made of the sensitive role of the investment advisers, advisory fees, and the duties of fund directors. The act in many areas is untried, yet to many observers it is surprisingly up to date in terms of its ability to meet new situations. The duties imposed by sections 10, 15, and 36 will undoubtedly form the core of a new effort to eliminate the evils set out in section 1(b) of the act.

The implication of private rights of action has gained wide recognition in the securities field and hopefully will be firmly established under the Investment Company Act by the Supreme Court in Brooks in line with the recent ruling in the Bolling case. This, however, is the jurisdictional question; the substantive issues have yet to be tried. The content of the duties imposed by the various provisions of the act will undoubtedly begin to emerge within the next few years.

The Investment Company Act is a comprehensive regulatory scheme, not merely a disclosure act, and directors of mutual funds are bound to act solely in the best interests of their funds. Hopefully, the investment company industry will face the issues squarely, especially the questions concerning the duties of directors and the fee arrangements, and not seek the temporary comfort offered by rationalizations grounded on misconceptions of the act.

The Investment Company Act is entering a new stage in its development, which will undoubtedly have a highly significant impact on the mutual fund industry and the rapidly increasing sector of the investing public that is turning to the funds as a medium for investment.