Introduction
On April 28, 2018, Denise Zamora called 911 and reported that her then-husband, Bryce Watkins, had physically attacked her in their shared home in Parker, Colorado.
When the officers arrived, Watkins had already left the home, and Zamora expressed that “she was afraid . . . Watkins would kill her.”
The next morning, Watkins returned home.
Zamora called 911, left to a nearby park, and met with Deputy Kevin Nichols from the Douglas County Sheriff’s Office.
Zamora reiterated that “she felt unsafe around . . . Watkins.”
During their conversation, Watkins called Zamora, and Zamora handed the phone to Deputy Nichols.
Deputy Nichols asked Watkins to “come to the front door of the home to speak,” but Watkins explicitly refused, stating: “[Y]ou cannot come inside my house. I do not want to talk to you.”
Zamora then provided Deputy Nichols with the code to their shared home’s garage door and explained how to enter.
After receiving Zamora’s explicit consent, Deputy Nichols and two other officers entered the shared home without a warrant, announced their presence, and told Watkins to come downstairs.
Appearing in only a towel and “continu[ing] [to] protest[] that the officers were in his home,” Watkins complied and descended the stairs.
After a brief physical altercation, Watkins was arrested for “second degree assault, domestic violence.”
The violence and fear that triggered the involvement of law enforcement in Zamora’s situation is far from exceptional in the United States. Every minute, thirty-two people in the United States experience intimate partner violence (IPV).
Nearly one in two women and more than two in five men have reported experiencing IPV at some point in their life.
Courts have responded to such violence by authorizing state intervention into the home through Fourth Amendment warrant exceptions, particularly the exigent circumstances and consent doctrines.
In Georgia v. Randolph, however, the Supreme Court created the disputed consent rule and held that disputed consent between co-occupants of a shared home cannot justify warrantless entry for evidentiary searches.
Consequently, courts have generously applied the exigent circumstances doctrine to justify warrantless entry in IPV situations and protect survivors from imminent harm.
But the exigent circumstances doctrine only applies in immediate emergencies, “in which police ha[ve] to act immediately” and do not have the time to obtain a warrant.
Even though survivors remain vulnerable to future acts of violence,
courts rarely consider situations in which a survivor has physically left the home, whether by choice or circumstance, to be exigent for Fourth Amendment purposes.
As such, this Note refers to IPV situations in which a survivor has left the home as “non-exigent” IPV situations.
Zamora’s situation illustrates a recurring dilemma in law enforcement responses to “non-exigent” IPV situations. When an alleged abuser is inside the home and the survivor is outside seeking assistance, officers must decide whether immediate concerns justify warrantless entry. “Non-exigent” IPV situations thus place two fundamental values in direct tension: protecting individuals from private violence and preserving the constitutional sanctity of the home.
Recognizing that the cycle of abuse does not end just because an IPV survivor is temporarily outside of their home, some courts have limited the application of Randolph’s disputed consent rule to evidentiary searches.
Although not clearly defined by case law, evidentiary searches generally refer to searches for evidence of crime, as opposed to protective searches, arrests, or investigations.
Limiting the scope of Randolph’s disputed consent rule therefore allows the police to enter the home and speak with the suspected abuser. Other courts, however, have determined that Randolph’s disputed consent rule applies to warrantless entry, regardless of the motivation for entry.
This difference has created a circuit split as to whether Randolph’s disputed consent rule is strictly limited to the context of evidentiary searches in “non-exigent” IPV cases.
This Note argues that Randolph’s disputed consent rule should apply beyond evidentiary searches to all warrantless entry into the home in “non-exigent” IPV contexts, regardless of the motivation for entry. Part I describes the development of the exigent circumstances and consent doctrines as exceptions to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement and provides background on Randolph’s disputed consent rule. Part II analyzes the circuit split between the Fourth, Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits regarding the application of Randolph’s disputed consent rule in “non-exigent” IPV situations. It also examines how Randolph’s disputed consent rule has been applied by state courts. Part III proposes to resolve the circuit split by adopting the Ninth Circuit’s approach of extending Randolph’s disputed consent rule beyond evidentiary searches and prohibiting disputed consent from justifying warrantless entry into the home when a survivor is outside. It also recommends statutorily requiring officers to remain with the survivor outside the home until a warrant is obtained or community-based alternatives are initiated.