Introduction
During the Vietnam War, young adults protested: “Old enough to fight, old enough to vote.”
Their movement culminated in the Twenty-Sixth Amendment, which lowered the voting age from twenty-one to eighteen in federal, state, and local elections.
Fifty-plus years later, a new generation asks: Is it time to lower the voting age again?
That normative question—should the franchise be extended to emerging adults, typically sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds—is hotly contested and has already generated a substantial body of scholarly and political literature.
Proponents invoke developmental psychology, civic-education theory, and international practice to argue that sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds are both capable of informed voting and uniquely positioned to form lifelong civic habits.
Skeptics worry about lack of knowledge, lack of maturity, potential for coercion, and partisan consequences. This normative debate pits the growing body of empirical evidence against the entrenched intuition of a skeptical public who will ultimately decide the fate of youth enfranchisement.
By contrast, the practical question—how, as a matter of constitutional structure and positive law, the franchise could be extended to emerging adults—has received far less attention. That gap hurts reform efforts. The “how” of enfranchisement is not merely a procedural footnote to the “should.” It is itself a site of democratic contestation and is highly influential to the normative debate. The path to enfranchisement will shape whether the public experiences reform as local self-determination or federal imposition.
Consider the pattern that has already emerged. At the national level, proposals to reduce the voting age have stalled:
Congressional proposals for a constitutional amendment have repeatedly failed. Federal statutory efforts have fared no better. At the local level, by contrast, change is happening. A small but growing group of municipalities has extended the franchise for local municipal and school board elections to sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds, often following years of hearings and deliberation.
These local experiments are instructive. When citizens are given the opportunity to debate and decide whether emerging adults should vote in their own local elections, they are more likely to say yes.
The resistance appears not to be to youth enfranchisement per se but to youth enfranchisement experienced as something forced on communities by state or federal actors without any democratic engagement or fiscal support. People want a say in whether emerging adults may have a say and whether scarce resources should be spent on the enterprise. This suggests a design principle: A reform regime that preserves local choice while providing federal fiscal support may prove more politically viable than either a centralized mandate or a purely normative appeal.
This Piece argues that the most promising path forward lies not in another frontal attempt to amend the Constitution or in another doomed effort to stretch the Elections Clause but in a yet unexplored tool that Congress has used for decades to shape state policy in other domains: the Spending Clause. Specifically, Congress should use its Spending Clause authority to create a voluntary conditional grant program that offers supplemental election-administration and civics-education funding to states (and indirectly, local governments) that extend the franchise to emerging adults. Properly designed, such a grant program would satisfy the South Dakota v. Dole test for conditional spending,
bypass constitutional bars to federal mandates, and address two of the most persistent political objections to youth enfranchisement: (1) concerns about federal overreach into state control of the franchise, and (2) worries about the administrative costs for already strained state and local election systems.
Part I briefly sketches the normative debate over youth enfranchisement. Part II reconstructs the legal architecture, explains why federal strategies have faltered, and evaluates state and local experiments. Section III.A turns to the Spending Clause, sketches the doctrinal limits after South Dakota v. Dole and National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius (NFIB),
and develops the case for a conditional-spending approach to youth enfranchisement. Section III.B offers a concrete statutory blueprint, and sections III.C–D address likely objections and the benefits of the blueprint.
I. The Normative Debate
A. The First Youth Enfranchisement Revolution
Calls to lower the voting age to eighteen date back to World War II when Congress lowered the draft age to eighteen in 1942.
For decades, these efforts stalled in Congress and the states.
It was only amid the political and moral crisis of the Vietnam War—when eighteen-to-twenty-year-olds were being conscripted in large numbers—that the movement finally succeeded.
The immediate catalyst was congressional action.
In 1970, Congress amended the Voting Rights Act to lower the voting age to eighteen in all elections—federal, state, and local.
President Nixon doubted its constitutionality but signed it anyway and urged judicial review.
Oregon and Texas promptly sued, contending that Congress lacked authority to set age qualifications for state and local elections.
In that case, Oregon v. Mitchell, a fractured Supreme Court majority concluded that Congress could set the voting age for federal elections but could not do so for state and local elections.
Mitchell would have required states to maintain dual registration systems—one for federal elections including eighteen-to-twenty-year-olds, another for state and local elections excluding them. Election officials warned that this bifurcated regime would cost tens of millions of dollars and breed “chaos and confusion.”
To avoid this administrative burden, Congress proposed the Twenty-Sixth Amendment, which the states rapidly ratified in a record-setting one hundred days.
The amendment provides that “[t]he right of citizens of the United States, who are eighteen years of age or older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged . . . on account of age” and grants Congress enforcement power.
It extends the age range of the right to vote: Neither Congress nor the states may exclude citizens eighteen or older from the franchise on account of age. Critically, it does not prohibit states from extending the franchise to citizens under the age of eighteen.
B. The Second Youth Enfranchisement Debate
Today’s movement to lower the voting age to sixteen builds on the Twenty-Sixth Amendment’s legacy but confronts a starkly different political landscape. There is no draft, no war, and no impending administrative crisis to drive support. Without these catalysts, proponents must rely on sustained persuasion to shift public opinion. Their case rests on three principal arguments.
First, proponents advance fairness-based claims. Young adults are increasingly forced into adulthood with all its responsibilities and consequences but few of its privileges—they have a stake in society but do not have a say.
Many work and pay taxes.
States are rolling back child labor laws, even as violations are on the rise.
Youth can be tried as adults,
forced to carry pregnancies to term,
and arranged into marriage.
They are deeply engaged by policies concerning “climate issues, gun violence, police violence, racial justice, immigration rights, voting rights, transgender rights, school funding, and many other issues.”
And the growing generation gap—between youth (voting age and nonvoting age) and the aging electorate
and aging legislators
—threatens the political interests of youth.
It is undemocratic to deny emerging adults the right to choose their representatives when they are subject to an increasing set of legal responsibilities and suffer disproportionately from poor governance. Enfranchisement would recognize their status as stakeholders affected by governance decisions. On the other hand, opponents warn that youth enfranchisement is a slippery slope to “adultification”—that is, a “projection of adult capacity and responsibility onto youth” that may “undermine the protections that we currently extend to minors . . . supporting [them] and protecting them from exploitation.”
But as the examples above illustrate, youth already find themselves at the bottom of the slope, and it is unclear how enfranchisement could make it any slipperier. To the contrary, enfranchisement may finally give youth a foothold to reverse adultification in a variety of domains—for example, by choosing representatives who will enact and enforce child labor laws, implement juvenile justice reforms, or ban child marriage.
Second, proponents invoke developmental psychology.
Research indicates that sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds possess cognitive capacities for “cold cognitions”—deliberative, information-based reasoning—comparable to those of adults.
Even if developmental concerns justify age restrictions on “hot cognitions” activities—like alcohol consumption or gambling—proponents argue such concerns have limited bearing on the considered act of voting,
particularly when embedded in supportive institutional contexts like schools and families.
Third, proponents tout more robust democratic participation.
Comparative studies suggest that first-time voting while still in school and living at home correlates with stronger lifelong civic habits than first-time voting amid the disruptions of turning eighteen—college transitions, employment, relocation.
First-time voting at younger ages may establish patterns of engagement that counter broader trends of democratic disillusionment and political extremism.
These arguments have gained some traction. Polling suggests gradual movement toward acceptance, though opponents remain skeptical.
This Piece does not adjudicate the normative debate. The question of whether sixteen-year-olds should vote has generated substantial scholarly attention; the question of how they could vote, as a matter of constitutional structure, has not. This Piece addresses that gap. Accepting the case for youth enfranchisement, it asks: what are the most constitutionally permissible and politically feasible mechanisms for extending the franchise to emerging adults?
II. The Legal Framework and Experimental Landscape
A. Federal Statutory Efforts and Their Limits
Since 1971, Congress has periodically attempted to extend the franchise to citizens under eighteen. These efforts have pursued two paths: (1) constitutional amendment and (2) federal statute. Neither has succeeded, and the latter faces formidable constitutional obstacles.
Constitutional amendment would provide the surest legal foundation. Since 2019, Representative Grace Meng has repeatedly introduced joint resolutions to lower the voting age to sixteen.
None has advanced beyond committee.
These unsuccessful attempts—and the absence of any other attempts—show a lack of political appetite. Without some motivating forces—like those driving ratification of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment—securing two-thirds support in both chambers and ratification by three-quarters of state legislatures appears politically unattainable in the near term.
Statutory routes have proven equally unavailing. Representative Ayanna Pressley has pursued federal legislation twice. In 2019 and 2021, she proposed amendments to the For the People Act that would have lowered the minimum voting age to sixteen in federal elections; both failed.
Also, in 2023, Representative Nikema Williams introduced the Youth Voting Rights Act, a more modest measure requiring states to permit preregistration for sixteen-year-olds.
That proposal has likewise stalled,
and in any event would not achieve the desired effect of lowering the voting age.
These proposals rest on three potential sources of congressional authority. The Elections Clause empowers Congress to regulate the “Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections” for federal office.
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment grants Congress “power to enforce, by appropriate legislation,” rights to equal protection, due process, and other constitutional guarantees, including voting protections.
And Section 2 of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment authorizes Congress to enforce the prohibition on age-based denial of the franchise to citizens eighteen or older.
None suffices.
Start with the narrowest theory: the Twenty-Sixth Amendment’s enforcement clause. That provision authorizes Congress to protect citizens eighteen or older from age-based exclusion.
It does not authorize Congress to expand the class of qualified voters to include those under eighteen.
The Elections Clause and Fourteenth Amendment theories confront a more complicated obstacle: Oregon v. Mitchell.
In that fractured 1970 decision, the Court held that Congress could compel the states to permit eighteen-year-olds to vote in federal elections but could not mandate the same for state and local elections.
However, this legal reasoning has not survived because Mitchell produced no majority rationale: Five Justices concluded that Congress could lower the voting age in federal elections, but they disagreed on the source of that authority. Justice Black invoked the Elections Clause; Justices Douglas, Brennan, White, and Marshall relied on the Fourteenth Amendment.
Conversely, five Justices rejected the Elections Clause theory (Douglas, Harlan, Stewart, Burger, and Blackmun), while a different combination of five rejected the Fourteenth Amendment theory (Black, Harlan, Stewart, Burger, and Blackmun).
The Court thus agreed on a result without agreeing on a rationale—a problem that left Mitchell’s precedential force uncertain.
The Court resolved this uncertainty in Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Arizona, Inc.
Reviewing an attempt to impose voter identification requirements, the Court unanimously characterized Mitchell as having “minimal precedential value” and held that “the Elections Clause did not confer upon Congress the power to regulate voter qualifications in federal elections.”
The Fourteenth Amendment theory would likely suffer a similar fate under the Court’s view of Mitchell.
Inter Tribal Council thus eliminated any remaining ambiguity: Congress lacks authority to prescribe age qualifications for federal elections absent constitutional amendment.
The constitutional architecture is clear. Neither the Elections Clause, nor the Fourteenth Amendment, nor the Twenty-Sixth Amendment can authorize a federal mandate to lower the voting age. A constitutional amendment would provide secure legal footing, but it is highly unlikely given the current political landscape. Facing these formidable obstacles at the federal level, advocates must consider alternative mechanisms.
B. Lessons From Local Experiments
While the top-down approach appears unlikely or unconstitutional, the burgeoning municipal movement to enfranchise emerging adults shows promise.
In Maryland, ten cities have lowered the voting age to sixteen in local elections since 2013.
In California, three cities (Berkeley, Oakland, and Albany) have lowered the voting age to sixteen in school board or municipal elections.
In 2023, Brattleboro, Vermont, lowered the voting age to sixteen for local elections.
And Newark, New Jersey, lowered the voting age to sixteen in school board elections in 2024.
These local experiments illuminate three critical lessons central to this Piece’s thesis.
First, process matters for public acceptance. Local measures are often adopted only after residents and elected officials engage in visible debate, hearings, and campaigns.
Take Greenbelt, Maryland. A 2015 referendum showed 23% of residents supported lowering the voting age in local elections.
“Over the next two years, the [city’s Youth Advisory Committee] organized work sessions, public hearings, and meetings with council committees . . . .”
In 2017, another referendum showed 53% supported lowering the voting age in local elections, and in response the City Council voted unanimously to do so.
The same process played out in Brattleboro, Vermont. After a 2015 referendum failed (garnering only 42% in favor), youth advocates and the legislature spent four years building support through public education and community organizing.
When the question returned to voters in 2019, it passed overwhelmingly (with 69% in favor), and the legislature subsequently enacted youth voting despite gubernatorial opposition.
When enfranchisement emerges from local deliberation rather than top-down federal fiat, opponents are welcomed into the process and have a harder time painting it as a partisan power grab. This suggests that youth-led organizing, paired with careful community outreach, can build broad coalitions across ideological lines.
Second, local officials repeatedly cite administrative cost and implementation challenges as major constraints.
Lowering the voting age requires revising registration systems, training poll workers, updating voter education materials, and sometimes running separate ballots (for example, when sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds can vote only in local races). Even in municipalities that have lowered the voting age, administrative barriers have delayed implementation.
Third, state law may impede local adoption. Most state constitutions and election codes already specify that citizens eighteen or older may vote, echoing the Twenty-Sixth Amendment. Some are phrased as creating a right for adults (“[n]o person shall be entitled to vote . . . unless such person be a citizen of the United States of the age of eighteen years or over”), others as creating a prohibition for children (“no one, under the age of eighteen years, shall be permitted to vote in any election”), and some are ambiguous.
In states with language prohibiting youth voting, lowering the voting age likely requires a constitutional amendment.
New York illustrates the tension between state constitutions and local authority. New York’s constitution limits the franchise to citizens who are at least eighteen years old.
In recent years, the New York City Council has repeatedly supported state bills to lower the constitutional voting age to sixteen or seventeen,
but those measures have stalled in Albany. The Council has also sought to expand the municipal electorate by local law—for example, by authorizing certain noncitizens to vote in city elections.
The New York Court of Appeals recently struck down that noncitizen voting law, holding that the state constitution’s citizenship requirement leaves no room for local expansion of voter qualifications.
Although the case involved citizenship rather than age, it explicitly rejected the proposition that New York City could lower the voting age for its elections.
This underscores how state constitutions can cabin municipal experiments.
By contrast, Maryland’s constitution and election laws give municipalities broader home-rule authority to amend their charters and set qualifications for purely local offices.
New Jersey’s constitution does not affirmatively bar sub-eighteen voting, and its home rule gives municipalities like Newark authority to set voter qualifications for local races.
This patchwork means that state-level change is indispensable for broad youth enfranchisement. Municipal experiments are important laboratories, but they remain limited in scope and vulnerable to state preemption.
III. The Spending Clause Alternative
A. Constitutional Framework for Conditional Federal Grants
With constitutional amendment politically unattainable and federal statutory mandates constitutionally impermissible, a third path emerges: conditional federal spending. The Constitution grants Congress broad authority to “provide for the . . . general Welfare of the United States,”
and the Supreme Court has interpreted this Spending Clause power to permit Congress to offer federal grants conditioned on states adopting particular policies—even policies Congress could not directly mandate.
The mechanism is straightforward. Congress appropriates funds for a particular purpose and offers those funds to states willing to meet specified conditions. States face a genuine choice: accept the money and the accompanying requirements or decline both. So long as the choice is a real one—not a “gun to the head”—the arrangement respects state sovereignty while allowing federal influence over policy domains traditionally reserved to the states.
The Supreme Court has established guardrails for this practice. In South Dakota v. Dole, the Court upheld a federal law conditioning highway funds on states raising their minimum drinking age to twenty-one.
Although Congress could not compel South Dakota to change its drinking age, Congress could incentivize that choice through conditional grants.
The Court articulated five requirements for valid conditional spending.
First, the spending must serve the general welfare—a standard the Court acknowledges is largely committed to congressional judgment.
Federal support for democratic participation and civic education easily satisfies this requirement, as decades of federal election assistance demonstrate.
Second, conditions must be stated unambiguously so states can make informed choices about whether to participate.
Clear statutory language specifying exactly what states must do to receive funds—for example, “permit citizens aged sixteen and seventeen to vote in school board elections”—meets this standard.
Third, conditions must relate to the federal interest in the particular national program.
In Dole, highway safety related to highway funding.
Here, youth civic participation relates to grants for election infrastructure and civic education.
Fourth, conditions cannot induce states to violate other constitutional provisions.
The Twenty-Sixth Amendment is crucial here: It prohibits age-based voting restrictions on anyone eighteen or older, but it does not prohibit enfranchisement of younger citizens.
Encouraging states to lower the voting age thus induces the exercise of authority that states indisputably possess, not the violation of constitutional limits.
Fifth, and most importantly after modern developments, financial inducement cannot be so coercive that it effectively compels state participation.
For many years, this limit was theoretical.
But in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, the Court invalidated the Affordable Care Act’s Medicaid expansion because it threatened states with loss of all existing Medicaid funding—up to 20% of state budgets—if they declined to expand eligibility.
Chief Justice Roberts characterized this as a “gun to the head,” leaving states no genuine choice.
NFIB established that the coercion inquiry focuses on two factors: the magnitude of funds at stake and whether Congress threatens to withdraw existing funding streams or offers new, supplemental grants.
Modest new grants pose little coercion risk; threatened withdrawal of entrenched funds that states have built their budgets around may cross the constitutional line.
The practical implication: Conditional spending programs must be structured as offers of new resources, not threats to existing support, and grant amounts must be proportional rather than overwhelming.
Applied to youth enfranchisement, these principles point toward a clear structure. Congress would create new grants for states that voluntarily extend the franchise to sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds. Grant amounts would be meaningful but modest relative to state budgets—enough to offset implementation costs and fund civic education enhancements, but not so large as to make refusal financially impossible. States declining to participate would retain all existing federal election assistance. The offer would be supplemental support for willing states, not a threat against resistant ones.
This approach has significant precedent. Congress employed precisely this mechanism two decades ago when it passed the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA).
The centerpiece of HAVA is Title III—the set of requirements for the administration of federal elections.
These Title III requirements are not conditional; states must comply, and the Department of Justice is tasked with enforcing compliance.
But recognizing that compliance with these provisions “involved significant financial investments for many states and localities,” HAVA authorized grant programs: general grants to help states meet Title III requirements, and more specialized grant programs “to facilitate or incentivize action on specific issues or policy proposals.”
HAVA offered billions in federal grants to states that voluntarily adopted specific election reforms: computerized voter registration databases, provisional ballot systems, poll worker training programs, accessible voting equipment, and voter information standards.
HAVA’s Title III requirements intruded deeply into state election administration, yet it passed with overwhelming bipartisan support,
and the program has never faced successful constitutional challenge.
HAVA’s success demonstrates that conditional spending can work in the politically sensitive domain of election law.
The following sections develop a concrete proposal modeled on HAVA’s voluntary grant program. Unlike HAVA, it would not compel states to do anything—if they choose not to lower the voting age, nothing would change. But for states that are interested, federal funds would be available to offset the costs of lowering the voting age.
B. Blueprint for a Youth Enfranchisement Grant Program
A Youth Enfranchisement and Civic Participation Act (YECPA)—the novel proposal of this Piece—would build on the proven model of HAVA. Like HAVA, which distributed billions in federal grants to modernize election infrastructure after the 2000 election,
YECPA would provide targeted federal funding to support states in expanding the franchise. And like HAVA, YECPA would vest administration in the Election Assistance Commission (EAC),
leveraging existing expertise rather than creating new bureaucracy.
1. Dual-Funding Mechanism. — YECPA would employ HAVA’s dual structure of formula grants and competitive grants.
Formula grants would provide predictable baseline funding to all participating states based on the number of sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds in the state.
For example, a state with 200,000 residents aged sixteen to seventeen might receive a base grant of $10 per person annually—$2 million total—scaled according to the tier of enfranchisement adopted. Competitive grants would reward innovation: States could apply for additional funding to pilot novel civic-education programs, develop model curricula replicable elsewhere, or partner with universities on longitudinal research.
2. Tiered Participation. — To qualify for formula grants, states would adopt one of four tiers. Sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds may vote:
- Tier 1: in local school board elections.
- Tier 2: in all municipal elections.
- Tier 3: in all state and local elections.
- Tier 4: in all federal, state, and local elections.
Grant amounts would scale with tier level, and states could progress from Tier 1 to Tier 4 over time. This structure mirrors HAVA’s flexibility: States could choose how to meet federal goals while receiving support proportional to their level of adoption.
3. State Implementation Plans. — Following HAVA’s requirement that states submit detailed implementation plans,
YECPA would require applicant states to specify: (1) which tier(s) they will implement and on what timeline; (2) whether their constitutions must be amended, and, if so, what the process and timeline for pursuing that will be; (3) a detailed budget showing allocation of grant funds across infrastructure, civic education, and outreach; (4) protocols for data collection and reporting; and (5) mechanisms for distributing funds to local jurisdictions. This planning requirement ensures deliberation, demonstrates commitment, and allows the EAC to monitor appropriate use of funds.
4. Permitted Uses. — Grant funds would be restricted to election-related and civic-education purposes:
- Infrastructure (40–50%): Upgrading voter registration databases, modifying ballot software, training poll workers, developing separate ballot systems if needed for partial enfranchisement.
- Civic Education (30–40%): Integrating voter registration with high school curricula, developing age-appropriate voter guides, establishing school-based registration programs, recruiting youth poll workers.
- Outreach (10–20%): Youth voter education campaigns, partnerships with schools and community organizations, youth advisory commissions.
- Evaluation (5–10%): Data collection, program assessment, research partnerships, dissemination of best practices.
5. Pass-Through to Localities. — States would be required to pass through at least 40% of formula grant funds to local jurisdictions implementing youth enfranchisement.
This ensures that municipalities—which sometimes bear direct costs of conducting elections
—receive tangible support. Localities could also apply directly for competitive grants if authorized by state law, creating bottom-up pressure for state participation.
6. Matching Funds. — To ensure commitment without imposing undue burden, YECPA would require a modest state match
scaled inversely to the level of adoption: 20% for Tier 1, declining to 5% for Tier 4. The EAC could waive match requirements for states demonstrating financial hardship.
This structure incentivizes broader enfranchisement while maintaining accessibility for resource-constrained states.
7. Reporting and Evaluation. — Participating states would submit annual reports
detailing: (1) the number of sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds registered and turnout rates; (2) expenditure of grant funds by category; (3) implementation challenges and solutions; (4) civic education metrics; and (5) recommendations for program improvement. The EAC would fund an independent research consortium to conduct longitudinal studies, cross-state comparisons, and public dissemination of findings—parallel to the research infrastructure that has evaluated HAVA’s impact.
8. Funding Scale. — Based on HAVA’s appropriations model,
YECPA would authorize approximately $100–150 million annually. This is a fraction of HAVA’s initial appropriation of $3.9 billion over three years, reflecting its more targeted scope. Initial grants in Years 1–3 would support infrastructure investments; ongoing grants would cover maintenance and civic education. This represents roughly 0.5% of current federal election assistance spending, scaled to the approximately eight million sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds nationwide.
9. Authorization Period. — YECPA would authorize the program for ten years with a mandatory comprehensive evaluation at Year 5. This sunset provision builds in accountability: Congress would reauthorize based on evidence of the program’s impact on youth civic engagement, administrative feasibility, and state satisfaction. The structure allows scaling up if successful or modification if challenges emerge.
C. Addressing Common Objections
Any legislative proposal invites criticism, and a conditional-spending approach to youth enfranchisement will face predictable challenges. This section addresses seven principal objections. It engages with the normative debate only to the extent the proposed practical mechanism intersects with the normative debate.
1. Partisan Manipulation. — Critics may contend that youth enfranchisement represents a partisan effort to advantage one political coalition over another. This concern is not unique to the Spending Clause mechanism; it would attach to any federal intervention in this domain. But the conditional-grant structure mitigates the perception of partisan manipulation in several ways.
First, state choice diffuses federal responsibility. Because states voluntarily elect to participate—and because adoption typically requires mobilization by diverse local coalitions including youth organizers, parents, educators, and election administrators—the program cannot plausibly be characterized as a unilateral federal imposition. Each jurisdiction that extends the franchise does so through its own democratic processes, not at congressional command. HAVA’s experience is instructive: Despite initial concerns that federalizing election standards might advantage particular constituencies, the program’s voluntary structure and state flexibility enabled broad bipartisan acceptance.
Second, the empirical premise of the objection is contestable. While polling aggregates suggest younger voters lean somewhat left on certain issues, data from jurisdictions with youth voting reveal substantial heterogeneity. Sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds do not vote as a monolithic bloc, and partisan effects are contingent on local political context rather than an inherent feature of youth enfranchisement.
More fundamentally, the charge of partisan manipulation has accompanied virtually every franchise expansion in American history—from women’s suffrage to the Twenty-Sixth Amendment itself—and has consistently proven overstated.
The appropriate response to concerns about electoral consequences is not to foreclose democratic participation but to ensure that new voters are adequately supported through civic education, a commitment YECPA explicitly requires.
Third, YECPA’s tiered structure invites experimentation that can address partisan concerns empirically rather than speculatively. Early-adopting states at Tier 1 (school board elections only) will generate data on actual youth voting patterns in low-salience, often nonpartisan contexts. If results demonstrate that youth voters are indeed ideologically diverse and that enfranchisement does not systematically advantage one party, skeptics in other states will face a harder case for categorical exclusion based on partisan fears.
2. Developmental Capacity. — Skeptics frequently argue that sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds lack the maturity, knowledge, or judgment necessary for informed electoral participation.
YECPA does not resolve—and need not resolve—this normative debate. Instead, it responds pragmatically by linking federal funds not merely to enfranchisement but to enhanced civics education and voter-support infrastructure.
If policymakers harbor concerns about informational deficits among newly eligible voters, the appropriate response is not categorical exclusion but targeted investment in civic learning. And it is past due for an investment in civic education.
YECPA finances precisely that investment, conditioning grants on states’ commitment to robust civics curricula, nonpartisan voter guides, and school-based registration programs.
In this respect, the program aligns incentives: States that extend the franchise also commit to ensuring that young voters are equipped to exercise it responsibly.
This approach mirrors HAVA’s response to concerns about voter competence in the wake of the 2000 election. Rather than restricting access to the ballot, HAVA invested in voter education, clearer ballot design, and poll worker training to ensure all eligible voters could cast effective ballots.
YECPA applies the same logic: address capacity concerns through capacity-building, not disenfranchisement.
3. State Constitutional Barriers. — Some state constitutions contain provisions that arguably mandate a minimum voting age of eighteen.
In such jurisdictions, legislative extension of the franchise to younger voters may require prior constitutional amendment—a deliberate, time-intensive process that could take years and involve public referenda or constitutional conventions.
YECPA accommodates this constraint.
For states facing constitutional barriers, the statute could authorize a separate stream of planning and implementation grants to support the amendment process itself: public education campaigns, drafting assistance, and logistical preparation for constitutional conventions or referenda.
By funding the process rather than dictating the outcome, Congress would respect state constitutional autonomy while facilitating reform in jurisdictions where public sentiment supports it.
To prevent hollow participation, planning grants would require states to demonstrate concrete progress. States would receive initial planning funds upon legislative approval to pursue constitutional amendments, with subsequent implementation grants conditioned on actual enactment. States that accept planning funds but fail to advance amendments within a reasonable timeframe (e.g., two election cycles) would be ineligible for renewal. This structure ensures genuine commitment while accommodating the realities of state constitutional processes.
Vermont’s experience illustrates the model. After a 2015 referendum failed, youth advocates and the legislature spent four years building support through public education and community organizing.
When the question returned to voters in 2019, it passed overwhelmingly, and the legislature subsequently enacted youth voting despite gubernatorial opposition.
YECPA planning grants would finance precisely this kind of sustained democratic deliberation.
4. Impermissible Coercion. — Opponents may argue that conditional grants become coercive when they are politically difficult to refuse, thereby undermining the voluntariness that Spending Clause doctrine requires.
This objection, however, conflates political pressure with constitutional coercion.
NFIB v. Sebelius instructs that courts scrutinize the magnitude and structure of the federal inducement, not its political salience.
A condition becomes impermissibly coercive when it threatens to withhold such a substantial portion of a state’s budget that refusal is financially untenable, or when it leverages existing funds in a manner that effectively compels participation.
YECPA does neither.
The proposed grants would represent new, supplemental funding targeted at election administration and civic education—policy domains where existing federal contributions are modest. Even at the upper bound of the funding estimate (around $150 million annually if all states participated at Tier 4), YECPA would constitute a tiny fraction of aggregate state election spending. For perspective, estimates of total state and local election expenditures in a “normal” election year exceed $4 billion;
YECPA’s maximum annual authorization would represent less than 4% of that figure, distributed across participating states. For individual states, YECPA grants would constitute well under 1% of total state budgets.
Crucially, states that decline to participate would retain full entitlement to all preexisting election-related funds, including ongoing HAVA appropriations. The offer is one of additional resources, not the threatened withdrawal of critical support. This structure mirrors Dole itself, in which the withheld highway funds represented only 5% of total federal highway assistance to states,
and stands in stark contrast to NFIB, in which the threatened loss of all Medicaid funding could have cost states over 20% of the average budgets.
Moreover, YECPA includes the same modest matching requirements that HAVA successfully employed—5% to 20% depending on tier—demonstrating that states must affirmatively choose to participate and invest their own resources.
States have repeatedly demonstrated willingness to decline conditional grants when the conditions are unacceptable, as the Medicaid expansion litigation itself proved.
Under Dole and NFIB, YECPA’s structure should easily withstand coercion scrutiny.
Perhaps the closest YECPA comes to coercion would be (1) the financial incentives offered to states that make concrete efforts to remove state constitutional barriers and (2) the cessation of funding for states that do not remove those barriers within the specified timeframe. But this is not an unprecedented use of the spending power. HAVA encourages states to enact laws that would make them eligible for federal funds by permitting states to certify compliance prior to passage of state laws.
But HAVA does not place a deadline on compliance; it just requires those states to “submit an additional certification once such legislation is enacted.”
And although cessation of funding is always the implied enforcement mechanism of Spending Clause legislations, HAVA does not explicitly threaten to withhold funds from states that fail to enact the necessary legislation.
YECPA goes further in several respects. It places a deadline on compliance, and it explicitly threatens to withhold funds when changes to state law are not completed within the specified timeframe. Also, while HAVA merely encourages states to change state law, YECPA contemplates changes in state constitutions and funds the amendment process itself. But there are two key aspects of the proposal that answer the coercion problem. First, these process funds would be a subset of YECPA funding, a separate stream of planning and implementation grants. The process funding is even more modest than the overall YECPA scheme, and so the threat of coercion is even less. Second, because it is a separate stream of funding, it could be easily severed from the statute if courts found the process funding unconstitutionally coercive.
5. Tier 3 Recreates the Mitchell Problem. — A more technical objection focuses on Tier 3’s potential to recreate the very problem that prompted the Twenty-Sixth Amendment: dual voting systems. Tier 3 would condition grants on states’ permitting sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds to vote in state and local elections while potentially excluding them from federal contests. This mirrors the Oregon v. Mitchell scenario that election officials warned would create administrative chaos.
This objection fails for three reasons.
First, and most fundamentally, YECPA does not recreate the Mitchell problem because it does not compel states to do anything. It offers financial support to states that voluntarily choose to adopt them. A state’s decision to accept Tier 3 funding represents a judgment that the benefits of youth enfranchisement (plus federal grants to offset implementation costs) outweigh the administrative burdens of maintaining separate systems. That is an informed choice made by states, not a federal mandate.
Second, although Tier 3 may come with administrative burdens—ones the states assume willingly—YECPA’s tiered structure provides an escape valve: Tier 4 (youth voting in all elections), which eliminates administrative bifurcation entirely. The graduated funding structure incentivizes this choice: Tier 4 grants would be larger than Tier 3 grants, rewarding states that embrace comprehensive enfranchisement and avoid operational fragmentation.
Third, some states may simply prefer Tier 3 despite its administrative complexity. State constitutional provisions or political constraints may make extending the franchise to federal elections more difficult than to state and local contests.
For such states, Tier 3 provides a pathway to youth enfranchisement that respects state constitutional processes while still advancing democratic participation. YECPA’s grants would fund precisely the technology and training needed to manage dual systems efficiently: upgraded registration databases that can flag age-specific eligibility, ballot software that generates appropriate ballot versions, and poll worker training to prevent confusion.
Indeed, several municipalities already operate bifurcated systems successfully. Takoma Park, Hyattsville, and other Maryland cities permit sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds to vote in municipal elections but not in state or federal contests conducted simultaneously.
While this bifurcated system introduces some administrative complexity, they have managed it effectively with far fewer resources than YECPA would provide, in part because these municipalities already permitted sixteen-year-olds to register to vote.
If small municipalities can administer dual systems, states with federal support certainly can—if they choose to.
Voluntary state choice, coupled with federal funding and structural incentives toward unified systems, transforms what was once a constitutional crisis into a manageable administrative question. States retain freedom to avoid dual systems by selecting Tier 4, and those that prefer Tier 3 receive resources to implement it efficiently. This is not Mitchell redux; it is cooperative federalism at work.
6. Political Infeasibility and the “HAVA Had a Crisis” Objection. — Skeptics may argue that YECPA will never attract sufficient political support to secure passage or appropriations. After all, HAVA responded to a widely recognized crisis—the 2000 Florida debacle—that created bipartisan urgency for election reform. Youth enfranchisement lacks such a galvanizing moment.
To be sure, the Twenty-Sixth Amendment and HAVA were motivated by crisis, and they might not have passed absent those emergency conditions. But the political feasibility of YECPA relies not on crisis but on state volunteerism and demonstrated success. The proposal does not assume immediate nationwide consensus on youth enfranchisement. Rather, it envisions a gradual process: Early-adopting states (likely those already sympathetic to youth voting) participate at Tier 1 or 2, their experiences generate evidence and momentum, skeptical states observe results before committing, and federal appropriations scale with demonstrated success and state demand.
The political feasibility objection also underestimates the power of federalism as a selling point. Conservative and moderate legislators skeptical of federal mandates may nonetheless support a voluntary program that respects state autonomy, especially when modeled on the successful bipartisan precedent of HAVA. There will surely be unpersuaded legislators, but the very features that make YECPA constitutionally sound—state choice, modest inducements, and respect for local variation—are also features that make it politically palatable to a broader coalition than a constitutional amendment or federal mandate could ever attract.
7. What’s the Federal Interest? — The federal interest in HAVA is apparent: Federal funds are used by states to improve election systems with direct benefits for all elections, federal and state. There is also a clear federal interest in YECPA Tier 4—providing funds to states that extend the franchise in all federal, state, and local elections. But Tiers 1–3 provide funds to states that extend the franchise in all elections except federal elections. What exactly is the federal interest in that? critics may question.
The normative debate provides the answer. Studies suggest that extending the franchise in state and local elections correlates with stronger lifelong civic habits and may establish patterns of engagement that counter broader trends of democratic disillusionment and political extremism.
Even where the federal government lacks a direct interest in the first election cycle—where sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds vote in state and local but not federal elections—the payoff comes in the next federal election cycle, when those voters become eighteen- and nineteen-year-olds who are eligible to vote in federal elections, and are more likely to participate due to the introduction of early voting in state and local elections, and the inculcation of civic values. So, while the federal interest in Tiers 1–3 may be more attenuated than Tier 4, there is a broader interest in more robust democratic participation and a direct interest in the more engaged voting population in the next federal election cycle, with compounding benefits every cycle.
D. Benefits Beyond Universal Adoption
YECPA’s value does not depend on immediate nationwide participation. Even partial adoption would yield three systemic benefits that advance the cause of youth enfranchisement and inform broader debates about electoral reform.
1. Demonstration Effects. — Early-adopting states would function as large-scale laboratories, generating empirical data on youth turnout, political knowledge acquisition, and downstream civic engagement far more robust than existing municipal experiments can provide. Takoma Park and similar jurisdictions offer valuable proof of concept, but their populations are small and their political contexts atypical.
Statewide implementation in demographically diverse jurisdictions would produce evidence at scale—evidence that could reshape public opinion in holdout states.
This dynamic mirrors the path of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment itself. Before Congress acted in 1970, Georgia, Kentucky, Alaska, and Hawaii had already reduced their voting ages, creating a foundation of state-level experience that legitimized federal intervention.
Similarly, if California, Colorado, or Massachusetts extended the franchise to sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds under YECPA and demonstrated measurable increases in youth civic participation without disruption to election administration, skeptics in other states would face a harder case for categorical exclusion. Conditional spending thus facilitates the kind of democratic learning that can precede broader reform.
2. Institutional Reframing. — YECPA would redirect public discourse from abstract questions of adolescent maturity to concrete questions of institutional design: how to structure school-based registration programs, develop age-appropriate ballot materials, train poll workers to assist younger voters, and create youth advisory commissions to inform election policy. This shift from normative debate to operational problem-solving may prove politically productive. Opponents who frame youth enfranchisement as irresponsible experimentalism must contend with proponents who frame it as carefully scaffolded civic infrastructure. When the question becomes not “Should we trust teenagers?” but rather “How can we equip young citizens to vote effectively?,” the terms of engagement change.
Moreover, conditioning federal funds on civics education enhancements allows supporters to answer the competence objection directly. If the concern is that sixteen-year-olds lack knowledge, YECPA offers resources to address that deficit rather than ratifying exclusion as the only solution. This rhetorical move—from gatekeeping to capacity-building—may resonate with voters otherwise ambivalent about lowering the voting age.
3. Local Empowerment. — Because YECPA channels federal resources through states to local jurisdictions, it empowers cities, counties, and school districts that support youth voting but lack the fiscal or legal capacity to act independently. Many municipalities have expressed interest in enfranchising young residents for local elections but hesitate due to concerns about implementation costs, voter-database interoperability, or conflicts with state law. A state’s decision to participate in YECPA would remove these barriers, enabling local governments to extend the franchise with federal fiscal backing and state legal authorization.
In this respect, conditional spending operates not as a centralizing force but as a tool for local empowerment—facilitating democratic experimentation at the level closest to affected communities. Cities that pioneered youth voting, such as Greenbelt, Maryland,
and Oakland, California,
did so because local coalitions mobilized around the issue and because state law permitted local variation. YECPA would formalize and finance that dynamic, transforming ad hoc local initiatives into a sustainable, federally supported framework. The result would be a more decentralized form of electoral innovation than either a constitutional amendment or a top-down statutory mandate could achieve.
Conclusion
The first youth-enfranchisement revolution ultimately required a constitutional amendment. That amendment emerged from an extraordinary confluence of moral urgency, political mobilization, and institutional necessity. Today’s movement to lower the voting age is unlikely to replicate that path, at least in the short term. The normative debate hasn’t shifted public skepticism; the political system is polarized; and voters are wary of sweeping constitutional change.
The path forward runs not through another round of abstract normative argument, but through a concrete institutional design that respects state autonomy, addresses administrative costs, and leverages federal resources to support local democratic innovation. A conditional-spending regime like the proposed Youth Enfranchisement and Civic Participation Act would fit comfortably within existing Spending Clause doctrine, avoid the pitfalls of Oregon v. Mitchell, and give willing states and municipalities the tools they need to bring emerging adults into the electorate.
Ultimately, the question “Who gets to vote?” is inseparable from the question “Who gets a say in how voting rules are made?” A Spending Clause approach answers both at once: It invites local communities to decide, with meaningful federal support, whether the time has come to welcome sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds into the democratic fold. It ensures that when communities are ready to say “yes,” the law does not respond with, “You’re on your own.” Over time, as more jurisdictions take up that invitation and the extraordinary becomes familiar, public perception of youth enfranchisement may shift—not because scholars win an argument on paper, but because citizens see it working in practice.