THE ORIGINS OF STATUTORY STARE DECISIS

THE ORIGINS OF STATUTORY STARE DECISIS

Federal courts apply stare decisis with extra force to decisions that interpret statutes. Critics contend that this “supercharged” deference to statutory precedent lacks a legitimate pedigree. But that charge rests on conjecture, since scholars have paid little attention to how English courts historically handled such cases. This Essay responds with a new history of statutory stare decisis. For much of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, it argues, common lawyers endorsed the maxim communis error facit ius—common error makes law. That maxim counseled against overturning a course of decisions merely because they had interpreted a statute erroneously. Indeed, as one leading judge remarked, “A series of precedents against the plain words of an act of Parliament have made a law.” Starting in the 1760s, however, several factors—better legislative drafting, partisan conflict over jurisprudence, and high-profile treason trials—led some lawyers, but not all, to reject communis error when it came to statutes. The result: By the 1790s, English law contained two rival approaches to statutory precedent—a classical paradigm, which effectively allowed a course of precedent to amend a statute; and a revisionist alternative, which held that precedent could clarify but not alter a statute’s meaning. Americans inherited that conflict, which endured well into the nineteenth century. This history offers a new perspective on statutory stare decisis today. It also suggests a further question: If some early Americans thought precedent could reshape legislation, what did that mean for erroneous constitutional precedents?

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Introduction

Federal courts apply stare decisis with “enhanced force” to decisions that interpret statutes. 1 Kimble v. Marvel Ent., LLC, 576 U.S. 446, 456 (2015); see also Amy Coney Barrett, Statutory Stare Decisis in the Courts of Appeals, 73 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 317, 327–28 (2005) [hereinafter Barrett, Statutory Stare Decisis] (“A majority of the circuits has explicitly adopted the super-strong presumption against overruling statutory precedents, and in those circuits that have never explicitly applied the rule, separate opinions assume that it applies.” (footnote omitted)). State courts mostly follow the same approach, but not always. See, e.g., People v. Wilson, 902 N.W.2d 378, 382 n.6 (Mich. 2017) (rejecting “any notion that cases involving statutory interpretation are to be afforded any greater stare decisis weight than other cases”); Zachary B. Pohlman, Stare Decisis and the Supreme Court(s): What States Can Learn From Gamble, 95 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1731, 1749 n.136 (2020) (collecting state decisions that divide over whether stare decisis applies with different force to statutory precedents). Common law cases get less respect, and constitutional ones less deference still. 2 Bryan A. Garner et al., The Law of Judicial Precedent 333–35 (2016). The Court has sometimes relied not on a formal statute/Constitution distinction but on the possibility of legislative correction. Compare South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 585 U.S. 162, 183–84 (2018) (giving constitutional-type deference to a dormant Commerce Clause precedent), with id. at 192–93 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that stare decisis should apply with “special force” because Congress can override such precedents by regulating interstate commerce (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 320 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment))). For decades, a broad spectrum of judges has applied this “super-strong presumption” against overruling statutory precedents. 3 William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 Geo. L.J. 1361, 1362 (1988) [hereinafter Eskridge, Overruling Statutory Precedents]; see also, e.g., Groff v. DeJoy, 143 S. Ct. 2279, 2297–98 (2023) (Sotomayor, J., concurring); Allen v. Milligan, 143 S. Ct. 1487, 1515 (2023) (Roberts, C.J.); id. at 1517–18 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part); Lee J. Strang & Bryce G. Poole, The Historical (In)Accuracy of the Brandeis Dichotomy: An Assessment of the Two-Tiered Standard of Stare Decisis for Supreme Court Precedents, 86 N.C. L. Rev. 969, 971–72 (2008) (discussing the Rehnquist Court); cf. Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 144 S. Ct. 2244, 2279–80, 2286 (2024) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (noting the Court’s reluctance to overrule statutory precedents but emphasizing exceptions).

To get a sense of that presumption’s bite, consider the legal history of baseball. In 1922, the Supreme Court held that professional baseball wasn’t subject to federal antitrust statutes because it didn’t qualify as interstate commerce. 4 Fed. Baseball Club of Balt., Inc. v. Nat’l League of Pro. Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200, 208–09 (1922). Over time, that holding became hard to square with the Court’s increasingly expansive reading of the Commerce Clause. (If growing wheat for one’s own farm counted as interstate commerce, 5 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 124–25 (1942). why didn’t the World Series?) Even so, when the issue popped up again in 1953, the Court relied on statutory stare decisis to reaffirm its earlier decision “[w]ithout re-examination of the underlying issues.” 6 Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356, 357 (1953) (per curiam); see also United States v. Shubert, 348 U.S. 222, 230 (1955) (“Toolson was a narrow application of the rule of stare decisis.”). Baseball’s antitrust exemption, the Court later acknowledged, was an “aberration” that seemed “unrealistic, inconsistent, [and] illogical.” 7 Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 282 (1972) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Radovich v. NFL, 352 U.S. 445, 452 (1957)). But it was an aberration “fully entitled to the benefit of stare decisis.” 8 Id. If the Court had unduly restricted the scope of antitrust legislation, the error was Congress’s to fix, not the Court’s. 9 Id. at 283. This account simplifies the story quite a bit. For a more detailed telling, see generally Stuart Banner, The Baseball Trust: A History of Baseball’s Antitrust Exemption (2013).

Courts routinely invoke super-strong stare decisis to retain statutory interpretations they would otherwise discard. 10 Skeptics might doubt whether the doctrine really matters, particularly for the Supreme Court. See Lee Epstein, William M. Landes & Adam Liptak, The Decision to Depart (or Not) From Constitutional Precedent: An Empirical Study of the Roberts Court, 90 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1115, 1118 (2015). Undoubtedly, the Court hasn’t always followed the doctrine consistently. See Frederick Schauer, Stare Decisis—Rhetoric and Reality in the Supreme Court, 2018 Sup. Ct. Rev. 121, 130–31. But the fact that judges and advocates act as if the doctrine exists suggests that it has some pull. See Jack Knight & Lee Epstein, The Norm of Stare Decisis, 40 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 1018, 1032–33 (1996); cf. Quentin Skinner, Some Problems in the Analysis of Political Thought and Action, 2 Pol. Theory 277, 292 (1974) (explaining that an actor’s professed principles can constrain her—even if she doesn’t believe them—when she needs to legitimate her conduct). And some recent decisions are hard to explain otherwise. Consider Kimble v. Marvel Ent., LLC, 576 U.S. 446, 449 (2015). “The sole question presented” was whether to overrule Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29 (1964), a little-loved decision about patent royalties. Kimble, 576 U.S. at 449. Brulotte had few defenders, and the Court acknowledged a “broad scholarly consensus” against it. Id. at 461; see also Anita S. Krishnakumar, Textualism and Statutory Precedents, 104 Va. L. Rev. 157, 169 (2018) (collecting critiques). Nonetheless, the Court retained Brulotte. The best explanation, Professor Herbert Hovenkamp observes, is that Kimble “was a stare decisis decision, pure and simple.” Herbert Hovenkamp, Brulotte’s Web, 11 J. Competition L. & Econ. 527, 542 (2015); accord Kimble, 576 U.S. at 472 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“Even the Court does not defend the decision on the merits.”).For a more recent example, consider the petition for certiorari in Beck v. United States. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Beck v. United States, 146 S. Ct. 405 (2025) (No. 24-1078). The petition invited the Court to “limit or overrule” Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950), which held that the Federal Tort Claims Act doesn’t waive the government’s sovereign immunity for injuries incident to military service. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra, at ii. In Justice Sotomayor’s telling, Feres was an “atextual” decision that “has garnered near-universal criticism,” “caused significant confusion,” and “produce[d] deeply unfair results.” Beck, 146 S. Ct. at 405–06 (statement of Sotomayor, J., respecting denial of certiorari). Nonetheless, she voted to deny the petition “out of respect for the Court’s rules of stare decisis” in statutory cases. Id. at 405. It’s awkward, then, that most scholars view the doctrine’s historical foundations as “shaky.” 11 See, e.g., Eskridge, Overruling Statutory Precedents, supra note 3, at 1364; Amy Coney Barrett, Stare Decisis and Due Process, 74 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1011, 1019–20 (2003). This Essay focuses on pedigree-based critiques, but scholars have also advanced theoretical objections to the prevailing doctrine of statutory stare decisis. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Stability and Reliability in Judicial Decisions, 73 Cornell L. Rev. 422, 427–29 (1988); Eskridge, Overruling Statutory Precedents, supra note 3, at 1397–1409; Randy J. Kozel, Statutory Interpretation, Administrative Deference, and the Law of Stare Decisis, 97 Tex. L. Rev. 1125, 1130–36 (2019). “The notion of an enhanced standard of deference to statutory precedent apparently had not occurred to founding-era commentators,” then-Professor Thomas Lee concluded, “or to the Supreme Court in the Marshall and Taney years.” 12 Thomas R. Lee, Stare Decisis in Historical Perspective: From the Founding Era to the Rehnquist Court, 52 Vand. L. Rev. 647, 730–31 (1999). In his assessment, the doctrine first emerged in the late nineteenth century and “crystallized in a series of opinions in the Hughes Court.” 13 Id. at 731. Professor Caleb Nelson’s research points the same way. Well into the nineteenth century, he argues, “the demonstrated error of a past interpretation of a statutory or constitutional provision was reason enough to overrule the past interpretation unless there were special reasons” to do otherwise. 14 Caleb Nelson, Stare Decisis and Demonstrably Erroneous Precedents, 87 Va. L. Rev. 1, 21 (2001) [hereinafter Nelson, Stare Decisis] (emphasis omitted). Indeed, statutory precedents typically received less deference than common law ones because the statutory text made it easier to show that a prior decision was wrong. 15 See id. at 21–23, 44–45 (“To the extent that the underlying legal provision was determinate, . . . courts were not thought to be similarly bound by precedents that misinterpreted it.”).

If that’s right, then we might doubt the doctrine’s life expectancy before an originalist Supreme Court. Justice Clarence Thomas has already sharpened the knife. 16 He’s not the only member of the Court to have questioned the doctrine. See, e.g., Amy Coney Barrett, Substantive Canons and Faithful Agency, 90 B.U. L. Rev. 109, 121 n.53 (2010) (“[F]ederal courts permit the institutional interest in stability to trump the obligation of faithful agency every time that they employ stare decisis to adhere to a prior erroneous interpretation of a statute. This conflict would be eliminated if courts [ceased] . . . giving statutory decisions ‘super strong’ stare decisis effect . . . .”). In his view, “the ‘judicial Power’ vested in the federal courts” doesn’t permit the Court’s present doctrine. 17 Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960, 1981–82 (2019) (Thomas, J., concurring). Instead, it demands a simpler rule: “When faced with a demonstrably erroneous precedent”—one that contradicts “the original understanding of the relevant” constitutional or statutory “text”—courts “should not follow it.” 18 Id. at 1982–85. In addition to insisting that federal courts must overrule demonstrably erroneous precedents, Justice Thomas has also suggested that courts may overrule decisions that reflect an imperfect but “textually permissible interpretation.” Id. at 1984. Scholars have observed that the latter, discretionary prong departs from traditional views of precedent. See William Baude, Precedent and Discretion, 2019 Sup. Ct. Rev. 313, 321–22 (contrasting Justice Thomas’s view with the historical account in Nelson, Stare Decisis, supra note 14, at 4–5).

His critique depends on contrasting English and American law. As he sees it, “[f]ederal courts today look to different sources of law when exercising the judicial power than did the common-law courts of England.” 19 Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1984 (Thomas, J., concurring). Stare decisis “made sense in a common-law legal system in which courts systematically developed the law through judicial decisions,” he argues. 20 Id. at 1981–82. “But our federal system is different.” 21 Id. at 1982. The Constitution charges federal courts not with developing “unwritten” law in the first instance, as English courts did, but with “interpret[ing] legal texts.” 22 Id. at 1982, 1984. In light of that basic difference, the old-world “pedigree” of stare decisis has little relevance for federal judges today. 23 Id. at 1982–84. Some circuit judges and academics have endorsed Justice Thomas’s view. See, e.g., Bianchi v. Brown, 111 F.4th 438, 498 (4th Cir. 2024) (en banc) (Richardson, J., dissenting); Hamilton v. Dallas County, 79 F.4th 494, 506 (5th Cir. 2023) (en banc) (Ho, J., concurring); Hammoud v. Ma’at, 49 F.4th 874, 887 (5th Cir. 2022) (en banc) (Oldham, J., dissenting); Randy E. Barnett & Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism After Dobbs, Bruen, and Kennedy: The Role of History and Tradition, 118 Nw. U. L. Rev. 433, 484 (2023) (“Our tentative approach to precedent is reflected in Justice Thomas’s concurring opinion in Gamble . . . .”); cf. Chambers v. District of Columbia, 35 F.4th 870, 896 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (en banc) (Katsas, J., dissenting) (“Justice Thomas has forcefully laid out the competing view that precedent should be overruled . . . if it is ‘demonstrably erroneous.’ But the Supreme Court has not yet accepted this view, and so neither may we.” (citation omitted) (quoting Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1981 (Thomas, J., concurring))); Gary Lawson, The Constitutional Case Against Precedent, 17 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 23, 24 (1994) (arguing against stare decisis for constitutional cases and suggesting that similar arguments apply against statutory precedent).

But English courts did interpret statutes—lots of them. 24 See infra section I.C. Indeed, just as twentieth-century lawyers lamented the “orgy of statute making” that afflicted American law, 25 Guido Calabresi, A Common Law for the Age of Statutes 1 (1982) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Grant Gilmore, The Ages of American Law 95 (1977)). their eighteenth-century counterparts bemoaned Britain’s “epidemical madness” of legislating. 26 Francis Stoughton Sullivan, An Historical Treatise on the Feudal Law, and the Constitution and Laws of England 7 (London, J. Johnson & J. Payne 1772). English judges, too, complained of the “enormous size” of the “statute books.” 27 15 The Parliamentary History of England 724, 725–26 (William Cobbett ed., London, T.C. Hansard 1813) (reporting Lord Chancellor Hardwicke’s May 24, 1756, speech in the House of Lords); see also David Lieberman, The Province of Legislation Determined: Legal Theory in Eighteenth-Century Britain 13–28 (1989) [hereinafter Lieberman, Province of Legislation] (collecting other complaints). Given the sheer ubiquity of legislation, it’s no surprise that eighteenth-century lawyers sometimes faced conflicts between a statute’s apparent meaning and the meaning it had previously been given. 28 See infra sections I.B–.F. But scholars have paid little attention to how lawyers traditionally resolved such conflicts, especially in England. 29 During the drafting of this Essay, two important exceptions emerged. First, a forthcoming article by Professor Jonathan Green offers an illuminating history of the relationship between custom and text in the common law tradition and then uses that history to show how “classical English constitutionalism” might inform the Supreme Court’s use of “history and tradition” to define enumerated constitutional rights. Jonathan Green, Some Traditional Questions About “History and Tradition,” 102 Notre Dame L. Rev. (forthcoming 2026) (manuscript at 57–58), https://www.ssrn.com/abstract=5170253 [https://perma.cc/SKJ5-4VUC] [hereinafter Green, Traditional Questions]. In eighteenth-century England, he argues, “where a written law codified (or modified) a preexisting, customary right, the scope of that right continued, as before, to be defined by a tradition of political and social practice that preceded and succeeded the statute’s enactment.” Id. (manuscript at 4). Because custom continued to evolve, so too would the codified customary right. That historical framework, Green argues, provides an originalist justification for giving certain constitutional rights—such as freedom of speech or the right to bear arms—a dynamic definition that accounts for post-ratification practice. Id. (manuscript at 58). At the same time, however, Green observes that tensions within eighteenth-century theories of tradition might complicate efforts to translate Founding-era methods into twenty-first-century jurisprudence. Id. (manuscript at 60–61).This Essay’s argument and Green’s are largely complementary, though their emphases differ. Green, with an eye to recent cases like Rahimi and Vidal, focuses on the history of laws that codified preexisting rights. Id. (manuscript at 3–4); see also United States v. Rahimi, 144 S. Ct. 1889 (2024); Vidal v. Elster, 144 S. Ct. 1507 (2024). This Essay, in contrast, examines the relationship between legislation and precedent more generally, without considering the immediate implications for the Supreme Court’s history-and-tradition cases. And while Green and I both note disagreements among common lawyers about the effect of precedent and usage, this Essay aims to map the causes and contours of that disagreement more precisely.Second, forthcoming work by Professor Ryan Snyder addresses how Founding-era courts used historical practice to interpret statutes and constitutional provisions. Ryan Snyder, Historical Practice at the Founding, 94 U. Chi. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2027) (manuscript at 3), https://ssrn.com/abstract=5894922 [https://perma.cc/QN9B-VAJ8]. English and early American courts, Snyder argues, used practice to help find the meaning of legal texts, but not to alter their meaning. Id. (manuscript at 5). To help police the line between law-finding and law-creation, courts developed a “seven-factor test” to “screen out” practices that didn’t reliably illuminate a provision’s original meaning. Id. (manuscript at 5). Under that test, Snyder argues, “a practice had to (1) begin shortly after the law’s adoption; (2) occur repeatedly; (3) continue for a long period of time; (4) be uniform; (5) be widely accepted; (6) reflect a good-faith effort to interpret the law correctly; and (7) represent a reasonable interpretation of the law.” Id.Snyder’s article sheds useful light on an important and enduring strand in Anglo-American legal thought. Unlike this Essay, however, which considers how both judicial and nonjudicial usage could shape the meaning of statutes, Snyder focuses on practice while excluding “express interpretations of the law,” including judicial opinions. Id. (manuscript at 6). As a result, Snyder’s approach sidesteps or discounts some of the strongest evidence that common lawyers traditionally thought that usage could trump a statute’s original meaning.Green, Snyder, and this Essay’s author have previously discussed the commonalities and differences among our respective articles. William Baude, A Scholarly Roundtable on History and Practice, Divided Argument (Apr. 3, 2026), https://blog.dividedargument.com/p/a-scholarly-roundtable-on-history [https://perma.cc/F6SL-3ET7]. Instead, scholarship has tended to focus on the early United States or to examine English doctrine without distinguishing statutory from non-statutory cases. 30 Lee’s influential article spends only a few pages on English law, while Nelson’s, following the path marked by Professor Frederick Kempin, focuses on U.S. law between 1800 and 1850. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 12, at 659–62; Nelson, Stare Decisis, supra note 14, at 4; Frederick G. Kempin, Jr., Precedent and Stare Decisis: The Critical Years, 1800 to 1850, 3 Am. J. Legal Hist. 28 (1959). As a result, lawyers interested in the long view of statutory stare decisis have had to rely on generalization and conjecture.

This Essay responds by offering a new history of statutory precedent in the long eighteenth century. 31 This Essay concerns horizontal, not vertical, stare decisis. Until well into the nineteenth century, a single statutory decision couldn’t bind later courts, let alone with “super-strong” force. But nor was there a Founding-era consensus that courts should presumptively reverse erroneous statutory decisions. To be sure, courts sometimes overturned statutory precedents. But judges also endorsed the maxim communis error facit ius—common error makes law (or, in Professor David Seipp’s translation, “if everybody has been doing it wrong, let’s just call it right and keep doing it” 32 David J. Seipp, Trust and Fiduciary Duty in the Early Common Law, 91 B.U. L. Rev. 1011, 1032 (2011). ). The maxim applied broadly. But it packed a particular punch for statutes: “A series of precedents against the plain words of an act of Parliament have made a law,” as Lord Hardwicke put it in 1737. 33 Ilchester v. Bendishe (1737) 25 Eng. Rep. 886, 886; West t. Hard. 184, 185. Like most maxims, communis error had its limits. As Part I explains, not every error made law. And that maxim sat uneasily with another, which Hardwicke also endorsed: that only Parliament could make a law. 34 Middleton v. Crofts (1736) 26 Eng. Rep. 788, 790; 2 Atk. 650, 654 (“[N]o new laws can be made to bind the whole people of this land, but by the King, with the advice and consent of both houses of parliament, and by their united authority . . . .”); 2 Atkinson MSS 301, 303 (another report of the case) (on file with Lincoln’s Inn Libr.) (“By the Gen[eral] [and] fundamental principles of our constitution it is undoubtedly certain that the people of England are bound only by such Laws, as have the consent of the whole Legislature, [which] consists of the King, the Peers, and the Commons in Parliament assembled.”). For background on Middleton, see George R. Bush, Dr Codex Silenced: Middleton v Crofts Revisited, 24 J. Legal Hist. 23, 23–25 (2003); Troy L. Harris, Secularizing a Religious Legal System: Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction in Early Eighteenth Century England, 8 Brit. J. Am. Legal Stud. 1, 1–36 (2019); Richard Helmholz, The Canons of 1603: The Contemporary Understanding, in English Canon Law: Essays in Honour of Bishop Eric Kemp 23, 24 (Norman Doe, Mark Hill & Robert Ombres eds., 1998). During the common law’s “classical” era (roughly, from Coke to Blackstone), England’s doctrine of statutory precedent reflected an ongoing struggle to reconcile these principles.

The classical approach to statutory precedent came under pressure in the later eighteenth century. As Part II explains, several developments encouraged lawyers to reject communis error for statutes and to argue instead that a statute’s authentic meaning should always prevail over erroneous constructions. First, legislative drafting improved, so that it became more plausible to claim that one construction was textually superior to another. Second, a reconfiguration of partisan politics focused lawyers’ attention on the distinction between legislative and judicial power. And, finally, a series of politically salient treason trials led defense lawyers to insist on strict adherence to statutory text in order to safeguard individual liberty. These developments didn’t destroy the older, communis error–based approach. But they created a second, competing paradigm. As a result, late-eighteenth-century lawyers had to navigate two incompatible theories of statutory precedent: The classical approach held that a series of precedents could sometimes trump a statute’s original meaning, while the revisionist alternative insisted that precedent could clarify but not alter an act of Parliament.

Part III uses this English history to reevaluate statutory stare decisis in the early United States. 35 Existing accounts of American stare decisis are helpful but incomplete. For instance, Kempin’s widely cited article doesn’t distinguish statutory from non-statutory precedent. See Kempin, supra note 30. Lee explores that distinction in depth. But because his project was avowedly presentist—“tracing the primary aspects of the Rehnquist Court’s doctrine of stare decisis” to the Founding—it tended to overlook historical doctrines without obvious analogues in the present, including communis error. See Lee, supra note 12, at 650. Nelson, in contrast, does identify the possibility of communis error at the Founding. See Nelson, Stare Decisis, supra note 14, at 37 n.129. But he reduces it to a reliance-based exception to judges’ duty to get statutes right. Id. That captures part of the story, see infra section III.C, but examining American law against its English backdrop allows us to see other angles. American lawyers inherited the English debate, and both the classical and revisionist paradigms had American adherents well into the nineteenth century. But the debate took a distinctively American turn, as those who favored communis error reframed it in republican terms that emphasized the people’s sovereign right to amend their laws, whether legislatively or through everyday practice.

This history raises two further puzzles, which Part IV explores but doesn’t claim to resolve. The first concerns the mismatch between the Court’s present doctrine and its ancestors. Today, the Supreme Court gives “supercharged” deference to a single statutory decision. 36 Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 144 S. Ct. 2244, 2295 (2024) (Kagan, J., dissenting); see also infra note 405. Nobody advanced that view in eighteenth-century England or the early United States; the debate was whether a course of precedent could trump a statute’s original meaning. In other words, the Court ultimately resolved the longstanding debate over statutory precedent by rejecting both sides and embracing a third option. Why?

The second puzzle involves the historical relationship between statutory and constitutional precedent. At the Founding, this Essay argues, many lawyers thought precedent could sometimes shift a statute’s meaning. We know, too, that many Founding-era lawyers thought the Constitution should be construed like a statute. 37 See infra note 458. Put together, those premises suggest that some eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Americans might have thought precedent could alter the Constitution’s meaning, too. 38 See infra section IV.B; cf. Akhil Reed Amar, On Lawson on Precedent, 17 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 39, 39–40 (1994) (“If a judicial misconstruction can trump a sovereign statute—the highest law promulgated by the sovereign Parliament—then one might ask why the same thing might not be true for the Constitution in America.”). Did they? If not, why?