Introduction
For decades, critical race and criminal procedure scholars have critiqued the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence on racial justice grounds.
As many have explained, modern Fourth Amendment doctrine has ignored the lived experiences of Black people and other communities of color who are policed most aggressively in the United States.
But also, by not grappling with race, Fourth Amendment case law has helped produce the racialized policing practices that have fueled the country’s current mass incarceration crisis.
These scholars have shown how the Court’s doctrinal choices have not merely tolerated racialized policing but also built the legal architecture that sustains it.
Yet while the Supreme Court has essentially treated race as irrelevant to Fourth Amendment search-and-seizure analysis—except when endorsing racially targeted systems of policing
—some state courts have taken a different approach. Across the country, state courts have rejected the Supreme Court’s cramped vision of the Fourth Amendment, formulating doctrines that impose greater restrictions on searches and seizures. These states are expounding their constitutions in ways that both implicitly and explicitly acknowledge the role that race plays in policing. In so doing, these states are working to “color in” the Fourth Amendment.
The traditional account of federalism’s effect on civil rights reform emphasizes that the United States’ diffuse constitutional structure once made it difficult, if not impossible, to secure equal rights nationwide.
Federalism frustrated the pursuit of racial justice.
And constitutional criminal procedure was one of the clearest examples of this: The Warren Court’s criminal procedure revolution was an explicit response to Southern states’ refusal to afford Black people basic constitutional protections throughout the criminal process.
But for the last half a century or so, as the Supreme Court has become less protective of procedural rights,
federalism has been functioning differently, especially when it comes to criminal procedure and the Fourth Amendment.
Rather than simply following federal law, state courts have crafted more protective standards.
And more recently, this innovation has taken the form of state courts interpreting their Fourth Amendment analogs to better account for how communities of color experience policing—the Fourth Amendment in technicolor.
Of course, turning to the states for a more capacious vision of rights is not new, and this is not to say that state constitutionalism is necessarily reactionary, with states only moving in a dialogic response to the Supreme Court.
But as the Burger Court reached its zenith, Justice William Brennan called on advocates and state courts to look to state constitutions as independent sources of rights, given the Supreme Court’s conservative shift.
And today, the Supreme Court is far more conservative than the Court on which Brennan sat, making his call even more urgent.
But Brennan’s concerns, rooted mainly in a broad rights-and-liberty frame, now take on a distinctly racial dimension. In one breath, the current Court has announced a full-throated embrace of constitutional colorblindness,
going so far as to call the charter document “our colorblind Constitution,”
while in the next it has endorsed a system of racialized policing.
In this climate, state innovation has become increasingly critical for acknowledging, confronting, and remedying the racial injustices that the Supreme Court refuses to see, or sees but refuses to correct.
While many today recognize that state courts are key battlegrounds for civil rights, the literature often operates at a higher level of generality,
focusing on interpretive method,
the scope of state constitutional rights,
or the uniqueness of state constitutional structure.
Rather than theorizing in the abstract, this Article works backward from state-court decisions that have departed from federal search-and-seizure standards to identify the arguments, institutional considerations, and doctrinal moves that have proven effective in persuading state courts to rise above the federal floor. It pays special attention to when state courts have been willing to recognize the racial dynamics of police–citizen encounters in their search-and-seizure doctrine. By providing these examples of success, this Article illustrates how other jurisdictions can “color in” their Fourth Amendment equivalents. At the same time, this Article looks beyond the arguments made in these cases to identify additional considerations that may resonate with state courts exercising their state constitutional authority today. In this way, this Article offers a bottom-up account of how state constitutional law can serve as a vehicle for advancing racial justice in policing, even as federal Fourth Amendment doctrine remains resistant to such concerns.
The Fourth Amendment provides an especially fertile case study for this inquiry.
State courts started developing the practice of departing from federal search-and-seizure doctrine long before the Roberts Court’s ascension, producing a mature body of state constitutional law from which to learn.
The Fourth Amendment’s centrality to everyday criminal law enforcement also means that constitutional questions arise—and are litigated—far more often in state courts than in their federal counterparts.
Today, Fourth Amendment–specific doctrinal roadblocks such as the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule and the Supreme Court’s own ambivalence about whether to retain the exclusionary rule have drastically reduced the number of Fourth Amendment cases the Court agrees to review.
As a result, state courts have had even more opportunity to engage their constitutions vis-à-vis the federal Constitution in the criminal prosecution context.
This is not to say that state courts always depart from federal Fourth Amendment doctrine or even usually depart from federal doctrine.
But still, there has been enough departure from states across the country such that the Fourth Amendment provides a useful example of state constitutional innovation. And while scholars have discussed how states have departed from the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence more generally,
the literature has not adequately focused on when and why state courts depart specially to consider issues of race. This Article brings a racial justice lens to the conversation.
Here’s a preview of what’s to come. The Article details in-depth departures in ten cases from state courts across the country that have charted a different course. Exploring what prompted these state-court departures in the Fourth Amendment context confirms some intuitions about new federalism.
State courts exercised their authority to depart from the Supreme Court by focusing on the textual differences between their state search-and-seizure provisions and the Fourth Amendment, as some state constitutions contain broader language.
Relatedly, state courts felt freer to depart when prior state-court precedents had enshrined broad search-and-seizure protections, allowing those courts to invoke stare decisis.
Also helpful was if other states had moved beyond the Supreme Court, as a state court could cite those decisions and follow their lead.
And when departing, state courts were often attentive to the lived realities within their state’s bounds, adopting arguments that emphasized how the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment doctrine inadequately protected their state’s residents.
The exploration of state courts interpreting their state constitutional search-and-seizure provisions independent of the Fourth Amendment also reveals new insights.
First, a more recent trend is for state courts to explain that issues of race require different search-and-seizure standards.
But importantly, state courts are more likely to focus on race when the parties foreground it.
In other words, when the parties invite the courts to think of search-and-seizure issues in racialized terms, some state courts have accepted the invitation. Of course, whether and how to focus on race remains contingent on the institutional posture of the particular court and the political realities on the ground. Second, and of self-interest to scholars, state courts often discussed whether Supreme Court rulings had been the subject of sustained scholarly criticism when deciding whether to follow them.
Thus, a robust body of scholarship explaining why a particular Supreme Court decision is wrong or wrongheaded can help legitimate a state court’s decision to chart its own course.
Finally, there are two lines of argument that do not feature prominently in the decisions or the briefing that may be ripe for this constitutional moment.
The first is highlighting the different democratic relationships state courts have with their citizens as compared to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court is antimajoritarian by design, while many state courts are democratically accountable.
Therefore, to the extent the Supreme Court’s sentiments are out of step with what a majority of the state’s citizens regard as just, then that can support state constitutional rulings that provide greater protections. The second is greater emphasis on how the Supreme Court’s precedents harm people of color. For all the talk of colorblindness, most Americans understand that race plays a role in policing and the criminal legal process more broadly.
That shared understanding can and should be leveraged in state court constitutional adjudication to reinforce the legitimacy of departures that acknowledge racialized policing.
Before proceeding, a couple of caveats. Although not the focus of this Article, legislation is also a means by which some states have addressed the racial injustices rife within police investigative practices.
To be sure, this form of state innovation is worthy of examination. This Article nevertheless focuses on courts and state constitutionalism for several reasons. First, unlike affirmative civil rights litigation or episodic legislative reform, criminal cases arise continuously, ensuring that constitutional questions—particularly those involving search and seizure—are litigated with regularity in state courts.
Second, legislative reforms remain subject to judicial interpretation and enforcement, and courts retain significant power to narrow their reach or blunt their remedial force.
In other words, even a focus on legislative action requires paying attention to the courts. Third, statutory reforms are contingent: They may be amended, repealed, or underenforced as political winds shift.
State constitutional rulings, by contrast, tend to be more durable and harder to unwind. For these reasons, state constitutional adjudication offers a relatively stable
and recurring vehicle for confronting racial injustice in criminal law’s enforcement, and hopefully, legislative efforts continue alongside it. Finally, a focus on the courts, and particularly on state constitutional interpretation, allows for closer attention to the meaning of the Fourth Amendment itself, especially the disconnect between everyday policing practices and the constitutional protections that govern them.
To be clear, this Article does not seek to romanticize state constitutionalism or federalism more broadly.
State criminal legal systems subjugate Black and Brown people in myriad ways, and this Article does not minimize those harms.
But in this constitutional moment—one defined by backlash, retrenchment, and revisionism—state autonomy can be leveraged to advance racial justice.
How states have innovated in the Fourth Amendment space provides proof of concept for how other states can engage and deploy their constitutions to do meaningful racial justice work when the Supreme Court will not.
With those caveats cleared away, this Article makes its case over the course of four parts. Part I explains the traditional account that “those interested in racial justice have long been skeptical of federalism,”
as diffuse authority and the “preservation of states’ rights” often interfered with “the federal government’s [historical] goal of promoting racial equality.”
As this Part explains, it was federalism concerns that fueled the Warren Court’s criminal procedure revolution, as the Court attempted to constitutionalize foundational criminal procedure rights in the face of Southern states routinely denying those rights to Black people accused of crime. But the new federalism movement has flipped the traditional account of federalism on its head—hence the label “new.” Now, with the Supreme Court adhering to the position that the Constitution must be colorblind while also claiming that the Constitution allows for racially targeted policing, states have taken on renewed importance in the struggle for racial justice.
And while this is true beyond policing, it is especially true in constitutional criminal procedure, where states have taken meaningful steps to better protect their residents—especially those of color—against unreasonable searches and seizures.
Part II explores the federal doctrine from which states have departed, focusing on three Fourth Amendment cases involving defendants of color that have drawn the harshest criticism for their racial obliviousness. It focuses on this cluster of cases because, as a corpus, they have given law enforcement sweeping power to aggressively police communities of color, while at the same time minimizing the experiences of those same people most aggressively policed.
It examines Whren v. United States, where the Court greenlit racial profiling by holding that an officer’s subjective motives are irrelevant under the Fourth Amendment;
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, where the Court held that the government does not have to prove consent was made with knowledge of the right to refuse, ignoring the precarity and coercion that people of color experience in police encounters;
and Illinois v. Wardlow—a case in which the Court held that “unprovoked flight” from police in a “high crime area” gives rise to reasonable suspicion, ignoring the innocent reasons people of color may wish to avoid police contact.
Together, these decisions constitutionalize a vision of policing that grants wide latitude to officers while failing to conduct any meaningful inquiry into how race shapes police–citizen encounters.
Part III describes state courts’ resistance to federal doctrine. It identifies how state courts have pushed back against the Supreme Court’s refusal to recognize race in its Fourth Amendment case law. For example, Washington has prohibited pretextual seizures—rejecting Whren.
New Jersey requires consent to be informed—bucking Bustamonte.
And Massachusetts has refuted the suspiciousness of a Black person’s flight from police—contra Wardlow.
To better understand what prompted these departures, this Part examines not only the decisions themselves, but, when available, the briefing and oral arguments underlying them.
Doing so illuminates how litigants framed race, policing realities, state constitutional text, and institutional competence—and how those arguments resonated with state courts deciding whether to chart an independent constitutional course.
Finally, Part IV distills lessons from the state Fourth Amendment departures. This Part identifies recurring patterns in how state courts have been persuaded to deviate from federal search-and-seizure doctrine, which essentially erases race, to more fully embrace a vision of the law attuned to a racialized reality. It synthesizes the doctrinal moves, institutional justifications, and framing strategies that have accompanied these departures, shedding light on how state courts have exercised their authority to move beyond the federal floor in concrete cases. Although this Article focuses on searches and seizures, the identified patterns provide insights that extend beyond the Fourth Amendment context, illuminating how state constitutional law can operate as a distinct site of racial justice across doctrinal domains.