This Article examines the “aggregation deficit” in antitrust: the pervasive lack of information, essential to choosing an optimal antitrust rule, about the frequency and costliness of anticompetitive activity. By synthesizing available information, the present analysis helps close the information gap for an important, unresolved issue in U.S. antitrust policy: patent settlements between brand-name drug makers and their generic rivals. The analysis draws upon a new dataset of 143 such settlements. This aggregate approach provides valuable information that can be used to set enforcement priorities, select a substantive liability standard, and identify the proper decisionmaker.

People pay their taxes for many different reasons. Some choose to game the system, paying only when the cost of noncompliance outweighs its benefits. Others comply out of habit, a sense of duty or reciprocity, a desire to avoid feelings of guilt or shame, and for many other reasons. Our tax enforcement system has ignored this variety of taxpaying motivations for decades. It continues to rely primarily on audits and penalties, at least where information reporting and withholding are impossible. Fines and audits deter those rationally playing the tax compliance game, but are wasteful or even counterproductive when applied to others. The shortcomings of the current one-size-fits-all approach to tax enforcement are well understood. They also appear to be insurmountable. This Article argues that it is possible to design a more tailored regime. The idea is to separate taxpayers based on their taxpaying motivations by creating two different enforcement regimes and inducing taxpayers to choose one when they file their annual returns.

Because tort law and healthcare regulation are traditional state functions and because medical, legal, and insurance practices are localized, legal scholars have long believed that medical malpractice falls within the states’ exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty. This conventional view fails to consider the impact that federal healthcare programs have on the states’ incentives to regulate. As a result of federal financing, each state externalizes some of the costs of its malpractice policy onto the federal government. The federal government therefore needs to take charge of medical malpractice in order to fix the spillover problem created by existing federal healthcare programs. The federal government’s prior interventions in healthcare spending have snowballed into a need for federalization of medical malpractice.

This Note addresses a circuit split concerning retaliatory arrest claims. In most circuits, a defendant police officer cannot be held liable for retaliatory arrest if the arrest was made with probable cause. This Note argues that courts should follow Hartman and require a plaintiff to prove the absence of probable cause only in a subset of retaliatory arrest cases: cases involving complex causation and cases where the officer had probable cause to believe that the plaintiff had committed a felony offense. In all other retaliatory arrest cases, courts should follow Mt. Healthy and permit plaintiffs to bring suit even if the officer had probable cause. This nuanced approach strikes the appropriate balance between free speech rights and the needs of law enforcement.

This Note defends the majority’s standing analysis in Massachusetts v. EPA as a matter of both jurisprudence and public policy. First, this Note recounts the Court’s state standing cases, tracing the development of the parens patriae doctrine that permits states to litigate in defense of interests related to their status as sovereigns. Massachusetts sits at the intersection of this jurisprudence and the Court’s recent debate over the purposes of standing. Massachusetts built upon cases that held the assurance of concrete adversarialism—rather than upholding the separation of powers—as the primary purpose of standing. Understanding parens patriae as separate from the traditional constitutional standing inquiry necessitates the development of a rationale justifying different standards for state plaintiffs. This Note seeks to do that by providing a unifying principle for state standing drawn from economics.