In July 2002 the trustees of the Milton Hershey School Trust announced a plan to diversify the Trust’s investment portfolio by selling the Trust’s controlling interest in the Hershey Company. The Company’s stock jumped from $62.50 to $78.30 on news of the proposed sale. But the Pennsylvania Attorney General, who was then running for governor, opposed the sale on the ground that it would harm the local community. Shortly after the Attorney General obtained a preliminary injunction, the trustees abandoned the sale and the Company’s stock dropped to $65.00. Using standard event study methodology, we find that the sale announcement was associated with a positive abnormal return of over 25% and that canceling the sale was followed by a negative abnormal return of nearly 12%. Our findings imply that instead of improving the welfare of the needy children who are the Trust’s main beneficiaries, the Attorney General’s intervention preserved charitable trust agency costs of roughly $850 million and foreclosed salutary portfolio diversification. Our analysis contributes to the literature of trust law by supplying the first empirical analysis of agency costs in the charitable trust form and by highlighting shortcomings in supervision of charities by the state attorneys general.

Literature suggests two distinct paths to stock market development: an approach based on legal protections for investors, and an approach based on self-regulation of listed companies by stock exchanges. This Essay traces China’s attempts to pursue both approaches, while focusing primarily on the role of the stock exchanges as regulators. Specifically, the Essay examines a fascinating but unstudied aspect of Chinese securities regulation—public criticism of listed companies by the Shanghai and Shenzhen exchanges. Based on both event study methodology and extensive interviews of market actors, we find that the public criticisms have significant effects on listed companies and their executives.

his Essay explores the enforceability and presence of pro-seller contract terms in internet retail contracts. Analyzing case law on internet contract enforceability and a survey of 500 firms’ websites, it demonstrates that even the enforceability of many internet contracts is questionable. It then presents new data that suggest that the prevalence of proseller contract terms is far less than usually assumed. It suggests that the benefit of making these terms enforceable is outweighed by the loss of user friendliness required for the necessary interface changes. Finally, it uses fresh statistical analyses to determine what relationship, if any, exists between enforceability, pro-seller contract terms, business size, product channel, or product type. Generally, it concludes that the contract literature has likely overestimated the benefit of the pro-seller contract terms and underestimated the role internet contract terms play in informal enforcement; unenforceable terms may still serve as guideposts to dispute resolution.

At both the federal and state levels of government, Congress and state legislatures have passed statutes conferring standing onto citizens to litigate in the public interest. These statutes allow citizens to assist in law enforcement and to hold the executive branch accountable to its statutory obligations. However, these conferrals of standing can be constitutionally controversial. At the federal level, the Supreme Court has ruled that statutory conferrals may sometimes impermissibly direct the federal courts to hear cases outside of the judicial power vested by Article III of the Federal Constitution. The Court has also hinted that such conferrals may infringe on the President’s authority over law enforcement. Since many state constitutions diverge from the Federal Constitution in important respects, one might expect state courts to reject the federal courts’ restrictions on legislative conferrals of standing. However, some state courts have imported the federal approach into their state constitutional law. This Note argues that state courts should be hesitant to restrict legislative conferrals of standing.

The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA) fundamentally changed many aspects of the Bankruptcy Code, but its impact on certain parts of the law remains unclear. The “ride-through” is one of these parts. The ride-through provides debtors with a fourth option for their property; other than surrendering, reaffirming, or redeeming property, debtors can retain their property by continuing to make pre-bankruptcy payments. The pre-BAPCPA ride-through’s scope, however, was limited, as only five circuit courts of appeals recognized its existence, while five others held it was not a part of the Bankruptcy Code. This circuit split was not resolved before Congress passed BAPCPA, which modified the Bankruptcy Code sections relating to the ride-through. This Note argues that because of this lack of clear change from BAPCPA, courts should continue to perform the ride-through based