Since its formation, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) has taken a hands-off approach with respect to its oversight of the futures industry. It has relied on self-regulatory organizations (SROs)—namely, exchanges such as the Chicago Mercantile Exchange and associations such as the National Futures Association (NFA). The Dodd–Frank Act (Dodd–Frank), Congress’s attempt to address unregulated derivatives and swaps trading, perceived as key contributors to the 2007–2008 financial crisis, created an expanded regulatory role for the CFTC while simultaneously increasing its reliance on old and new SROs. Yet Congress failed to grasp the expansion in resources the CFTC would require both to perform its new duties and to continue its traditional oversight of industry self-regulation. In particular, the CFTC lacks the statutory mandate and the resources to counter the risks associated with industry self-regulation in theory and in practice. This Note compares the divergent schemes of the Commodity Exchange Act and the Securities Exchange Act to show that the statutory impetus to review SRO rulemaking is much stronger with the SEC than with the CFTC. It then empirically assesses CFTC oversight of rulemaking by the National Futures Association to show that from 2003 to 2012 ninety-four percent of rule additions or amendments proposed by the NFA—which must be sent to the CFTC before taking effect—were adopted unmodified. This Note argues that the CFTC likely is not adequately scrutinizing rule proposals by the NFA—or, if it is doing so, it is doing so out of the pub- lic eye. It concludes that the CFTC should conduct a self-assessment and begin disclosing conversations with the SROs it oversees in order to determine how it can better monitor self-regulatory organizations.