Introduction
The immense scale of predicted climate migration demands an effective and coordinated international response.
One component of this effort must be clarifying the application of existing international legal regimes to this novel context—perhaps most saliently, the extent to which the protections of international refugee law can encompass climate migrants.
As for any other category of displacement, the standard governing refugee status in the context of climate migration emerges from the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (“Refugee Convention”) and its 1967 Protocol.
The Refugee Convention defines a refugee as an individual who has a “well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion,” is outside their country of origin, and, due to such fear, is “unwilling to avail [them]self of [its] protection.”
To be legally considered refugees and eligible for asylum, climate migrants thus face three central challenges: they must have (1) experienced harm amounting to persecution (2) on account of (3) one of these five protected grounds.
Though persecution has no precise definition in this context, “a threat to life or freedom” based on one of the protected grounds “is always persecution.”
The second requirement, termed the “nexus,” demands that such persecution be inflicted because of one of the protected characteristics.
There is widespread recognition that some climate migrants will meet the Refugee Convention’s standard but little agreement as to the precise context it governs.
Some types of climate change–related
asylum claims correspond more naturally to conventional understandings of the protection that the Refugee Convention offers. For instance, President Joe Biden’s Administration has recognized that a government’s discriminatory withholding of climate change relief from particular groups might amount to persecution.
Similarly, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) accepts that the Refugee Convention extends to situations in which climate change increases the risk of persecution or violence.
For example, refugees who fled from northern Cameroon to neighboring Chad in 2021 after conflict erupted due to climate change–induced water scarcity would fall within the ambit of the Refugee Convention.
However, these limited categories exclude what might be termed “climate asylum”: qualification for asylum on the basis that climate change–based harm, for which a set of international high-emitting actors are responsible, amounts to persecution, against which climate migrants’ own governments are unable or unwilling to protect them.
In the absence of an international agreement reconciling climate migration and refugee status, examining domestic legislation implementing the Refugee Convention better facilitates actual consideration of the potential success of a climate asylum claim. In the United States, the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) incorporates and expands upon the language of the Refugee Convention.
As amended by the Refugee Act of 1980, it establishes a burden-shifting framework for an asylum claim, introducing additional elements: (1) the applicant must establish past persecution, which creates a presumption of a well-founded fear of future persecution; (2) the government may rebut this presumption by proving either that country conditions have changed or that the applicant could reasonably relocate within their country of origin; and (3) the applicant, by prevailing on a claim of humanitarian asylum, may overcome the rebuttal.
Prior scholarship has explored strategies for establishing past persecution under the INA but has largely neglected to evaluate this framework as a whole.
In particular, it has failed to consider the role of humanitarian asylum, the discretionary grant of protected status in the absence of a future fear of persecution, in combating challenges raised by the U.S. government.
Considering this burden-shifting framework collectively, this Note argues that U.S. asylum law is capable of providing—and, applied justly toward humanitarian ends, must provide—protection for climate refugees. It first introduces international discourse surrounding climate asylum and its relationship to the United States’ burgeoning response to climate migration. It then examines the initial and humanitarian asylum claims in turn, countering potential rebuttals and outlining a successful claim.