 2021); see also Colindres, 71 F.4th at 1019–20. Consular nonreviewability is a new doctrine—at least as recognized in the Supreme Court. See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2407 (2018) (labeling consular nonreviewability a “doctrine” for the first time). Using the term “doctrine” leads to consequences, invoking a “religious overtone.” See Allison Orr Larsen, Becoming a Doctrine, 76 Fla. L. Rev. 1, 18, 52 (2024) (“Doctrinizing a concept, in other words, will change it, compress it, and simplify it.”). To avoid overstating consular nonreviewability’s permanence, this Note refers to it simply as “consular nonreviewability.” Mr. Colindres voluntarily trusted the immigration system to adjust his status. In response, the U.S. government labeled him a criminal and banned him from his home of more than two decades. 16 See Colindres, Brief of Appellants, supra note 1, at 4–6 (describing how Mr. Colindres’s attempt to obtain lawful immigration status forced him to leave the United States).

Mr. Colindres’s story highlights the immense, unchecked power of consular officers over the visa process. 17 See infra section II.C.1. Immigration to the United States almost always requires a visa, 18 See 8 U.S.C. § 1181 (carving out small exceptions for “returning resident immigrants” and people “admitted as refugees”). and consular officers determine who is eligible to receive one. 19 See id. § 1101(a)(16). Consular officers churn through hundreds of applicants in a day, making “judgement call[s]” after minutes-long interviews. 20 Christopher Richardson, Opinion, Visa Officers Aren’t Racist—They’re Just Enforcing the Law, Wash. Post (Feb. 21, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/02/22/visa-officers-arent-racist-theyre-just-enforcing-law/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review). In such a pressure-packed environment with limited information, bias creeps in and mistakes are inevitable. 21 See James A.R. Nafziger, Review of Visa Denials by Consular Officers, 66 Wash. L. Rev. 1, 54 (1991) (“[A]ny exercise of discretion is potentially fallible.”); see also Donald S. Dobkin, Challenging the Doctrine of Consular Nonreviewability in Immigration Cases, 24 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 113, 119 (2010) (“Racial discrimination can easily work its way into consular decisions because many of those decisions rely upon subjective factors.”). At its worst, this discretion enables consular officers to exploit their positions for personal gain or to promote racist ideologies. 22 See infra note 251 and accompanying text. But even in ordinary applications, the discretion still creates arbitrary results. Visa acceptance rates vary widely by officer and location. 23 See Nafziger, supra note 21, at 69 (describing the variation in acceptance rates at a particular consulate and between posts). The unfortunate reality of the visa process is that Mr. Colindres’s rejection was likely influenced more by the officer adjudicating his application than the merits of his case. 24 See David Lindsey, Delegated Diplomacy: How Ambassadors Establish Trust in International Relations 34–37 (2023) (“[T]he cumulative exercise of visa discretion is one of the largest influences on global migration patterns.”).

Notwithstanding the potential for error, visa denials are almost impossible to challenge in court. 25 See Eric Lee & Sabrina Damast, Why Everyone Should Care About the “Doctrine of Consular Nonreviewability”, AILA Blog: Think Immigr. (Nov. 22, 2022), https://thinkimmigration.org/blog/2022/11/22/why-everyone-should-care-about-the-doctrine-of-consular-nonreviewability/ [https://perma.cc/7FAU-R5N5] (highlighting Muñoz as the first federal court decision to find a consular officer’s explanation inadequate). When reviewing visa decisions, courts apply consular nonreviewability—an extensive form of deference originating from the racially motivated Chinese Exclusion Case of 1889. 26 See infra section I.A.1. Under consular nonreviewability, judges do not second-guess consular visa decisions. Historically, there has been a small exception when a decision “allegedly burdens the constitutional rights of a U.S. citizen.” 27 U.S. Dep’t of State v. Muñoz, 144 S. Ct. 1812, 1821 (2024) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2419 (2018)); see also Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 768–70 (1972) (articulating this exception). Even then, the courts limit its review to only consider whether the consular officer gave a “facially legitimate and bona fide reason” for the denial. 28 Muñoz, 144 S. Ct. at 1821 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Kerry v. Din, 576 U.S. 86, 103–04 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment)).

Despite an increase in judicial scrutiny over other areas of immigration law 29 See Kevin R. Johnson, Immigration in the Supreme Court, 2009–13: A New Era of Immigration Law Unexceptionalism, 68 Okla. L. Rev. 57, 62 (2015) [hereinafter Johnson, Immigration in the Supreme Court] (“[I]mmigration matters regularly comprise a bread-and-butter part of [the Supreme Court’s] docket.”); Catherine Y. Kim, Plenary Power in the Modern Administrative State, 96 N.C. L. Rev. 77, 88 (2017) (highlighting that the Supreme Court “has granted certiorari in at least one immigration case every term since 2009 and vacated a government immigration decision roughly every other year”); cf. Karla McKanders, Deconstructing Invisible Walls: Sotomayor’s Dissents in an Era of Immigration Exceptionalism, 27 Wm. & Mary J. Race, Gender & Soc. Just. 95, 96 (2020) (describing the “many different theories accounting for the proliferation of immigration cases on the Supreme Court’s docket”). and broader antideference and antidelegation trends, 30 See, e.g., Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 144 S. Ct. 2244, 2265 (2024) (overruling Chevron deference); Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2133–35 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“The legislative cannot transfer the power of making laws to any other hands . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government and a Letter Concerning Toleration § 141 (1947))); Michigan v. Env’t Prot. Agency, 576 U.S. 743, 762 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“Such a transfer is in tension with Article III’s Vesting Clause, which vests the judicial power exclusively in Article III courts, not administrative agencies.” (citing U.S. Const. art. III, § 1)); Thomas W. Merrill, Response, Chevron’s Ghost Rides Again, 103 B.U. L. Rev. 1717, 1729–34 (2023) (outlining constitutional objections to Chevron deference). consular nonreviewability remains robust. 31 See Muñoz, 144 S. Ct. at 1820 (“The Judicial Branch has no role to play ‘unless expressly authorized by law.’ . . . This principle is known as the doctrine of consular nonreviewability.” (quoting United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 543 (1950))); see also Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2407 (2018) (mentioning “the doctrine of consular nonreviewability” for the first time in a Supreme Court opinion). In fact, days before overturning Chevron deference, 32 See Loper Bright Enters., 144 S. Ct. at 2265 (rejecting Chevron deference). the Court expanded the discretion of consular officers over visa decisions. 33 See Muñoz, 144 S. Ct. at 1821, 1826 (holding “that a citizen does not have a fundamental liberty interest in her noncitizen spouse being admitted to the country” and noting that “Mandel does not hold that citizens have procedural due process rights in the visa proceedings of others”). In United States Department of State v. Muñoz, the Court reversed a successful visa denial challenge 34 See Muñoz v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 50 F.4th 906, 923–24 (9th Cir. 2022) (holding “that the government did not meet the notice requirements of due process”), rev’d, 144 S. Ct. 1812 (2024). and curtailed consular nonreviewability’s already limited exception. 35 Muñoz, 144 S. Ct. at 1826 (curtailing the scope of the Mandel exception).

The Muñoz decision has enormous implications both for the families involved in the visa process 36 See Colindres Petition, supra note 12, at 39 (“The Colindres Family is in dire straits.”). and the prevalence of judicial review in immigration law. 37 See Muñoz, 144 S. Ct. at 1819 (“Visa denials are insulated from judicial review by the doctrine of consular nonreviewability.”). Every year, hundreds of thousands of people rely on the spousal visa process to establish lawful permanent resident status in the United States. 38 See infra note 132 and accompanying text. For people like Mr. Colindres, who are denied a visa based on a mere citation to a catch-all statutory provision, judicial review makes the ultimate difference. 39 See Merrill, supra note 30, at 1726 (“[T]hese various exercises in deference to the conclusions of others are often critical to whether the rights of individuals are sustained or denied.”). And given broader trends in immigration and administrative law, it is worth questioning the logic of empowering unelected administrative officials with such unchecked authority. 40 See Harry N. Rosenfield, Consular Non-Reviewability: A Case Study in Administrative Absolutism, 41 ABA J. 1109, 1110 (1955) (describing consular nonreviewability
as an “anomaly in American jurisprudence”).

This Note discusses the future of consular nonreviewability after Muñoz and its implications for the immigration system. Part I provides a history of consular nonreviewability, explaining its theoretical foundation, legal development, and application to spousal unity cases. Part II introduces the Ninth Circuit’s short-lived Muñoz exception, discusses how the Supreme Court struck it down, and describes the consequences of this decision for the visa system and broader administrative law. Recognizing the practical impossibility of judicial review, Part III charts a path forward. By requiring consular officers to provide factual and timely explanations for visa denials, Congress can inject greater fairness into the visa application process and better align consular nonreviewability with broader immigration and administrative law—while respecting national security concerns, consular and judicial efficiency, and immigration exceptionalism.