Giving Precise Content to the Eighth Amendment: An Assessment of the Remedial Provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act

Congress passed the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA) in response to a deluge of inmate litigation and judicial micromanagement of penal institutions. Among other things, the Act limited injunctive relief in prison conditions cases to the minimum required by federal law. This change set Eighth Amendment cases apart from other constitutional violations by imposing special restrictions on equitable remedies. This Note argues against hemming in courts’ ability to correct Eighth Amendment violations. Drawing on the work of Professor Jeremy Waldron, this Note points out that the Eighth Amendment shares with laws against torture a respect for human dignity that distinguishes legal from other types of force. That commitment renders the Eighth Amendment (like torture bans) ill-suited to a “speed limit” model of enforcement—with the “cruel and unusual punishment” norm treated as an envelope that may be pushed or even marginally exceeded. Yet the PLRA, this Note argues, creates such a paradigm by inhibiting the type of remedy needed to address the systemic failures that often underlie Eighth Amendment violations. This Note therefore joins the American Bar Association, former Third Circuit Chief Judge John J. Gibbons, and former U.S. Attorney General Nicholas de B. Katzenbach in supporting repeal of the PLRA’s remedial restrictions. Alternatively, this Note proposes that Congress reword certain provisions, or, failing that, that courts read the statute in a manner embraced by the Ninth Circuit but rejected by other courts of appeals—as placing the burden of proof on defendants moving to terminate judicial supervision of prisons.